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Abstract 
 
In the spirit of comparative political theory, this thesis analyzes the ideas that have 
shaped Western and Islamic constitutional discourse and assesses the extent to which 
they intersect at key historical and philosophical points. This goal is placed within a 
larger debate of whether Islam and constitutionalism are mutually exclusive.  
 
The thesis begins by positioning itself against Samuel Huntington and Elie Kedourie, 
who argues that Islam is inherently incompatible with constitutional governance. It 
then addresses the idea of constitutionalism as described by Western thinkers on three 
constitutional concepts: the rule of law, reflection of national character, and placing 
boundaries on government power. These are examined through the lens of a particular 
canonical text or thinker, Cicero, Montesquieu, and The Federalist Papers, 
respectively. This is followed by an examination of Muhammad’s “The Constitution 
of Medina.” Islamic corollaries to the constitutional ideas discussed earlier are then 
examined. Al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State, ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya (group feeling) 
in the Muqaddimah, and the redefinition of the state in the 19
th
 century Ottoman 
Tanzimat reforms  are discussed. Following this, the thesis looks at a moment in 
history where these two traditions intersected in 19
th
 century Tunisia in the work of 
Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, undertaking a detailed analysis of the introductory section of 
his book The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries.  
 
The abstract philosophical questions that motivated this inquiry suddenly have 
unquestioned practical implications. In recognition of this, the conclusion of the thesis 
summarizes the findings of this work to look at how theorists might address the 
pressing constitutional concerns of various states and peoples.  
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I. Introduction: Constitutional Conversations- Alternative 
models for the challenge of civilizational conflict
1
 
 
A word said but not heard does not make language. Therefore, realization is made 
through dialogue… The general commonalities that languages share, both in terms of 
wisdom and numerous similar functions stem from the common humanistic nature of 
humans. Their differences, however, stem from their historical, geographical and 
civilizational differences as well as due to their different social and cultural experiences. 
And since we grow inside cultural and lingual surroundings, rather than outside them, 
recognition of this point, that the cultural and lingual surroundings of fellow nations 
originally differ from our history, culture and language is extremely difficult. 
Nonetheless we may accept these differences, interpreting them in the context of cultural 
and religious pluralism. 
 
- Mohammad Khatami, “The Theoretical Foundations of the Dialogue of Civilizations”2 
 
The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other 
civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China… The survival of the West depends 
upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their 
civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against 
challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization 
depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational 
character of global politics. 
 
- Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
3
 
 
 
… dialogue means exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self… it signals an 
alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation… 
it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself,’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative 
learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated. 
 
- Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism
4
 
 
 
As the above words of former Iranian President Khatami’s words illustrate, a great 
deal of debate and controversy has been generated by the idea of a “clash of 
civilizations” between the Western and Islamic worlds.5 The outcome of this debate, 
                                                          
1
 Referencing throughout will conform as closely as possible to the Chicago 15
th
 a-style guide. 
 
2
 University of St Andrews International Lecture, speech delivered 31 October, 2006. 
 
3
 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996. pp. 20-21. 
 
4
 Dallmayr, Fred R. Beyond Orientalism : Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996. p. xviii. 
 
5
 Throughout the thesis, the phrase ‘Islamic’ signifies ideas, history, and thinkers which come from a 
context in which the majority of the population is Muslim. Although Muslim may be more accurate in 
some senses, Islamic is used both as a matter of common practice and in an effort to isolate the political 
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in real terms, is one which has taken on a particular urgency as it appears that a 
significant number of Muslim citizens may soon have the opportunity to form truly 
representative forms of government, which may or may not be amenable to Western 
aims and norms depending upon whom one believes. A casual reading of Samuel 
Huntington and Fred Dallmayr’s work could easily lead one to conclude that they 
approach the question of civilizational conflict from diametrically opposed positions. 
As the above quotes reveal however, even thinkers from opposing camps in the “clash 
of civilizations” debate may have important commonalities. In this case, it quickly 
becomes clear that both writers are advocating the continuation of disparate traditions 
rather than the triumph of any one mode of civilization. Huntington’s prescription of 
relying upon “world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the 
multicivilizational character of global politics,” is not altogether different from 
Dallmayr’s contention that dialogue is “an alternative both to imperialist absorption or 
domination and to pliant self-annihilation.” In other words, the clash of intellectuals 
can be easily overstated and used to purposes opposite of those intended by their 
authors.  
 
It is fair though, to note that the crucial difference between these two points of view is 
as, or perhaps even more, important than their shared advocacy of civilizational 
pluralism. Huntington approaches these entities as unique, opposite, potentially 
conflictual, and in discrete categories of “I” and “other.” His concern is couched in 
warlike, existential terms like “survival of the West” and “global war of civilization.”  
This could be considered scholarship via hyperbole. It also poorly reflects the fact that 
Islam is very much a part of Western civilization. Aside from millions of Muslims 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and cultural from the religious. In this sense, even a Jewish writer like Maimonides could be said to an 
Islamic thinker, though he was not a Muslim. Thus, the term should not be interpreted as granting any 
sort of religious legitimacy or Quranic imprimatur. 
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living in Western states, the influence of Muslim scholars upon Western philosophy 
and political thought has been substantial since at least the time of Thomas Aquinas 
(who borrowed liberally from al-Farabi), even when this influence has not been 
readily acknowledged. Thus the primary problem with Huntington’s thesis is that it is 
based on false premises of discrete civilizations and concludes with a false choice 
between civilizational war and civilizational détente achieved through Western 
assertions of its distinct and irreconcilably different civilizational character.  
 
On the other hand, Dallmayr’s approach is one in which the bounds of the 
civilizations themselves are not taken for granted as having any real and clear 
definition, but rather they are evolving entities which, much like individuals in 
relationships, “risk themselves” in the process of interacting openly in the 
“transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are constantly 
renegotiated.” This is far more reflective of the overlapping and evolving relationship 
between the categories of Christendom, or the West, and the “Muslim world,” since 
they collided so violently in the Crusades. If any historical time period would validate 
Huntington’s thesis it would be this particularly bloody era with its cycle of 
religiously-inspired conquest and bloodshed, yet the Crusades concluded with a 
wholesale infusion of ideas, products, and cultural influences from the Middle East 
into Europe. Far from losing its civilization, Western culture thrived under this new 
infusion of ideas and the dynamism they helped to unleash laid the groundwork for 
what would come to be considered Europe’s Renaissance. This is exactly the type of 
process Dallmayr describes in his theories of comparative politics. Indeed, it is fair to 
ask if this is the result of the Crusades, which occurred in an age of far less 
communication technology and cultural mobility, how much more likely is it that the 
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present challenges posed by conflicting philosophies (the West and Islam cannot be 
assumed to be in conflict when they are sometimes united in individual people and 
ideas) will result in an even greater level of accommodation and understanding, and 
possibly even genuine and popularly accepted cultural pluralism. 
I.i Research Questions, Methodology and Central Hypothesis 
 
 
It is this effort to examine pre-defined boundaries, reassess them, and to create a 
discursive space between and beyond these boundaries which this thesis seeks to 
undertake. Since so much of the discussion about the relationship between the West 
and Islam operates in an atmosphere of assumptions about the respective values, goals 
and governmental models they embody, the subject of the following examination can 
be broadly defined as constitutionalism, and more narrowly as the narratives of 
constitutional ideas and values as they’ve developed across various times and places 
in both Western and Islamic contexts.
6
 This is done with a view to demonstrate both 
the commonalities and distinctive elements that these philosophies of government 
have with the further aim of being able to elucidate potential avenues for how they 
may evolve, overlap, coexist and blend in the future. No claims are made that the 
accounts of constitutionalism given are exhaustive or representative of the whole 
breadth of their respective traditions. Indeed, each of the traditions could easily form 
the subjects of multiple books, so the account here is one which is intentionally 
simplified into these core constitutional concepts in order to provide a starting point 
for a comparative analysis based upon an exegesis of key texts.  
 
                                                          
6
 Western and Islamic are terms used primarily for simplicity and readability. They are not meant to 
signify exclusive or essentialist typologies. 
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I.ii. Research Questions 
 
The key questions can thus be summarized as follows: 
1. What is constitutionalism and why does it matter? What are its most basic and 
fundamental components? 
2. Are the aims and characteristics of constitutionalism essentially different in 
different cultural contexts, or are there relatively universal aspirations and 
qualities that it lays claim to? 
3. Specifically, are Western and Islamic notions of the state and 
constitutionalism in any way compatible or similar? 
4. What can actual constitutional texts from each tradition contribute to a larger 
understanding of the constitutional concepts of rule of law, government that is 
reflective of those it governs, and limited government? 
5. Based on both historical and philosophical grounds, are Western and Islamic 
political and constitutional values bound for a civilizational clash? If not, have 
the boundaries of these two discourses been previously misunderstood? Did 
such boundaries ever truly exist? How can these traditions and their mutual 
understandings of one another be renegotiated fruitfully in light of the 
demands of international law and universal humanitarian demands? 
 
I.iii. Methodology 
 
Generally speaking, the project of comparative political theory introduces non-Western 
perspectives into familiar debates about the problems of living together, thus ensuring 
that "political theory" is about human and not merely Western dilemmas.7 This presumes 
an understanding of political theory as defined by certain questions rather than particular 
answers. As Salkever and Nylan (1991, 1994) argue, emphasizing shared dilemmas and 
questions rather than universal answers enables the project of comparative political 
philosophy to avoid the conclusion that cultures are morally and cognitively 
incommensurable without imposing supposedly universal categories and moral rules. 
Additionally, I want to suggest that recognizing the possibility of and conditions for 
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conversations between and among thinkers across cultures is transformative, opening 
theoretical discourse to admit of parallels and comparisons that narrower conceptions of 
political theory occlude.
7
 
 
 
The methodology used in the various textual analyses in this thesis is largely 
inspired by the hermeneutical approach to comparative political theory used by 
thinkers like Roxanne Euben, who is quoted above, and other contemporaries 
like Andrew March, Jürgen Gebhardt, and Kimberly Hutchings. Euben’s claim 
that comparative theory is “about human and not merely Western dilemmas,” is 
one which was decisive in focusing on constitutionalism as a discourse of social 
goods and values rather than as various institutional arrangements for governing 
a people.  
 
It seems likely that focusing on institutional differences can obscure as much as it 
illuminates the underlying visions of social good and the role of government that 
actually animate a given state. Britain and the United States, for instance, have 
radically different styles in political campaigning (party-driven vs. personality-
driven), equally divergent methods for the creation and execution of law 
(parliamentary vs. presidential), and even quite different methods for restraining law-
making powers (there is no real equivalent of Marbury vs. Madison in British 
jurisprudence). However, these real and important institutional differences do not alter 
the fact that both systems rest on a political and legal tradition that is inherently 
rationalist, liberal, and constitutional. The illustrative power of the different 
evolutionary arcs of British and American constitutional arrangements actually lies in 
its vivid demonstration of how groups with strikingly similar values and even origins 
                                                          
7
 Euben, Roxanne L. "Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of 
Rationalism." The Journal of Politics 59, no. 1 (1997): 32. 
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(after all the United States was once part of the British Empire and its laws reflect a 
great deal of reliance and respect for British jurisprudence) can nonetheless pursue a 
wide variety of institutional arrangements in pursuing the societal values they most 
wish to prioritize. If this is true for the United Kingdom and the United States, there is 
no reason to assume the same may not be true of majority-Muslim states. Whilst most 
of them may claim a constitutional basis in Islam and the sharīʿa, their interpretations 
of what this means in both theory and practice vary widely depending upon cultural, 
historical, social, economic and other factors traditionally considered in political 
study.  
 
“Constantly changing and in the throes of novelty, such a dynamic universe may 
never be completely transparent or fully grasped by traditional conceptual 
categories.”8 This statement from Dallmayr’s Integral Pluralism could easily be 
applied to the ever-evolving concepts of constitutionalism. Its preoccupation 
with society and its organization into political units means that the avenues for 
its expression are potentially as numerous as the human race. Contrary to the 
assertions of Elie Kedourie or Steven Emerson, the application of Islam in the 
political process is not bound to any particular fate and there is perhaps less 
separating the fundamental assumptions of Western and Islamic constitutional 
narratives than is usually suggested. Rather, as Mark Tessler contends, “The 
influence of the religion thus depends to a very considerable extent on how and 
by whom it is interpreted. There is no single or accepted interpretation on many 
issues, nor even a consensus on who speaks for Islam.”9 
                                                          
8
 Dallmayr, Fred R. Integral Pluralism : Beyond Culture Wars. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010. p. 3. 
 
9
 Tessler, Mark. "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on 
Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries." Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (2002): p. 340. 
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The methodology Dallmayr proposes is one which this work aspires to emulate, 
recognizing that its call to avoid representing people in monolithic categories and to 
maintain a type of Kantian notion of people as ends unto themselves is far more 
difficult to achieve than it may at first appear. Although a great deal can be written 
about his framework for comparative political theorizing, it suffices for the purposes 
of this review to address his conclusion in his book Border Crossings: Toward a 
Comparative Political Theory. In it he writes the following: 
In the context of postmodernity, globalization (or the globalization of truth) acquires and 
distills a radically new meaning: it is wary of “ethnocentric chauvinism” on the one hand 
and “faceless universalism” on the other… It cannot be mistaken for and confused with 
ethnocentric identification or essentializing totalization. Rather, it subverts and 
transgresses the Eurocentric enframing (Heidegger’s Gestell) of truth… it is the result of 
a cross-cultural intertwinement or chiasm in which one culture can no longer be the 
“negative mirror” of another… (Harmonization) itself- like making music together- is not 
inimical to difference; it is rather the play of difference(s), of heterogeneity, not of 
homogeneity. It accentuates the eccentricity of difference. Cosmopolitanism is not the 
question of merely discovering a Plato, an Aristotle, a Machiavelli, a Descartes, a Kant, 
or a Hegel in the non-Western world but also of finding a Confucius, a Mencius, a 
Nishida, a Watsuji, a Hu, a Tagore, or a Radhakrishnan in the West.
10
 
 
 
A few elements of this paragraph are worth highlighting. Firstly, this thesis is 
addressing concerns about the compatibility of ideas in a cross-cultural globalized 
context that have been presented in an alarmist and problematized fashion by thinkers 
like Kedourie, Huntington, Emerson and others. As such, Dallmayr’s use of 
globalization as a positive force that mediates between ethnocentrism and 
universalism is one which is highly attractive for its recognition that not all 
consequences of globalization are necessarily negative. Additionally, since there is no 
sign of globalization reversing or even slowing, it behooves political thinkers and 
people generally to find ways to cope with its various socio-cultural effects.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
10
 Dallmayr, Fred R. Border Crossings : Toward a Comparative Political Theory, Global Encounters. 
Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999. p. 288. 
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Specifically, the rejection of framing and categorizing that has characterized Western 
thought since at least the Enlightenment, and brought to its culmination in scientific 
schemes of evolutionary trees and classification of individuals into genus, species, 
etc., is one which can allow analyses to go beyond their pre-defined disciplinary 
boxes and potentially to more accurately and effectively deal with the interdependent, 
multi-polar and global political and cultural context that characterizes the present. By 
recognizing similarity and difference simultaneously, and by acknowledging their 
contingency, it is possible to have difference without conflict. It is his admonition to 
find the Western cognates of non-Western thinkers in addition to finding resonances 
of Western thought in Islamic contexts, which this work seeks to follow by analyzing 
key texts not only in civilizational/cultural/religious terms, but also simply on their 
own merits as representations of constitutional themes which seem to persist across 
eras and civilizations.  
 
It is hoped the reader will appreciate al-Farabi, not only as a Muslim neo-Platonist, 
but as an original and formidable philosopher in his own right. Likewise, though both 
Montesquieu and Ibn Khaldun write about the nature of societies, Ibn Khaldun is not 
being presented as the Muslim Montesquieu, but rather as a thinker who can be 
considered the global “Father of Sociology” and whose novel approach and vast scope 
of study on the rise and fall of society is without precedent. Finally, it may be noted 
that both Dallmayr and I have still been forced to resort to terms like “Western” and 
“non-Western” or “Islamic.” In some senses it is unfortunate that these labels are so 
pervasive. On the other hand, if one recognizes that these too are subject to change 
and negotiation, and even combination, then they can be used to make one’s case 
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more readily understood while avoiding the most pernicious types of essentializing 
and stereotyping. 
 
In some respects, this thesis is also an attempt to engage in the type of comparative 
political theory articulated in Andrew March’s “What is Comparative Political 
Theory?” In this critique he notes that beyond the simple goal of expanding scope of 
the canon of theorists beyond the West, the “justifications are often more ambitious 
and tend to coalesce around the following five themes: the epistemic, global-
democratic, critical-transformative, explanatory-interpretative, and the 
rehabilitative.”11 Each of these goals is potentially admirable, but as March notes, 
there is the question of whether they are properly part of the scholarly enterprise. One 
cannot be engaged in scholarship if there is a presumption of validity or inherent 
worth in a given work simply by virtue of the fact it is derived from a non-Western or 
third world source.
12
 He argues that the “strongest warrant for a comparative political 
theory is that there are normative contestations of proposals for terms of social 
cooperation affecting adherents of the doctrines and traditions that constitute those 
contestations.”13 Elsewhere he states that these should be semi-autonomous traditions 
and that in particular, “religious thought helps us set boundaries (however porous) 
between traditions of thought, (and) it does so without leading to the problem 
(discussed above) of patronizing non-Western thinkers by treating them as important 
or interesting merely because of their cultural identity or because of the fact that they 
                                                          
11
 March, Andrew F. "What Is Comparative Political Theory?" The Review of Politics 71, no. 04 
(2009): 538. 
 
12
 Ibid., pp. 564-65. 
 
13
 Ibid., pg. 565. 
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were once colonized by Europeans.”14 This is not a perfect delineation by any means. 
As Kimberly Hutchings comments, comparative theory and insights for International 
Relations will not stem “from a dialogue between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ 
constructed on either Socratic or Habermasian terms, but from conversations between 
multiple, fractured self-identities, which acknowledge the imperfect and provisional 
nature of the insights that they generate.”15 
 
In an effort to avoid some of the essentializing that can occur when analyzing a 
culture other than one’s own, this thesis will bring together an analysis of both 
Western and Islamic traditions in a way that illustrates common roots and applications 
of their respective political theories in addition to pointing out their distinctive 
characteristics. It also attempts to assess the application of these ideas in terms 
derived from native thought. Thus, the discussion of the role of national character in 
Islam for example, will be conducted using ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiyya, or 
group feeling, rather than Montesquieu’s “spirit of the law.” Likewise, each text will 
be approached with an assumption of validity, even if it did not necessarily make 
much practical impact at the time of its writing.
16
 This simply recognizes that fact that 
political actors draw inspiration for their political movements and reforms from all 
manner of religious, philosophical, and historical repositories and that any of them 
can become relevant when made so by another thinker who uses them. Although it is 
unfortunate that I do not have the language skills to look at each text in its original 
                                                          
14
 Ibid., pg. 552.  
 
15
 Hutchings, Kimberly. "Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/ Non-West Distinction in 
Promoting Global Dialogue in Ir." Millennium - Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): pg. 
647. 
 
16
 This specifically applies in the case of al-Farabi. Given his historical context, it is likely he was very 
careful in his choice of words and may have self-censored. As such, Leo Strauss’ approach of looking 
for hidden meaning in the text may lead to a fuller understanding of the text. 
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language, I have consulted the best-regarded English translations available and have 
further consulted secondary materials where there is disagreement on the proper 
translation or interpretation of a given work. To a degree, this is reflective of the way 
these texts are approached by those who would wish to actually use them politically 
rather than simply analyze them in a purely academic form. Additionally, with the 
exception of al-Farabi and ibn Khaldun, all of the key writers who feature in this 
thesis originally wrote in a European language, including Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, 
whose work serves as a very early exemplar for the type of constitutional discourse 
advocated by Dallmayr, and who wrote and published in both French and Arabic.  
I.iv. Working definition of Constitutionalism and limitations of this 
enquiry 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, constitutionalism will be defined as a mode of 
governance which is defined by adherence to a written or generally agreed body of 
law, equally applied to all adult members of society. Furthermore, it reflects the 
cultural values and civilizational goals of its citizens, establishing both the boundaries 
of the state’s role in society as well as the scope of the various institutional organs of 
the state. This view of constitutionalism is one which is located within the classical 
tradition of viewing the constitution as an organic political/institutional representation 
of a society and with the more modern approach which looks at constitutions as legal 
documents which codify the architecture and operation of the state.
17
  
 
                                                          
17
 This definition is developed further throughout the thesis and is directly influenced by the work of 
C.H. McIlwain and Adbullahi An-Na‘im. It is also informed by Nathan Brown’s contention that 
whereas constitutions, as simple “legal frameworks for governing” can be non-liberal and not provide 
guarantees of personal rights, constitutionalism is necessarily concerned with the ideological and 
institutional “arrangements that promote the limitation and definition of means of exercising state 
authority.” See Brown, Nathan J. Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the 
Prospects for Accountable Government, SUNY Series in Middle Eastern Studies. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2002. p. 8. 
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The subject of constitutionalism can be broken down into a wide variety of 
approaches. Due to its focus on limiting government power, discussions of 
constitutionalism are often tightly focused on the language or rights and duties, with 
an emphasis on rights, in accordance with certain pre-established liberal guarantees of 
personal rights. Institutional examinations tend to examine constitutional regimes in 
terms of the three established branches of government: executive, legislative, and 
judicial (or monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy in classical terms). Case-based 
approaches look at the extent to which constitutional regimes adhere to various liberal 
values and how relevant constitutions are, or are not, to the day to day political 
process and state function. In Middle Eastern and Islamic cases, there is widespread 
agreement that a state’s written constitution is often little more than a formality and is 
not applicable to an analysis of the actual structures or power in the state.
18
  
 
In order to compare constitutional narratives between Western and Islamic thinkers 
and historical contexts, it is necessary to focus on the ideas that inform the 
institutional arrangements of the state rather than on the organs of the states 
themselves, as these are often highly conditioned by custom and historical practice. 
As the following chapters will demonstrate, there are concerns and issues which seem 
to transcend historical and civilizational divides and which would be generally seen as 
central to constitutionalism and/or governance by both traditions. Although there are 
more topics which could be found in common, this thesis will examine in particular 
how Western and Islamic thinkers have conceived and applied the principals of the 
                                                          
18
 See, for example, Owen, Roger. State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 
2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge, 2000. p. 27-28. Owen discusses “a huge expansion in the 
power and pervasiveness of the state” in the “post-independence Middle East,” but his explanation of 
this expansion never mentions either constitutions or constitutionalism. Rather, the discussion is 
couched in terms of power, security, and pan-Arab nationalism. 
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rule of law, the reflection of national
19
 character in the state, and the limitation and 
definition of state power. This is what might be termed a “thin” definition of 
constitutionalism, which is necessary for the purposes of balancing the universal and 
local elements that are always part of a comparative endeavor.  
I.v. Organization of the Work 
 
The overall plan of the work then, proceeds in the following manner: 
The remainder of the Introduction identifies the central hypotheses of the thesis and 
then provides an overview of some of the literature in the relevant sub-fields of 
Comparative Politics, Constitutionalism, and Islamic Constitutionalism. The 
Introduction further defines what is meant by constitutionalism for the purposes of 
this work. This is done by examining the debates between Western scholars about 
both the derivation of the term constitution and the way it has come to be used in 
Western parlance. C.H. McIlwain and Hans Kelsen are also consulted for their 
invaluable contributions to the practical implications of constitutionalism as a mode 
of government and legality. Finally, it looks at the context of constitutional dialogue 
concerning Western and Islamic norms. Specifically, it outlines and refutes the 
contentions of Orientalists like Elie Kedourie, whose work denies the possibility of a 
genuinely Islamic constitutionalism.  
 
From this perspective, Chapter 1 then examines the more specific constitutional 
concepts of the rule of law, national character, and limiting government power. This is 
done through exegesis of Cicero’s Republic, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, 
and The Federalist Papers, respectively.  Other relevant secondary literature is 
                                                          
19
 This term is used for the purposes of simplification. More accurately, it could be said to represent the 
characteristics of the people living within a state’s territorial boundaries or otherwise under its 
sovereignty. 
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consulted throughout to illustrate how these works can further understanding of the 
core constitutional values, rather than particular state structures, that lay the 
foundation of Western constitutionalism. 
 
The second chapter provides a transition into a focus on Muslim constitutional values. 
As the best place to start is often at the beginning, this chapter analyzes what has 
come to be called “The Constitution of Medina,” which despite not being a 
constitution in the modern sense, is nonetheless an example of an explicit social 
contract, and one which was overseen by none other than Muhammad himself. It also 
includes a brief look at the work of modern thinkers like Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, whose 
work advocates an open approach to the question of how Muslims should govern 
themselves. This approach and even counter-arguments that propose certain terms like 
shura, ijma, and others can be seen as constitutional and in accordance with the 
Qurʾan, both highlight the importance that texts like the Medina document could have 
in majority-Muslim states that nonetheless need to make allowances for minority 
populations and basic pluralist values in accordance with their commitments in 
various international treaties and organizations.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at Islamic versions of the rule of law through the philosophical lens 
of al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State and the juristic notions of this same concept in the 
work of Mawardi. This provides a crucial link to the development of Western 
constitutionalism as it was influenced by the re-introduction of philosophy via the 
Muslim world and the reconquista of Andalusia. Furthermore the writings of 
Mawardi, the “father of Muslim realpolitik”20 provide potential insight into how one 
                                                          
20
 As he is called by Dr. Colin Turner. 
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can elaborate the role of the rule of law within an actual legal and international 
framework. 
 
The fourth chapter examines the concept of national character through the vehicle of 
Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya, or group feeling, as related in his famous Muqaddimah. In 
particular it assesses how his term could be used to promote constitutionalism in both 
a macro sense of uniting all Muslims under a banner of shared faith and religious 
identity and in a more local manner that would be something akin to nationalism. It 
will be shown that despite, or perhaps because of, the volatility of asabiyya it can 
offer key insight into constitutional notions of the evolution and decay of nations and 
societies and their essential character. 
 
Chapter 5 examines a period of time when the changing nature of international 
relations between the Ottoman Empire and various European imperial powers forced 
what could be termed a pre-colonial clash of civilizations. As would be expected, this 
19
th
 century clash sparked a whole range of anxieties and questions and efforts at 
reform on the part of those whose states were under an increasing threat of colonial 
subjugation. In particular, the official Ottoman reforms called the Tanzimat will be 
analyzed to understand how they sought to create stronger and more legitimate 
government by fundamentally re-defining and limiting its role. Additionally, it will 
briefly examine the works of Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida alongside 
the broader Young Ottoman movement and the Ottoman constitution of 1876, in order 
to establish the relevance of these reforms to  the wider context of these first modern 
Islamic constitutional reform movements. 
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Chapter 6 looks at one instance in which the dialogue of these two traditions did in 
fact overlap in significant ways and led to new interpretations and fusions of both 
Western and Islamic concepts in the work of Tunisia’s Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi. After 
detailing the contemporary historical and political scene, along with his personal 
biography, it undertakes a sustained exegetical analysis of his book The Surest Path to 
Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries. This book, written by the man 
who helped to write and enact the Arab world’s, indeed one of the entire world’s first 
written constitutions, the Tunisian Constitution of 1861, describes a brief but 
comprehensive and coherent political philosophy that seeks to negotiate a path 
between Western and Islamic traditions, subverting some and creating new 
combinations of others, in order to both assert autonomy and to participate more fully 
in the globalizing industrial age in which it was written. 
 
The concluding chapter analyzes the overall presentation of the thesis to posit 
potential answers and avenues for further research into the central concern of whether 
the “West and Islam” are bound at some philosophical level to undergo the 
civilizational clash that has been predicted for them. It also assesses whether or not 
both the commonalities and distinctive elements that these constitutional traditions 
contain can peacefully co-exist in spheres that may at times align, at times overlap, 
and at other times conflict with one another. 
I.vi. Central Hypotheses 
 
The central hypotheses of this thesis can thus be summarized as: 
 
1. The study of constitutionalism is one which can and should be taken in its own 
right, and as distinct from the study of democratization or political development. 
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2. The most basic and universal qualities of constitutionalism are the equal application 
of law to all citizens of a given state or regime, the reflection of the collective identity 
and aspirations of the governed by those who would govern them, and the delineation 
of specific and enforceable limits on the scope and power of the regime or state. 
 
3. The narratives of Western and Islamic constitutionalism, such as they have been 
defined to date, evidence a significant and sustained overlap in their discussion of 
these concepts, albeit with a high degree of internal and external uniqueness 
depending upon the time and place in which they were discussed.  
 
4. The political thought of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi as represented in his work The 
Surest Path represents an intriguing and instructive example of how these narratives 
can fruitfully combine. Furthermore, his role in drafting and implementing the first 
written constitution of any majority Muslim state and his later service as Grand Vizier 
of the Ottoman Empire secure his status as a statesman of note and as a rare example 
of a political actor who is also an important political thinker.
21
  
 
5. The ideological boundaries which are presumed to define Western and Islamic 
constitutional discourses are at the very least constantly shifting, and are very possibly 
so intertwined and fluid as to make sharp distinction between them essentially 
meaningless, unless in a historical sense. 
 
                                                          
21
 His ongoing legacy can be found in the immediate period after his death as seen in his influence on 
the Young Ottomans and early Tunisian reformists, but has continued through to the present as shown 
by the continual significance of the term dastour (constitution) in Tunisian political discourse.  
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6. New methods of analyzing and discussing constitutional values must be developed 
that can cope with the global demands of the state in terms of human rights, rule of 
law, respect and representation of the populace of a given territory, and defining what 
is and what is not the business of the state in addition to being able to recognize and 
respect these same concepts as they are understood locally.
22
 
I.vii. Literature Review 
 
In the case of the present work there is very little literature that fits within the 
discourse of Comparative Constitutionalism from Western and Islamic Political 
Theoretical Perspectives. A recent undertaking can be found in Antony Black’s The 
West and Islam (2008). The stated argument of this particular work is that  
up to c.1050 Christian Europe, Islam, and the Byzantine world had more in common than is usually 
thought; and, secondly, that what decisively differentiated them was the papal revolution of the late 
eleventh century followed by Europe's twelfth-century renaissance… it goes without saying that in 
1450 western political theory as we know it today had barely got off the ground. Since then, western 
political thought has become more and more different from anything that had gone before, either in its 
own past or in other cultures. Islamic political thought remained almost completely fixed. The West 
and Islam simply became more and more different, and that is about all there is to say by way of 
comparison after the fifteenth century.
23
 
 
This dissertation however, addresses fundamentally different concerns and comes to 
equally different conclusions, although perhaps with a degree of similar motivation in 
seeking to understand “in which respects ideas put forward in one culture differed 
from, or were similar to, those put forward in another.”24 Any comparative work 
likely has such an aim. Rather than focusing on political thought generally however, 
                                                          
22
 This is not to undermine the importance of religion within a given society, but rather to highlight that 
its importance is one of political motivation and mobilization rather than one of the basic constitution 
and institutional operation of the state itself. For a fuller discussion of this distinction see Na'im, 
Abdullahi Ahmad. Islam and the Secular State : Negotiating the Future of Sharīʿa. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2008. 
 
23
 Black, Antony. The West and Islam : Religion and Political Thought in World History. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 1-4. 
 
24
 Ibid. p. 5. 
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and rather than primarily assessing that thought during a fixed period of time that ends 
with a proposed fundamental divergence, this thesis looks specifically at foundational 
constitutional values as they are and have been enumerated in Western and Islamic 
contexts. Furthermore, it ultimately interrogates the very categories of “Western” and 
“Islamic” and questions their continued usefulness in light of the relentless growth of 
globalization and particularly in light of the ubiquity of the modern state and 
adherence, at least in the sense of being treaty signatories, to various human rights and 
international legal conventions.
25
 It may even be, that upon closer examination, the 
constant intercourse of European (and later North American) ideas and people with 
those of the majority Muslim regimes stretching from North Africa to Southeast Asia 
will be so sustained, substantial, and significant that the categories of Western and 
Islamic will be shown to be contrivances meant to reinforce a sense of otherness that 
may not be entirely justified by philosophical and historical analysis.  
 
Having addressed the aforementioned comparative study of Western and Islamic 
political thought, this review of relevant literature will address the key components of 
the thesis. The first of these is comparative political theory. The second is 
constitutionalism as an object of study separate from discourses on political theory 
and particularly as distinct from democratization. Finally, the third area of relevant 
literature looks at some of the work being done on the specific subject of Islamic 
political thought.  
                                                          
25
 In the sense in which it is being used here, globalization, or the process by which ideas, people and 
goods are exchanged between and amongst cultures in a way that gradually and mutually changes these 
cultures has been ongoing since the earliest days of human navigation. Indeed, it is difficult to find a 
single historical period in which there were not some forms of significant contact between Christendom 
and the House of Islam.  
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I.viii. On Comparative Political Theory, Constitutionalism, and Islamic 
Political Thought 
 
As discussed above, the relatively new field of comparative political theory is one 
which is still struggling to differentiate itself from other subfields of comparative 
politics, area studies, and political though. Excellent examples of the quest to properly 
define this field include Andrew March’s “What is Comparative Political Theory?”26 
and Roxanne Euben’s more specific articles on comparing Western and Islamic 
political theory.
27
 Equally important is Kimberley Hutchings admonition that 
comparativists recall that their work contains insights from people whose identities 
cannot simply be amalgamated under simplistic labels and which are highly 
contingent and fractured. Thus, the insights gleaned from comparative work must be 
treated with a healthy dose of humility and appreciated for their contingency.
28
 Jürgen 
Gebhardt’s “Political Thought in an Intercivilizational Perspective,” is also highly 
instructive in its proposition that comparative political theorizing is properly and 
meaningfully located in “the common ground of the intercivilizational modality of 
human existence in history and society” because it “intends to bring to our attention 
the essence of the political in all of its historical modalities.”29 There are several more 
comparative thinkers treated throughout this work, and many more like Charles 
                                                          
26
 March, Andrew F. "What Is Comparative Political Theory?" The Review of Politics 71, no. 04 
(2009): 531-65. 
 
27
 See Euben, Roxanne L. "Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of 
Rationalism." The Journal of Politics 59, no. 1 (1997): 28-55 and Euben, Roxanne L. "Contingent 
Borders, Syncretic Perspectives: Globalization, Political Theory, and Islamizing Knowledge." 
International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 23-48. 
 
28
 Hutchings, Kimberly. "Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/ Non-West Distinction in 
Promoting Global Dialogue in Ir." Millennium - Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 639-
47. 
 
29
 Gebhardt, Jürgen. "Political Thought in an Intercivilizational Perspective: A Critical Reflection." The 
Review of Politics 70, no. 01 (2008): 5. 
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Taylor who are incredibly significant to this sub-field, but these and Fred Dallmayr 
are by far the most influential on this text.  
 
In terms of literature on constitutionalism as a broad subject of enquiry, the array of 
writers and various related subjects is truly vast. The primary limitation of most of 
this literature, at least until recently, is that despite many of its universal claims, it is 
predominantly and overwhelmingly Western in orientation. In terms of this traditional 
approach to constitutionalism, Charles McIlwain’s Constitutionalism, Ancient and 
Modern is absolutely essential reading and will be discussed in much greater detail 
later in this thesis. It established many of the methodologies and discourses 
surrounding constitutionalism and also helped to solidify the Western political canon 
while simultaneously developing a canon of literature specific to constitutional 
thought. Furthermore, it presents a cogent defense of the constitution as a natural 
growth of a given society, and as such, provides an implicit defense of the natural law 
school of constitutional thought. This is in stark contrast to the work of Hans Kelsen, 
as seen in his General Theory of Law and the State, which is perhaps far more 
influential in terms of its application by policy makers and presents a thoroughly 
positivist vision of constitutionalism. A much more recent and self-aware book on 
constitutionalism is Loughlin and Walker’s (2007) The Paradox of Constitutionalism. 
This edited volume contains chapters from several present scholars, the most relevant 
of which for this work are those in its final section on “Extension and Diversification 
of Constituent Power.” It may be noted that this title emphasizes the element of 
identity and individuals in the idea of a constitution as being a representative social 
arrangement, rather than simply an amalgamation of various legal norms and 
institutions. As such, Stephen Tierney’s chapter on “Plurinational States” and James 
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Tully’s argument about the “Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy” make 
incredibly cogent points on the challenge of claiming representativeness in states with 
mixed populations and the problematic conflation of constitutionalism with 
democratization.
30
 Larry Alexander’s Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, 
and Alan Brudner’s Constitutional Goods are excellent volumes to read alongside this 
discourse as they highlight the questions posed by constitutionalism from a 
philosophical perspective, in contrast to the history of political thought method of 
McIlwain.  
 
Of course, constitutionalism is often broken down into institutional works that discuss 
the functions of various organs of state. These works are essential, but not directly 
relevant to this discussion. However, as this thesis is primarily concerned with 
constitutional values, the other main sub-category of constitutionalism that focuses on 
particular ideas like justice, the rule of law, etc. is crucial. These works are extremely 
diverse in their normative orientation and philosophical underpinnings, but they 
generally advocate stronger adherence to a particular core constitutional norm. These 
would include Justice by Sandel, Richard Tuck’s Rights of War and Peace, Tom 
Bingham and Brian Tamanaha, both on The Rule of Law, Kymlicka’s work on 
nationalism and identity,
31
 and Larry May’s Global Justice and Due Process. 
                                                          
30
 Loughlin, Martin, and Neil Walker. The Paradox of Constitutionalism : Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. See particularly Tierney, 
Stephen, “ ‘We the Peoples’: Constituent Power and Constitutionalism in Plurinational States,”: 229-
246, and Tully, James, “The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy,”: 315-338. 
 
31
 Key works include: Justice in Political Philosophy. 2 vols, An Elgar Reference Collection. 
Aldershot, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA: E. Elgar, 1992.  
Politics in the Vernacular : Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford, UK New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Multicultural Odysseys : Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Liberalism, Community, and Culture. New York: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
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Additional considerations on issues such as the tension between positivist and natural 
law justifications for constitutionalism will be considered later in this text. 
 
The Western constitutional canon itself does not require repeating in depth here, but it 
bears mentioning that it generally traces the evolution of Western thought from 
Socrates onward, with a great deal of emphasis on the Enlightenment ideals of 
rationality and individuality. Therein lays one of its key weaknesses from a 
comparative perspective. The canon, as such, is designed with an often 
unacknowledged teleology that is meant for the reader to arrive philosophically 
convinced of the inevitability and suitability of the modern liberal state as the 
definitive political model, representative of the pinnacle of social achievement, and 
worthy of universal imitation and perhaps even imposition. Thus, when one searches 
for resources on constitutionalism, references to democracy and liberalization are 
absolutely rife. Mohammed Khatami identified this very danger in the speech quoted 
at the start of this thesis. He cautions that “We cannot simplistically speak of an end 
to history as liberalism cannot be introduced as the sole image of wickedness or the 
sole symbol for perfection of social thought.”32 Whether from institutional approaches 
like those of Donald Lutz
33
 or theoretically-based works like those of Bellamy,
34
 
Elster and Slagsted’s (1998) Constitutionalism and Democracy, and Cass Sunstein’s 
(2001) Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, the conflation of these closely-
                                                          
32
 Khatami (2006), p.6. 
 
33
 See "Thinking About Constitutionalism at the Start of the Twenty-First Century." Publius 30, no. 4 
(2000): 115-35. Also, Principles of Constitutional Design. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
 
34
 Political Constitutionalism : A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
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related, yet nonetheless distinct, concerns is pervasive and generally goes 
unquestioned. 
 
This leads to a great deal of spillover once one ventures into the rather newer field of 
Islamic political theory, which can be broken into two further groupings of writings 
which proceed on a history of thought or history of philosophy model, and others 
which seek to use Islamic thinkers to advance a particular normative political agenda. 
The first category includes works by Patricia Crone, who provides a sophisticated and 
extremely thorough historical and philosophical context for understanding medieval 
Muslim thought in books such as God’s Rule: Government and Islam.35 One could 
also include Antony Black’s History of Islamic Political Thought in this group, which 
is more or less a literary introduction to various Muslim thinkers arranged in a 
chronological fashion.
36
 John Esposito largely subscribes to this approach, but with a 
more explicitly conciliatory aim in works including Islam: the Straight Path and 
Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue.
37
 In contrast, Nathan Brown deals 
with concrete observation of majority Muslim states and their constitutional norms, 
and his primary normative argument seems to be quite simply for a constitutional, 
though not necessarily liberal, mode of governance. In light of recent events, his The 
rule of law in the Arab world: courts in Egypt and the Gulf is highly relevant and may 
offer some explanation for why revolution has broken out in some states and not 
others. From a more general perspective, his insistence on decoupling 
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 Crone, Patricia. God's Rule : Government and Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 
 
36
 Black, Antony. The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001. 
 
37
 Esposito, John L. Islam : The Straight Path. 3rd ed. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998. See also Esposito, John L., and John O. Voll. "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue." 
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constitutionalism and democratization, seen in Constitutions in a non-constitutional 
world, is crucial to this project.
38
 
 
Providing a bridge between these works and those advocating a particular political 
vision are the writing of Tariq Ramadan. Key amongst his writings for the present 
enquiry are Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity, Globalisation: Muslim 
Resistances, and The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism.
39
 
Working with an explicitly pluralist and liberal perspective, Abdullahi an-Naim’s 
African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam and his more recent Islam and the 
Secular State lay out a role for Islam as guarantor of social and political rights and 
advocates pluralist government to be the only form of political organization that can 
satisfy the demands of sharīʿa.40 These works will be discussed in greater detail later 
in the thesis. Likewise, Noah Feldman seeks to create a role for the ‘ulama within a 
liberalized context in his The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. As someone who 
participated in the Iraq reconstruction effort following the 2003 Iraq invasion, his 
intellectual arc has undergone a substantial transformation from advocating a more or 
less Western state with Iraqi vernacular, seen in his book After Jihad, to advancing a 
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 Brown, Nathan J. The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge 
Middle East Studies 6. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. See also, Brown, 
Nathan J. Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for 
Accountable Government, SUNY Series in Middle Eastern Studies. Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2002. 
 
39
 For an applied version of his thought, see his most recent The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New 
Middle East. London: Allen Lane, 2012.  
 
40
 Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmad. African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. Also, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharīʿa. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
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far less concrete vision of a constitutional regime in which the institutions reflect local 
practice and are open to negotiation. 
41
 
 
It goes without saying that the subject of this thesis cuts across a variety of 
disciplinary boundaries and engages with an equally great variety of theoretical 
concerns. Its original contribution to the field lies primarily in its use of comparative 
political theory methods to redefine constitutionalism for use in a globalized and 
pluralist context. By freeing constitutionalism from its liberal teleology it then 
becomes possible to examine Western and Muslim thinkers in a mutually constructive 
fashion, advancing the stated aim of civilizational dialogue. 
I.ix. Constituting Vocabulary- The Derivation of “Constitution,” 
Sartori vs. Maddox  
 
Lest one be tempted to think that the study of constitutionalism is the study of a 
settled field with well-defined and agreed upon boundaries, it is helpful to first 
examine how contestable the very concepts of what a constitution is and means are. 
An illuminating example of the very fundamental disagreements on these issues can 
be found in an interesting debate on the very nature of the word constitution, which 
occurred between the 1960s and 1980s as seen in two articles by Giovanni Sartori and 
Graham Maddox, both of which appeared in The American Political Science Review. 
The earlier of these arguments, Sartori’s, takes particular care to show that what most 
scholars think of as constitutions from the 19
th
 Century onwards does not derive, as is 
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suggested by some scholars and even standard dictionaries,
42
 from the Latin 
constitutio, because for him it simply meant “an enactment,” and later in its plural 
form “came to mean a collection of laws enacted by the Sovereign.”43 This is 
problematic especially because, for Sartori, the mother country of constitutionalism is 
Britain, which seems to “delight” in confounding outsiders by claiming for itself a 
constitution that is present but largely unwritten, or according to some, even entirely 
unwritten but strongly underpinned by a variety of “particularly solemn written 
documents: the Magna Charta (sic), the Confirmation Acts, the 1610-1628 Petition of 
Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679…etc.”44 This is ultimately of only secondary 
importance however, as his primary concern is with the telos of the constitution, 
which written or not, in examples from England, the Continent, and America is 
concerned with a common goal, what the Italians and French call garantisme. “In 
other terms, all over the Western area people requested, or cherished, ‘the 
constitution,’ because this term meant to them a fundamental law, or a fundamental 
set of principles, and (emphasis mine) a correlative institutional arrangement, which 
would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a ‘limited government.’” However, post 
World War I this “situation of over-all basic agreement has come to an end rapidly 
and radically.”45 
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What is the basis for Sartori’s claim for a “radical” shift in the way constitutions 
themselves are understood? It is here that his argument would seem especially open to 
scrutiny, as he himself says that the problem is that “legal terminology… shares the 
same destiny as political terminology in general: that is, it tends to be abused and 
corrupted.”46 In essence, the political atmosphere of the mid-20th Century led 
politicians to abuse the term constitution to whip up nationalistic impulses to suit their 
own purposes and Continental scholars to seek out universals when defining 
constitutionalism, which brought about the parsing of the term into two components: a 
constitution which was a formalized set of rules for governing, and being 
constitutional, which required enumeration of individual liberties/rights and the 
means of protecting them.
47
 This leads, in the end, to an ability to say any order is a 
constitution, rendering the word both dangerous to the masses for its positive emotive 
content, and useless for the scholar for its lack of a normative element that would 
reattach the word to its role in protecting rights as well as delineating rules and 
duties.
48
 Sartori concludes this discussion by proposing a starting point for his own 
definition of constitution that is able to account for the word’s normative and 
descriptive properties whilst still allowing for significant variation in the norms it 
promotes and the institutions it develops to enact and protect them. Oddly though, this 
is boiled down to what he calls a “role theory” approach which appears to be a blend 
of function and process that looks at a constitution “vis-à-vis the role-taking of the 
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power holders…does it help to enforce, and if so to what extent, a desired ‘role 
performance’ upon the persons in office.”49  
 
This seems entirely unsatisfactory based on his own arguments for political terms to 
be assessed in light of historical experience rather than political expedience, and given 
that this approach seems unlikely to address the totality of a constitution as not only a 
set of laws, institutions and rights, but also as an embodiment of the national 
sovereign will and character that the term has carried since at least the time of 
Aristotle, who even Sartori notes spoke of the politeia as conveying “the idea of the 
way in which a polity is patterned.”50 It is based on similar and additional critiques of 
Sartori that Graham Maddox seeks to enlarge, or at least enlarge the discursive space, 
for the word constitution in his 1982 article “A Note on the Meaning of 
‘Constitution’.” He systematically analyses Sartori in light of other key constitutional 
scholars and demonstrates the need for a broader definition of the word if it is to be 
useful for comparative and analytical purposes.  
 
One of Maddox’s first qualms with Sartori’s work is that he finds it disingenuous to 
separate the Latin term constitutio from constitution simply because the meaning of 
the term changed through time. He points out that the term itself derives from the root 
constituere, which means ‘to set up, establish, erect, construct, arrange, to settle or 
determine,’ and that even in imperial Rome the emperor’s decrees were called 
constitutiones “because they collectively defined the limits of state action.”51 This 
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seems perfectly in line with Sartori’s idea of the constitution being centrally 
concerned with limiting government. Maddox then goes on to show how several 
writers including Cicero, Tacitus, St. Augustine and Boethius all used the term in 
fairly consistent fashion, satisfying the historical criterion laid down by Sartori 
himself and contradicting his dismissal of Cicero’s usage as imprecise (a charge that 
is especially serious as Cicero is known as much for rhetoric and his care with words 
as he is for his philosophical and political thought).
52
  
 
Interestingly, this feeds into a later concern of Sartori’s that scholars of political 
thought not project present issues into the past.
53
 Maddox makes the basic observation 
that various scholars of constitutionalism (including Loewenstein, Ostwald, and 
McIlwain)  have thoroughly shown the classical lineage of constitutionalism and that 
even in antiquity the “idea of constitution as the total establishment of a state system 
rested alongside more restricting notions of the limitations on government power by 
the ‘power of the people.’”54 Further to this, the entire idea of limits on government 
power being the true and universally agreed telos of the constitution is highly 
questionable. Is it not possible, Maddox asks, for there to be more than one end to 
which constitutions aim? If it is indeed not the case that all earlier scholars of Greek 
were wrong in translating the Greek politeia and Latin constitution as “constitution,” 
then to what extent can the term be widened without losing its specificity and 
usefulness? Here, he very effectively refers to one of the foremost 20
th
 Century 
scholars of constitutionalism, CH McIlwain, to note that over the centuries, including 
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recent ones that saw the development of the American constitution amongst others, 
there was an equally urgent need to have a “strong gubernaculums, government 
power, to control inordinate private interests to the benefit of a peaceful civil order, 
along with the essential jurisdictio which implied a civil control on government 
power.”55 If one accounts for the divergent aims of constitutions, Maddox contends, 
then “the balance between strong government and the firm control of government may 
then remain a more open question.”56 
 
I.x. Putting the “Norm” in Normative- Constitutionalism as an 
Instrument in the work of C.H. McIlwain 
 
Exploring the open question of what constitutions do and should aim to accomplish is 
the overarching concern of most of the work of CH McIlwain, whose works include 
influential titles like The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) and 
Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (1947). A sustained examination of his 
contribution to the development of constitutionalism as an academic discipline is 
warranted not only by his substantial list of books and articles, but also by the 
influence he exercised on other scholars in his role as professor at Harvard University 
in the first half of the 20
th
 Century. As Douglas Sturm suggests he was “both historian 
and political theorist. In his case this was a fruitful combination.”57 Over the course of 
his career he developed a historically-based theory of constitutionalism that eschewed 
the type of limited definition advocated by Sartori and instead viewed it as a history 
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and developmental process in its own right. Sturm compares this view of 
constitutionalism to that of the lawyer of the common law tradition who prefers it to 
“black letter law” because it is fluid rather than fixed, and “definitions are pro 
tempore and not in aeturnum.”58 It would seem that this view would lend itself most 
strongly to a view of the constitution as an accretion of laws, customs, and institutions 
rather than as a written code, but McIlwain in fact spent a great deal of energy 
examining the written manifestations of constitutional order, particularly as it related 
to the US Constitution. The general motivation and normative element of his works is 
best summed up in his own words in his book Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern 
in which he states the following: 
The earlier history of the growth of our constitutionalism can, of course, furnish no 
definite or conclusive answer to many of these questions, because the conditions under 
which they exist now are in so many ways different from those which surrounded their 
growth in past ages. Nevertheless, I do believe that careful unbiased study of this past 
growth is not without its practical value in helping us to analyze our own pressing 
problems, if not to answer them.
59
  
 
This is coupled with the dual-natured view of government that Maddox 
mentioned that takes an inherently conservative line that seeks a steady, rather 
than reactionary, dialectic between strengthening and limiting government in 
order to create a regime that is strong enough to rule and a population that is 
strong enough to hold its rulers accountable.
60
 This struggle is one that 
McIlwain sees present through the historical record beginning at least as early 
as the Ancient Greek polis and continuing through the Roman era, the 
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Medieval Period, the Early Modern/Enlightenment age, and finally into the 
Modern present.
61
 
 
Now that the nature and method of his work have been summed up, it is 
helpful to look at the actual definition he gives to constitution. He sees present 
constitutions as first and foremost self-conscious creations made by “direct 
and express constituent action.”62 This differs from earlier versions of 
constitutionalism in which law was identified with custom as much as with 
legislation and it was seen as binding in a legal sense. It also excludes 
arguments in which consent of the governed is taken to be implicitly present 
simply by their continued presence within the territorial sphere of a given 
regime.
63
 Despite these differences, what makes constitutionalism something 
that can be studied as a tradition and as a recognizable quantity is that it “has 
one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis 
of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the government of will 
instead of law… the most ancient, the most persistent, and the most lasting of 
the essentials of true constitutionalism still remains… the limitation of 
government by law.”64 
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In using this approach of definition by examining both advocacy and 
opposition, McIlwain brings the discussion of constitutionalism and its 
meaning full-circle. Like Sartori and others he does not hide his enthusiasm 
for constitutionalism as an instrument (as well as a tradition that can be 
studied for insight into present questions and difficulties). He also agrees with 
the view that the primary role of the constitution is to limit state power by 
codifying and defining it. This in turn gives the state the legitimacy and 
strength that it needs to enforce the law and to remain stable when the people 
enforce their will upon the state through some sort of consensual mechanism. 
However, what is for Sartori a telos, is ultimately for McIlwain the means to 
achieving an altogether larger telos that derives from the ancient conception of 
government existing to promote the good/virtuous/just life. As McIlwain says 
in his 1936 “Government by Law,” “The problem of constitutionalism, then, 
is everybody’s problem, whatever economic or social system he may prefer. It 
is law alone that gives protection to rights of any kind in any individual, 
personal as well as proprietary, whatever form the state…”65 
 
I.xi. Positively Constitutional- Hans Kelsen and the Constitution as 
Legal Foundation 
 
Law, of course, is the singular obsession of legal positivist Hans Kelsen. His 
strain of constitutional thought is important because in addition to spending 
the majority of his career in academia, he also personally drafted the Austrian 
                                                          
65
 McIlwain, CH. “Government by Law.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jan., 1936), pp. 185. Note 
also the use of the word “proprietary,” which seems especially apt in a time when state’s are judged by 
their ability to foster economic growth and to protect the intellectual wealth, along with more material 
products, that they produce. It seems that there is an ongoing and increasing appreciation for the 
relationship between the political economy and the stability of the state and its constitution. 
 
P a g e  | 36 
 
constitution of 1920, which continues to form the basis of Austrian 
constitutional law and constitutional review, which in turn has influenced 
constitutional theory in various parts of Europe.
66
 As Nicoletta Ladavac points 
out, this legacy is further extended due to political events in Europe that 
forced him, as someone of Jewish heritage, to emigrate, first to Switzerland 
and then to the United States.
67
 In the United States he quickly established 
himself as an authority on law and wrote a detailed critique on the then new 
United Nations charter and assessed its various components for their 
effectiveness and adherence to a consistent vision of law. Any new regime 
seeking statehood finds itself needing to demonstrate conformity with these 
UN ideals, and therefore finds itself too under the significant weight of 
Kelsen’s positivist vision. His influence can be seen not only through his 
writings, but also through his teaching, as his students included eminent 
scholars and theorists like Adolf Merkl, Alfred Verdross, Felix Kaufmann, 
Eric Voegelin, and Franz Weyr.
68
  
 
In order to fully appreciate the scope of his work, it would require an 
examination far too involved for the confines of this dissertation. However, a 
reasonably nuanced understanding of his contribution to constitutional and 
legal theory can be gained through examining his seminal work General 
Theory of Law and State in consultation with some of his shorter articles and 
lectures. His work is at once both philosophical and legal, and as such 
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proceeds carefully from definition of an issue or case, to definition of terms, 
to use of evidence, and then to drawing conclusions. Using his own 
organization, we will first look at his definition of law, particularly from a 
positivist perspective (in contrast with natural law), then examine how he 
thinks it is used to define the ends for which a State exists, what the State 
itself is, the role of the constitution in the State, the separation of powers of 
constitutional organs, and finally the question of which order of law is 
supreme between national and international law. 
 
Law is an order of human behavior. An ‘order’ is a system of rules. Law is not, as it is 
sometimes said, a rule… It is impossible to grasp the nature of law if we limit our 
attention to the single isolated rule. The relations which link together the particular rules 
of a legal order are also essential to the nature of law.
69
 
 
 
Much has been written about the virtues and dangers of Kelsen’s view of law and its 
basis.
70
 His definition of law itself, seen above, is however equally notable and 
important. The first thing that strikes the reader is that law is supposedly not grounded 
in nature, but is “an order of human behavior.” On what basis can Kelsen argue that 
this behavior itself is not derived from nature or natural instinct? This seems to 
require an assumption that human agency is something that exists apart from the 
natural order and is an order unto itself. If there is a physical order made of 
Newtonian objects with their own relationships and rules of motion, then Kelsen 
argues here that there is also a legal order, made of legal objects (laws) with 
relationship to legal subjects (citizens, corporations, governments, etc.) and that the 
relationships of these laws to one another and to their subjects are important in their 
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own right. Indeed, they are “essential to the nature of law.” In rejecting natural law, 
Kelsen nonetheless creates something that would appear very akin to an organism, 
composed of different parts which must be properly ordered for mutual benefit, and 
which has its own identity that is greater than the sum of its parts. This conception of 
the law seeks to maintain “purity” that is devoid of relations to appeals to supernatural 
codes, morals, or natural law in order to recognize as equally valid (at least 
potentially) any legal system regardless of the ends to which the order may aspire. As 
he goes on to say, 
 
(Law) designates a specific technique of social organization. The problem of law, as a 
scientific problem, is the problem of social technique, not a problem of morals… There 
are legal orders which are, from a certain point of view, unjust. Law and justice are two 
different concepts. Law as distinguished from justice is positive law.
71
 
 
Here can be seen Kelsen’s effort to achieve a definition of law that can be universally 
valid, but in so doing does he create a definition that is essentially meaningless? One 
of his more vociferous opponents and contemporaries, Carl Schmitt, mocked his 
conception of law as one in which a norm is “‘valid if it is valid and because it is 
valid,’ but not because it refers to a more fundamental moral ideal. Consistent 
normative thereby evolves into a mode of ‘bourgeois relativism.’”72  
 
This critique seems justified in light of Kelsen’s further point that the very existence 
of so many ideas of justice in the world makes the discussion of the term as an 
absolute entity which can be discovered via deduction from the natural order, divine 
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inspiration, or any other means, in the end, absurd.
73
 What Schmitt and others with 
similar critiques do not account for, however, is that although Kelsen is divorcing law 
from morality and natural law in his pure theory in order to create a definition that is 
functional in any context, he is not arguing that the law must remain devoid of this 
normative element in individual contexts. Indeed, in his article on the Preamble of the 
UN Charter, he argues the following: 
The content of a statute or treaty is legally relevant, that is to say, has binding force only 
if it has a normative character. It has binding force if its meaning is to establish by itself 
or in connection with other contents of the statute or treaty an obligation. A statement 
whose meaning is to establish an obligation is a norm.
74
 
 
This means that law should contain an element of what people should or should not 
do. Without this element it is meaningless because it cannot be enforced.
75
 What this 
means then is that whilst the morals may differ between systems and be “relative,” 
they must nonetheless be present in some manner in order to give the law social 
impetus. This should element is what Kelsen calls an “obligation.” What results then, 
is a system of statements that create obligations (either for the citizen to do or not do 
something, or for the state to assign penalties for disobedience), these norms provide 
the normative character to law, which socially justifies the contents of the laws and 
the charters that underpin their validity. What Kelsen offers is a flexible account of 
constitutions that can accommodate all types of human social organization and mores, 
past, present, and future. The constitution can be reconstituted in a variety of forms 
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for a variety of reasons but it remains a constitution so long as it is a self-sustaining 
system of law that is socially valid. 
 
Kelsen seems keenly aware that the long tradition of natural law theory will provide 
ample grounds for criticism of his ideas by those who hold to its general assumptions. 
He acknowledges that “Faced by the existence of a just ordering of society, 
intelligible in nature, reason, or divine will, the activity of positive law makers would 
be tantamount to a foolish effort at artificial illumination in bright sunshine.”76 This 
does not trouble him greatly though as he is convinced that, 
 
The usual assertion, however, that there is indeed a natural, absolutely good order, but 
transcendental and hence not intelligible, that there is indeed such a thing as justice, but 
that it cannot be clearly defined, is in itself, a contradiction. It is, in fact, nothing but a 
euphemistic paraphrase of the painful fact that justice is an ideal inaccessible to human 
cognition.
77
 
 
This hostility to natural law theory forces Kelsen to seek out an alternative to justice 
as a basis upon which a legal order can be founded. Here, he creates the idea of 
Grundnorm. TC Hopton sums up this term as one whose “validity cannot be 
objectively tested; it must be presupposed or assumed.”78 Here one is drawn 
inexorably back to the criticism of Schmitt and must ask why this assumption of 
validity is a strong enough reason to justify its perpetuation. Perhaps Kelsen could 
reply that natural law theorists argue that justice can be discovered through 
observation of nature, so why can he not argue that the social base from which law 
springs likewise can be discovered, even if its existence is purely socially constituted 
and ephemeral rather than something eternal and transcendent. It may have horrified 
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people of an earlier age to conceive of our entire planet floating through the void of 
space, held in check by non-material bonds of gravitational attraction, but this non-
material force of attraction is nevertheless strong enough to keep our material 
existence secure for the time being. To argue that law is based upon anything greater 
than this is, for Kelsen, intellectually dishonest. 
 
This concern for utmost, brutal honesty is what leads him to definitely rule out the 
existence of law outside of positive law.
79
 Consequently, he must also reject any 
considerations of telos that so heavily figure in the works of other constitutional 
scholars, including the aforementioned Sartori and McIlwain. To his mind the very 
idea that the State serves “some sort of ultimate end” is problematic as it follows that 
“some sort of definite regulation of human behavior, proceeds from ‘nature,’ that is, 
from the nature of things or the nature of man, from human reason or the will of God. 
In such an assumption lies the doctrine of so-called natural law.”80  
 
If natural law is rejected, along with the notion of finding and delivering justice, what 
then is the identity and the role of the State? Where other thinkers see the state as an 
entity with its own character, lifespan and will, for Kelsen there is “no sociological 
concept of the State different from the concept of the legal order; and that means, that 
we can describe the social reality without using the term ‘State.’”81 The State then, is 
simply shorthand for the amalgamation of norms and laws which a given society 
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follows and creates. This has enormous implications for the idea of the State as a 
continuous and coherent actor with prerogatives in both the domestic and 
international spheres. If there is no inherent national identity being expressed through 
the state, no consolidation of wills, or no conception of the state as an entity beyond 
its statutes and ordinances, then what justifies its position as an agent with the power 
of life and death over its subjects or citizens? Does every change in the law change 
the very identity of the state? 
 
To these questions Kelsen makes a couple observations. The first is that the State is 
not simply a territorial unit existing in space. It also exists “in time… Just as the State 
is spatially not infinite, it is temporally not eternal… The point of time when a State 
begins to exist, that is, the moment when a national legal order begins to be valid, is 
determined by positive international law according to the principle of effectiveness. It 
is the same principle according to which the territorial sphere of validity of the 
national legal order is determined.”82 That is, the State exists as an actor because other 
actors of a similar nature recognize it as an entity existing within certain territorial and 
temporal boundaries. The agency that the State appears to possess and exercise is, in 
fact, merely due to the fact that it is recognized by international law, which confers 
upon the State both rights and duties. Since the State does not exist apart from the 
social context however, “International law obligates and authorizes the state to behave 
in a certain way by obligating and authorizing human beings in their capacity as 
organs of the state to behave in this way.”83  
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Of course, though this conception of sovereignty is one that is to some extent 
observable and based upon the actual exercise of international law, it is not wholly 
satisfactory as it still leaves open the question of the basis upon which international 
law is valid. Professor Kelsen admits that ultimately, the determination of where 
sovereignty properly lies, at the national or international level, is a chicken and egg 
argument to which one’s answer is greatly influenced by one’s identity being, or not 
being, fundamentally shaped as part of a given nation or state. Taken from the point 
of view of law as science, it “remains totally indifferent towards both” points of view 
and merely “frees the way to political development of either without postulating or 
justifying the one or the other.”84 In fact, Kelsen may go beyond this question to an 
almost post-structural view that there is neither chicken nor egg in the Platonic sense 
of something material approximating an ideal, but rather simply two collections of 
molecules with certain characteristics that society recognizes as chickens and eggs.
85
 
 
This leads finally, to his conception of the foundational law of the state, or its 
constitution. Here again, Kelsen is frustratingly circular in his description of what a 
constitution is, what it does, and on what basis it exists. He defines the constitution of 
a state as “its ‘fundamental law,’ (it) is the basis of the national legal order… as used 
in political theory, the concept is made to embrace also those norms which regulate 
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the creation and competence of the highest executive and judicial organs.”86 In a way 
then, the constitution is a sort of Grundnorm for the legal system of a state, and in 
particular for the organs through which the state will enact and enforce its laws. The 
importance of this role of constitutions is that it more firmly grounds national law 
within its own local context on the basis that it “receives its validity from the 
constitution, since it has been established by the competent organ in the way the 
constitution prescribes.”87 This means that law is valid not only when socially 
recognized but it must also be enacted in a lawful manner by the appropriate state 
body or bodies as specified in the constitution. This clearly lays the groundwork for a 
justification of judicial review of the constitutionality of individual statutes and for the 
separation of powers within a government. Strangely however, Kelsen rejects most of 
the assumptions of the doctrine of Separation of Powers. He contends that 
The concept of ‘separation of powers’ designates a principle of political organization. It 
presupposes that the three so-called powers can be determined as three distinct coordinated 
functions of the State, and that it is possible to define boundary lines separating each of 
these three functions from the others. But this presupposition is not borne out by the facts. 
As we have seen, there are not three but two basic functions of the State: creation and 
application (execution) of the law… Further, it is not possible to define boundary lines 
separating these functions from each other, since the distinction between creation and 
application of law- underlying the dualism of legislative and judicial power (in the broadest 
sense)- has only a relative character, most acts of State being at the same time law-creating 
and law-applying acts.
88
  
 
Granted that significant overlap does in fact exist between the branches of 
governments and their spheres of authority, it is difficult to understand why Kelsen so 
thoroughly rejects the idea of the Separation of Powers. It could perhaps be that it 
contradicts his quest for purity because it assumes that a true legal (constitutional) 
order must have this division in order to be valid, which contradicts his goal of 
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looking at constitutions as a framework devoid of content. He explicitly says that in 
his Pure Theory of Law the “contents of the norms of a positive legal order are 
determined exclusively by acts of will of human beings… constituted by acts of 
human beings and instituted by the constitution as a law-creating fact.”89 
 
If constitutions are simply the framework for the apparatus of the State, then what is 
the source of their validity?
90
 Kelsen answers that, “If we ask why the constitution is 
valid…ultimately we reach some constitution that is the first historically and that was 
laid down by some individual usurper or assembly. The validity of this first 
constitution is that last presupposition, the final postulate, upon which the validity of 
all the norms of our legal order depends.”91 Once again, there is no ultimately 
satisfactory answer as to where the validity of the constitutional order comes from in 
any sense beyond the fact that it is recognized as valid by those participating in it. 
This opens the possibility that the constitutional order itself can change. Though this 
idea is anathema to many political actors, particularly in the United States, it is clearly 
seen in history. France, for instance, is on its 5
th
 constitution since the creation of the 
Republic in 1789. Although the 5
th
 Republic is not bound to the constitutions of its 
predecessors, there is nonetheless a large degree of continuity in its very basic 
assumptions and values. This seems to demonstrate that the constitution cannot be 
“the final postulate,” but that the true Grundnorm must lie in some deeper source, 
even if that source is simply social custom. That is why he argues that despite the 
efforts of framers to create a document that is unchanging through time, “There is no 
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legal possibility of preventing a constitution from being modified by way of custom, 
even if the constitution has the character of statutory law, if it is a so-called ‘written’ 
constitution.”92 This is because ultimately even the most fundamental or basic norm is 
“hypothetical.”93 
 
Though it would seem logical to conclude that any positivist constitutional order 
would necessarily be one with a written constitution, this is not necessarily the case. 
He notes that for one thing, “Very often the constitution is composed of norms which 
have partly the character of statutory and partly the character of customary law,” and 
that furthermore “The distinction made by traditional theory between ‘written’ and 
‘unwritten’ constitutions” is simply “the difference of constitutions the norms of 
which are created by legislative acts and constitutions whose norms are created by 
custom.”94 In other words, the distinction does not matter except that customary bases 
for law would appear to be stronger in many instances than statutory bases. The value 
of the constitution is somewhat dubious in this conception. As Michel Troper points 
out in “Marshall, Kelsen, Barak and the constitutionalist fallacy,” Kelsen would argue 
that “the constitution is superior to the law because it governs the drafting of laws. It 
is supreme simply because there is no other positive rule of law in which it could find 
the basis for its own validity.”95  
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For a legal positivist then, the ultimate justification for the creation and maintenance 
of a constitutional order is to provide a framework in which law can be created and 
enforced to act towards some socially agreed order. This order can take on an endless 
variety of forms and moral injunctions. There is no means of using this theory to 
describe a just order or one which is morally correct, but its value lies in its ability to 
make obvious the contingency of law, the necessity of maintaining some sort of social 
agreement that allows the law to be seen as valid and enforced. Avoiding chaos and 
stasis were the primary objectives of Greek constitutionalism, and in the end, despite 
his rejection of a telos for the state, Kelsen can be seen to implicitly demonstrate the 
value of having order over none, even if it cannot be cosmically justified. It is this 
very quality of creating order seemingly out of nothing more than agreement to do so, 
that makes law appear almost magical and which ultimately sustains it as a system.
96
 
As he concludes in his 1952 article “What is a Legal Act?” it is the “principal of 
efficacy, which as the content [Inhalt] of the basic norm” and which is of “specifically 
legal cognition,” which “offers an adequate guarantee that legal theory cannot ever 
lose sight of the connection between legal norms and what we call ‘social reality.’”97 
It is to the social reality of Majority Muslim states, and its relationship and potential 
future with constitutionalism, to which this review now turns. 
 
I.xii. A Review of Constitutionalism in Majority Muslim Contexts 
 
The Fall and Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism- A brief analysis of the recent 
work of Noah Feldman and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im 
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The new Islamic state, if it is to succeed, must do for itself the difficult and slow work of 
establishing new institutions with their own ways of operating that will gradually achieve 
legitimacy… Borrowing, with all of its limitations, still seems easier than invention. 
Nevertheless, with all its risks and dangers, the aspiration to re-create a system of 
government that draws upon the best of the old while coming to terms with the new is as 
bold and noble a goal as can be imagined.
98
 
 
 
As seen above, scholars like Noah Feldman take the future existence of Islamic states 
as a virtual given. Written in 2008, his book The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State 
came well before protestors took on the regimes of Ben-Ali and Mubarak and won the 
right to work out a new solution to the problem of how to govern justly, legitimately, 
and accountably. Considering the unprecedented pace of change surging through 
North Africa and the Middle East, this section will bring together the threads of 
narrative between Western and Islamic scholars by examining two fairly recent works 
on Islamic government. By comparing how a former U.S Supreme Court law clerk 
and constitutional adviser to the interim Iraqi government envisions the future of 
Islamic government, with the way it is portrayed by a former political refugee and 
practicing Muslim law professor from the Sudan, it may be possible to ascertain 
whether a consensus is emerging on the viability and applicability of Islamic 
constitutionalism and what that consensus may be. 
 
Noah Feldman’s view of historical Islamic government is simple and elegant. He 
argues that 
 
 
A common constitutional theory, developing and changing over the course of centuries, 
(was) obtained in all (Islamic states). A Muslim ruler governed according to God’s law, 
expressed through principles and rules of the sharīʿa that were expounded by the 
scholars. The ruler’s fulfillment of the duty to command what the law required and ban 
what it prohibited made his authority lawful and legitimate.
99
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This view shares a universalizing element with earlier Western accounts of Islamic 
government. Thus far there is little to distinguish it from those of the Orientalists. 
What immediately sets his work apart, however, is this statement: 
When empires fall, they tend to stay dead… There are, however, two prominent 
examples of governing systems reemerging after they had apparently ceased to exist. One 
is democracy, a form of government that had some limited success in a small Greek city-
state for a couple of hundred years, disappeared, and then was resurrected some two 
thousand years later. It re-creators were non-Greeks, living under radically different 
conditions, for whom democracy was a word handed down in the philosophy books, to 
be embraced only fitfully and after some serious reinterpretation. The other is the Islamic 
state.
100
 
 
From the very beginning then, his argument consistently makes reference to Western 
historical and political precedents that in some way mirror those of the Islamic world. 
The way Feldman creates a comparison between democracy and the Islamic state as 
political systems is unexpected to say the least. Though there are certainly reasons to 
question the validity of this comparison (it is difficult to see what Greek democracy 
and traditional Islamic government share in common beyond their philosophical 
preoccupations), it serves to notify the reader that the Islamic tradition will be treated 
as an equally valid alternative to that of the West.  
 
Not only is the Islamic state potentially experiencing a reformulation and rebirth, but 
it is doing so in a way that is necessarily breaking new ground in order to find a voice 
that is authentically Muslim but still able to participate in global discussions of 
politics and commerce. 
The movement toward the Islamic state is riding a wave of nostalgia, but it is also 
looking forward. The designers and advocates of the new Islamic state want to recapture 
the core of what made the traditional Islamic state great. They declare their allegiance to 
the sharīʿa, while simultaneously announcing an affinity for democracy. This means the 
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new Islamic state will be different from the old one. There is no turning back the clock of 
history, no matter what anyone says.
101
 
 
This recognition of Feldman’s also puts him well outside the traditional Orientalist 
camp. Rather than emphasizing the backwardness and “obstinacy” of Islamists, he 
makes a point of describing the movement as one that is forward-looking regardless 
of the claims made on its behalf by groups that claim to be “returning” to the rule of 
sharīʿa. Instead of being a reactionary conservative retrenchment, “The call for an 
Islamic state is therefore first and foremost a call for law- for a legal state that would 
be justified by law and govern through it.”102 The preoccupation with law and with an 
exemplary past is something that is intrinsic to both Western and Islamic 
constitutional discourse.
103
 The contours of the law may be different, but the desire 
for a supreme rule of law is of paramount importance to the entire project of 
constitutionalism in both traditions.  Thus it is not an absence of the rule of law that 
threatens the future of the Islamic state, but the “greatest challenge facing the new 
Islamic constitution derives from the uncertainty about identifying who is in charge of 
specifying the meaning of the sharīʿa and by what authority.”104 This is the type of 
fundamental question that Western philosophy has wrestled with for decades. Liberal 
democracy is one answer to this dilemma because it provides a mechanism for 
citizens to have a representative and regulated voice in the creation of new laws and 
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in the institutions that will implement them. The general lack of democracy in Muslim 
states is often cited as one reason that they are either despotic or unstable. It is argued 
that they need a strong figure to dictate the source of state authority and impose a 
unified vision of the state’s purpose.105 To such critics, Feldman offers the following 
reply: 
From the perspective of the sharīʿa as a totalizing legal methodology, it can be claimed 
that the written constitutions of the state is legitimate only to the extent that it makes the 
sharīʿa paramount. This viewpoint would assimilate the new Islamic state into the logical 
structure of the old. But from the standpoint of the written constitution, matters are much 
less clear, because the meaning of the sharīʿa is explicitly being made the province of the 
legislature and courts of the state. This confusion- does the sharīʿa come before the state 
or the state before the sharīʿa?- is in fact a version of a familiar problem in the 
constitutions of liberal states. Americans have never fully resolved the question of 
whether the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property preexist the U.S. Constitution 
or derive from it. It is more than possible to run the constitutional system of a legal state 
without resolving this thorny and ever-controversial difficulty.
106
 
 
 
By refusing to be sidetracked by tangential philosophical concerns, Feldman is 
illustrating a way to move the conversation about Islamic government and the role of 
sharīʿa forward. Plenty of Americans would argue that the principles upon which 
their constitution is based are derived from Christian ethics and scripture. The fact 
that this lends extra legitimacy to the state actually helps consolidate the constitutional 
rule of law despite the fact that it raises the problem mentioned above of determining 
whether rights or the codification of rights are prior in existence.  
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The argument that Feldman ultimately makes is that the one sure way to introduce 
more control over the Islamic state is to create, or more accurately reinstate, a stronger 
role for the religious scholars. He contends that historically they acted as an important 
check on the power of the sultan because they “accepted the yoke of the law as 
interpreted by the scholars- a position of subservience to the law otherwise unheard of 
in the annals of great empires. Justinian’s great Digest stated that ‘[t]he prince is not 
bound by law.’ No less powerful or extensive in their reach, the sultans earned the 
caliphate at the price of accepting that God and his law were above them.”107 In this 
manner, the scholarly class could serve as a check on any executive or legislative 
power because they would ensure that any new regulations or laws conformed to their 
understanding of the sharīʿa.  
 
Feldman’s prognosis for the viability and stability of the Islamic state is one which is 
ultimately very uncertain. This lack of confidence is reassuring in its humility even if 
it lacks the compelling force of alternative arguments. He sums up the present 
situation of the Muslim world as follows: 
... mainstream Islamism has in principle accepted the compatibility of the sharīʿa and 
democracy… the most prominent proposed solution is for the constitution of the state to 
acknowledge divine sovereignty rather than establish popular sovereignty and then use it 
to enact Islamic law. On this theoretical model, the people function somewhat as the 
ruler did in the classic constitutional order: they accept the responsibility for 
implementing what God has commanded… 
 
Yet for all its creativity as a solution to the challenges of modernity and egalitarianism, 
the democratized sharīʿa faces a deep question: to what does it owe its authority? If the 
sharīʿa is to be the ultimate source of law in the state, then it must also be the source of 
law for the constitution. Yet the constitution is enacted by actually existing citizens, and 
legislation is enacted by actually existing legislators. The classical sharīʿa dealt with this 
problem by claiming that the task of the scholars was solely to interpret, not to legislate, 
and that this task of interpretation was authorized by the sharīʿa itself. For the 
democratized sharīʿa, the same answer cannot be given because laws are actually being 
passed and because the classical sharīʿa nowhere envisions an elected legislature.108 
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Ultimately, the dilemma Feldman sees may or may not be as important as he makes it 
out to be. Present events would seem to indicate that the desires to have jobs with 
decent wages, the prospect of a good future, and basic political freedoms may very 
well be more important to Muslim citizens than more abstract questions of the basis of 
legal authority. 
 
A similar, but distinct vision for Islam’s role in the state can be found in Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na‘im’s books African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam and Islam 
and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharīʿa. Coming from the Sudan and 
with an admitted normative goal of seeing constitutionalism take a stronger hold of 
African and majority Muslim states, he shows less propensity to resort to cultural or 
religious defenses of practices that offend Western constitutional norms. Being well 
aware of the potential for laws to be worth little more than the paper they’re written 
on, he emphasizes that “such rights as freedom of expression and association are not 
useful without the institutional means for exercising the sort of judgment and 
continuous accountability of government officials envisaged by the principle of 
constitutionalism.”109 One such mechanism of accountability that he discusses is the 
Islamic concept of shura, or consultation. Although the “meaning of the Arabic term 
shura… at most indicated a requirement to seek advice, without necessarily being 
bound by it,” he makes the point that this meaning does not need to be considered 
sacrosanct and timeless. There is no reason it “cannot be used today as a basis for 
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institutionalized constitutional principles of democratic government that are legally 
and politically accountable to the population at large.”110  
 
A distinct, but related, notion of accountability and representation can be found in the 
bay‘a, which was a “traditional oath of allegiance” which An-Na‘im argues “should 
now by seen as an authoritative basis for a mutual contract between the government 
and the population at large, whereby the former assumes responsibility for the 
protection of the rights and general well-being of the latter in exchange for their 
acceptance of the authority of the state and compliance with its laws and public 
policy.”111 This is yet another idea that is thoroughly rooted in Western social contract 
theory. The fact that it is being advocated by a devout Muslim would seem to 
challenge those who describe Islamic opposition to Western ideas in monolithic terms 
and who would proscribe the possibility of people freely adopting and adapting those 
ideas which they find suitable for their present needs and goals, regardless of their 
origins. This is highly reminiscent of Khayr al-Din’s argument that the ‘ulama should 
not reject a technology or idea out of hand simply because it came from a non-
Muslim. To put it simply, if something is good, then its goodness is not altered by its 
origin but will be confirmed by its demonstrable effectiveness. 
 
An-Na‘im’s perspective on constitutional concepts and their cross-cultural application 
is nicely summarized as follows: 
I hold that the universal validity and applicability of concepts like constitutionalism is a 
pragmatic necessity in view of the universalization of the European model of the nation-
state through colonialism and postcolonial relations. This model is likely to continue as 
the dominant form of organization in national politics and international relations for the 
foreseeable future…In other words, the commonality of tensions in state-society and 
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state-individual relations recommends giving notions like constitutionalism and 
democracy broader applicability by expanding their meaning to include the experiences 
of other societies now seeking to adapt the same notion to their own respective 
contexts.
112
 
 
His concern is thus imminently practical but also highly normative. The state as 
defined on the European model seems to be here to stay, so Muslim states need to find 
a way to exist and hopefully thrive within this system. It does not mean, however, that 
they must subvert their identities to the Western other. The basic universal concerns 
with reconciling the rights and duties of the social contract and creating mechanisms 
by which it can be successfully maintained are enough to provide a common 
discursive and legally compatible space for the international aspect of constitutional 
government to work.  
 
There are many practical and potentially beneficial lessons to be drawn from the 
arguments of An-Na‘im and others who approach the constitutional question from the 
perspective of non-Western, often post-colonial states. If comparative constitutional 
dialogue is indeed conducted openly and with as few preconceptions as possible, then 
it is possible that not only will non-Western powers move toward governments that 
are law-governed in a way that is acceptable to Western norms, but that those Western 
states themselves will have the benefit of drawing upon new sources of political ideas 
and organization that may be revolutionary in addressing hitherto insurmountable 
political crises in regards to communitarian concerns for medical care, the elderly, and 
the environment. As he says, “Each society is constructing its own constitutional 
development on its own terms, and that includes its own retrieval and adaptation 
projects, as well as internally generated responses to current challenges and 
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concerns.”113 Of course, many of the challenges that political theorists perceive are 
external, rather than internal, and it is the use of Islamic civilization, and especially 
Islamism, as a threatening other which will now be discussed via Elie Kedourie’s 
influential Politics in the Middle East. 
 
I.xiii. Challenging Kedourie’s Critique- A conservative Orientalist 
perspective on Islam and Governance 
 
 
The beliefs, norms, and attitudes of Islam, the experiences, triumphs, and vicissitudes 
that Muslims have encountered over the centuries have combined to bring about a society 
of a highly distinctive character… Even today, when the Western world is the source of 
industrial techniques and military weapons, and is seen as providing intellectual and 
political norms, Islam as a religion is far from being defeated or silenced. And its 
influence as a culture, whether acknowledged or not, obstinately persists in permeating 
and shaping institutions, attitudes, and modes of discourse. This is nowhere more true 
than in government and politics, and in the mutual responses of the rulers and the 
ruled.
114
 
 
 
Constitutionalism was thus the Western political tradition which was adopted earliest in 
the Middle East. It had a long, albeit very checkered career. It proved, as has been seen, 
to be a failure everywhere…115 
 
It would be easy to mistake the above sentiments as having derived from the text of a 
19
th
 century European treatise on the nature of colonial possessions in the Middle 
East. The tone of the language and the way in which Islamic civilization is clearly 
painted as an “other,” makes equally clear the author’s opinion of the prospect of 
Islamic societies finding a way to remain true to themselves and to pursue a 
constitutional form of governance. This quote however, does not come from the 1890s 
but from the 1990s, or 1992 to be specific, and it comes from Elie Kedourie’s 
succinctly titled Politics in the Middle East. The date is important because it 
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illustrates that in some quarters it remains acceptable to accuse by implication when it 
comes to Muslims and Islam. It is also important because it marks a major turning 
point in recent history, when the Cold War had just come to a resounding end in favor 
of Western liberal democracy. Perhaps the downfall of one long-lasting enemy, the 
Soviet communists, partly explains the rise, or at least the perception of a rise, of a 
new threat, Islamic fundamentalism and violence. The pedigree of this type of writing 
extends back to thinkers like Bernard Lewis, Montesquieu, and even Dante. It 
continues in more strident tones in the work of writers like David Horowitz, Steven 
Emerson and Robert Spencer.
116
 
 
This is not to say however, that the contentions of these thinkers should not be 
examined seriously. Precisely because Kedourie’s arguments are couched in academic 
language and conducted along historical lines, it is possible to engage with them in 
order to understand the particular historical events and political concerns that 
comprise his wide-ranging critique. Mark Tessler, for example, refers to his work by 
acknowledging that he was “a prominent student of Arab and Islamic society” who 
“gave forceful expression to” the point of view that Islam is inimical to a restrained 
political system.
117
 As mentioned before, the period of history in which Kedourie 
wrote this book ranged from the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution to before the beginning of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika to after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the USSR.
118
 The end of the Cold War saw Middle 
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Eastern states able to act more independently than ever before as they had mostly 
been consolidated into relatively stable (or what appeared to be stable) states, had 
resoundingly cast off official colonial administration, and no longer were divided into 
client states or spheres of influence between the Americans and Soviets. This was a 
time in which there was space for an Islamic identity to fundamentally reassert itself. 
It is also a setting in which the rise of fundamentalism in the Middle East was in stark 
contrast to the wave of democratization cresting in Eastern Europe and some parts of 
Central Asia.  
 
Kedourie himself did not address his immediate historical setting in any sustained 
manner, but rather laid out a historical case of the Islamic polity from its founding 
under Muhammad, continuing to the days of the Ottomans, and finally to post-
Ottoman nationalized states. Beginning with Muhammad’s rule, he states that Islam, 
as instituted by its founder, “was not only a religion, but also a government, and a 
fast-rising international power.”119 As will be seen later in this thesis, this statement is 
accurate in some senses. The nature of the Islamic movement has had both religious 
and political elements from its inception.
120
 His next contention however is more 
problematic. Kedourie claims that what “Western Christianity from very early times 
distinguished as temporal and spiritual were ab initio inextricably intermixed in Islam. 
Islam made all Muslims one community where all concerns, spiritual and temporal, 
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were attended to and codified in the Divine Law.”121 Although the earliest Christians 
seem to have abstained from making many religiously-based political claims, from at 
least the time of Constantine until the Reformation, in real terms, Christianity 
experienced centuries of a very similar mixing of religious and political power with 
often only the thinnest of veneers masking the Church’s maneuvering within the state. 
122One must therefore question Kedourie’s application of Muhammad’s legacy as one 
which necessarily remains definitive within Muslim societies, despite the 
overwhelming variety of governmental institutions and mores found within Islamic 
society.  
 
In terms of the constitutional concepts that form the basis of this thesis, his critique of 
Islam’s relationship with the rule of law can be briefly summarized as one that is 
beset by endemic corruption
123
, frequent opportunistic amendments to the law itself, 
the legitimization of power relations that are inherently illiberal and despotic
124
, 
outbreaks of political violence, and sham elections that make a farce of the idea of 
accountability and representation.
125
 
 
In a similar fashion, Politics in the Middle East also tackles the subject of what could 
be termed the cultural and political character of Islam and Islamic states. Kedourie 
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argues that the first slate of 19
th
 Century reforms were done in imitation of Europe 
and with little regard for local custom.
126
 Even worse, according to Kedourie, is that 
some constitutions were written to gain recognition by Europeans with little effect in 
the actual governance of the state.
127
 In other cases, European powers mistakenly 
allowed themselves to be bullied and misled into allowing groups like the Wafd in 
Egypt to take over the political life of a country in the name of respecting 
representation of the majority, whilst in reality they may have had little public support 
to begin with.
128
 
 
In terms of restricting the power of government, Kedourie’s argument is even more 
forceful and remains firmly tied to the historical record of certain Islamic states. He 
claims that government power is unfettered and citizens are lacking in rights and 
expect virtually nothing of their governments. For instance, al-Ghazali’s theological 
injunction of the religious requirement and practical benefit of political obedience, 
which is quoted at length, is oddly characterized as one in which readers will see “a 
clear-eyed, skeptical pessimism, or even desperation, about what the ruled can at best 
expect from the rulers.”129  The only problem with this is that the entire passage 
simply talks about the chaos of a world without a strong leader, in a manner very 
similar to that of Hobbes. It never discusses expectations of the ruler or ruled at all; 
aside from the reason religion requires obedience.
130
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Kedourie’s only nod to any conception of limited power in the Islamic state is 
confined to a recognition that the scope of government action traditionally did not 
touch upon private or family law, which was dealt with by sharīʿa courts. This is 
given only the most limited treatment, and by way of criticism. He begins this 
admission by saying that “Traditional Middle Eastern rulers simply took no interest in 
a vast range of issues in which modern governments of all colors assume it their right 
and duty to intervene.” They didn’t bother to educate their subjects or to ensure that 
the most basic elements of sustenance were provided for. Instead, 
just as non-Muslims were left a large measure of freedom in their communal affairs, so 
the ruler took it for granted that certain affairs relating to the umma were the subject of 
divine prescription with which no one could tamper and were to be regulated by the 
qadis, or religious judges, according to the sharīʿa. All these, then, were built-in 
limitations on the activities of government under oriental despotism.
131
 
 
He sums up the various efforts of Muslim thinkers and political actors to contain the 
government with this gloomy assessment.  
 
The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the military coups d’état in Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq, and the regimes issuing from them, the destruction of the Lebanese 
Republic, and the mixed fortunes of the constitutional and representative government in 
the Turkish Republic are the outcome, thus far, of one hundred and fifty years of 
tormented endeavor to discard the old ways, which have ceased to satisfy and to replace 
them with something modern, eye-catching, and attractive. The torment does not seem 
likely to end soon.
132
 
 
One cannot help but ask how Kedourie can so easily lump Islam’s experience with 
government into such generalized descriptions and how he can even dismiss the very 
secular example of a place like Turkey, which is not only predominantly Muslim, but 
is at the heart of the last great Islamic empire. Indeed, the very contentious nature of 
its present debates on the role of Islam in society and the state show that politics is 
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alive and well in that state and that Turkish society itself is trying to find its own 
understanding and method of interpreting Islam’s role through popular and 
democratic means.
133
 
 
Throughout the book, much of Kedourie’s argument is focused either directly or 
indirectly upon the Ottomans and their successors, the Turks. After detailing the 
various reforms carried out in the 19
th
 century which ostensibly provided a variety of 
liberal guarantees of personal protection and freedom, he then goes on to show how 
they were ultimately meaningless because they simply transferred absolute power 
from the sultan to the bureaucracy.
134
 If the same standards were applied to the early 
iterations of liberalizing Western reforms they could also be roundly dismissed as 
historically insignificant and therefore mere aberrations.  
 
The Constitution of the United States, for example, was meant to institutionalize the 
convictions laid out in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created 
equal,” yet it permitted the institution of slavery and included the infamous “Three-
fifths Compromise,” which gave slave states 3/5 of a person in apportioning 
representation in the Congress and the Electoral College. Likewise, the much earlier 
and often cited Magna Carta protected very narrow segments of society from arbitrary 
rule and was a far cry from present-day standards of equality. Kedourie actually 
directly compares the 1808 Ottoman sened-i ittifak or “deed of agreement” between 
the Sultan and the Janissaries to the Magna Carta. He mentions that Sultan Mahmud 
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was forced to sign a legal contract which, in return for obedience and 
acknowledgement of his authority, he would recognize the property and inheritance 
rights of the nobles. Although comparing “this document to Magna Carta is natural,” 
he argues that it is a false comparison because the sened did not accurately reflect 
Ottoman power relations and was “speedily proved to be a dead letter.” Nowhere does 
he mention that King John, who signed the Magna Carta, also quickly rescinded it by 
giving the Pope lordship of England.
135
 Should these documents then be dismissed as 
mere political conveniences that did little during their time to enshrine or enlarge 
liberty?  
 
What emerges then from this examination of Kedourie’s portrayal of Islamic 
governance? Firstly, there is an inherent temptation to analyze foreign traditions in a 
way that makes them more distinct and “othered” than is necessarily justified by their 
histories. Secondly, the nuances found in localized versions of these traditions can 
easily be glossed over in the pursuit of finding generalized concepts that can be said 
to apply to an entire civilization. Finally, there is a glaring double standard in the way 
Islamic history and reform movements are treated when compared with the way in 
which the Western tradition is discussed.  
 
In order to further assess the validity of the critiques of Kedourie, Huntington, and 
others, and to gain an understanding of what the long-term prospects for 
constitutionalism in an Islamic context might be, it is first necessary to look at some 
key underpinning values constitutionalism from a Western perspective. It is this 
perspective that dominates constitutional discourse and sets the terms of the debate on 
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issues like freedom and human rights. The universalist aspirations of the Western 
constitutional tradition must therefore be interrogated in order to understand the 
degree to which certain ideas and values may indeed be universally valued by 
humanity and shared between Western and Muslim thinkers who have pondered them.  
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Chapter 1: Western Constitutionalism- Universal Norms or 
Contingent Cultural Concepts  
 
In order to assess these questions and to address the critics of constitutionalism 
generally and of constitutionalism in Islamic contexts specifically, it is vital to first 
take a comprehensive view of Western constitutional development as it is the 
dominant point of reference and voice in constitutional discourse. Briefly, this chapter 
will examine constitutionalism in terms of three fundamental constitutional values 
that directly respond to the critiques of Elie Kedourie and others by examining the 
relationship between constitutionalism and 1) The Rule of Law, 2) National Character 
and 3) Limits on Political Power. Again, this is by no means an exhaustive list of 
constitutional ideas, values, or institutions. Rather, it is an intentionally circumscribed 
inquiry designed to allow for comparison of a thin model of constitutionalism which 
can be examined in various cultural and historical settings. Each of these values will 
be examined primarily in light of the work of one key Western thinker or text: Cicero, 
Montesquieu and the Federalist Papers, respectively. The arguments of these texts and 
the surrounding literature will be explored in order to arrive at a more developed and 
holistic understanding of each term. 
 
It is the use of the rule of law to create a potentially eternal social reality, i.e. The 
Roman State, which will first be examined in the work of Cicero. 
1.1. The Eternal and Universal Constitution- Cicero’s Dream of a Law-
Governed World 
 
 
Cato used to say that our constitution was superior to others, because in their 
case there had usually been one individual who had equipped his state with laws 
and institutions, for example, Minos of Crete, Lycurgus of Sparta…Our own 
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constitution, on the other hand, had been established not by one man’s ability 
but by that of many, not in the course of one man’s life but over several ages and 
generations. He used to say that no genius of such magnitude had ever existed 
that he could be sure of overlooking nothing; and that no collection of able 
people at a single point of time could have sufficient foresight to take account of 
everything; there has to be practical experience over a long period of history.
136
 
 
In the introductory section of Book 2 of his Republic, Cicero discusses the founding 
of Rome and its distinctiveness. He is keen to show that Rome is an exemplar not just 
of the ideal society, but primarily of the ideal state, which alone can deliver the 
opportunity at the good life that all people long for.
137
 From the passage above it is 
crystal clear that he sees constitutions as derived from collective experience and the 
accretion of ancestral mores and customs over a long period of time.
138
 In turn, this 
allows for the gradual acceptance and consolidation of law such that it becomes 
largely self-enforcing.
139
 As Scipio continues in Cicero’s dialogue: 
 
…states in which the best men strive for praise and honour, shunning disgrace and 
dishonour. They are not deterred so much by fear of the penalty prescribed by law as 
by a sense of shame- that dread, as it were, of justified rebuke which nature has 
imparted to man. The statesman develops this sense by making use of public opinion, 
and completes it with the aid of education and social training. So in the end citizens are 
deterred from crime by moral scruples as much as by fear.
140
  
 
This manner of looking at the constitution seems perfectly in line with the scope and 
definition given constitutionalism by McIlwain with its emphasis on historical 
development. It is also interesting to note the almost explicit advocacy of a pluralist, 
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consensus-based approach to establishing a ruling order and the way in which Cicero 
combines a conservative concern with observance of the ancestral ways with a 
modernizing twist that accepts the need for constant, gradual change in actual 
legislation. In effect, Cicero is arguing that the consolidation of a legal order over the 
generations ultimately should make enforcing that order relatively easy because the 
succession of steward-statesmen who help to enact law do so in consultation with 
“public opinion.” This same majority of the public will be those who provide the 
education and social training Cicero says are needed to foster the best kind of citizens, 
again doing much of the hard work of the state by accepted custom and free will, 
minimizing the need for force and naked expressions of power. As President Reagan’s 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III cites in his “Law of Constitution” speech,141 “We 
are heirs to a long Western tradition of the rule of law. Some 2,000 years ago, for 
example, the great statesman of the Roman Republic, Cicero, observed, ‘We are in 
bondage to the law in order that we may be free.’”142 
 
In effect, this idea of being bound to the law, even if one does not agree with a 
particular law or set of laws, is the very essence of the much used, and much less 
often defined term, the Rule of Law. Tom Bingham undertakes a historical and 
detailed look at the term’s development and contemporary meaning in his aptly 
named book, The Rule of Law. “The core of the existing principle,” he argues, “is… 
that all persons and all authorities within the state, whether public or private, should 
be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect 
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(generally) in the future and publicly administered by the courts.”143 Bingham 
evocatively demonstrates that this condition of equality before the law is not one to be 
taken for granted or to be assumed universal, reminding the reader that the 
manifestations of a regime that does not embrace this concept are present in a nasty 
variety of horrors: 
the midnight nock on the door, the sudden disappearance, the show trial, the subjection 
of prisoners to genetic experiment, the confession extracted by torture, the gulag and the 
concentration camp, the gas chamber, the practice of genocide or ethnic cleansing, the 
waging of aggressive war. The list is endless.
144
 
 
Interestingly, Bingham’s formulation of the Rule of Law and its antithesis is one that 
does not mention democracy or representation. He clearly favors government that is 
democratically elected and accountable, but for the purposes of his argument it is not 
essential. The same goes for constitutional discourse more generally. An order can be 
governed by law and constitutional without also being representative, republican, or 
otherwise democratic. In fact, the abuses of state power he catalogues may very well 
be sanctioned by popular majorities. Placing the rule of law at the forefront of 
assessing the constitutionality of a regime removes the temptation to conflate 
constitutionalism and democratization, and emphasizes the role that constitutionalism 
plays in placing sovereignty outside the hands of any would-be tyrant or tyrants so 
that equal protection and equal “benefit of laws publicly made” are available to all 
citizens. This also allows the conceptual tools of constitutionalism and the rule of law 
to be applied to various historical and political contexts, even allowing one to define 
which parts of a given state’s institutions are or are not run constitutionally. 
 
                                                          
143
 Bingham, T. H. The Rule of Law. London; New York: Allen Lane, (2010). p. 8. 
 
144
 Ibid., p. 9. 
P a g e  | 69 
 
It is well known that the Roman Republic was not a democracy in the mode of the 
New England town hall, nor were all people within its jurisdiction equally protected 
by the law. All citizens, however, were indeed equally protected by the laws and 
entitled to various rights according to their position. Thus, it is the historical role of 
Roman aristocracy that is essential to understanding Cicero’s conception of the idea 
of being bound to a sovereign law. Although certainly not a democrat according to 
modern understandings, he is well aware that power in the Republic is very fluid and 
quickly changes hands. Although there were societal ceilings on certain groups, lesser 
noble families could potentially achieve fame, honor, and wealth in a relatively short 
span of time should they do well politically. As EW Atkins point out, the reason that 
ancestral custom was so important to the ruling class was three-fold. “First, these men 
learnt their ethics from their predecessors, especially from exemplary stories of 
heroism. Secondly, the pre-eminent position of the elite had remarkably little 
protection in law; it relied upon a powerful respect for precedent (emphasis mine). 
Thirdly, the family rather than the individual was the primary location of reputation 
and of pride.”145 
 
This suggests that legitimacy, as much as power, is key to the establishment of the 
Rule of Law. The imperial experience of Rome likewise shows that sovereignty, 
rather than being an intrinsic part of a state’s national character, is in fact a 
characteristic that is anthropomorphized onto the state via the recognition of its 
legitimacy and its beneficence by its subjects. This implies, and Cicero explicitly 
states, that the statesman must be persuasive as well as just because it is vital that 
society be convinced of the wisdom of his rule, otherwise he will be unable to be 
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elected to a further term of office.
146
 Furthermore, the laws passed by the legislative 
body must meet certain standards if they are to attain what Cicero calls “law in the 
right sense,” which is “right reason in harmony with nature.”147 The danger for the 
state is that if it does not pass laws in accordance with this higher law, the state itself 
could die, which is “never natural…when a state is destroyed, eliminated, and blotted 
out, it is rather as if (to compare small with great) this whole world were to collapse 
and pass away.”148 To briefly recapitulate, Cicero traces a linear thread of legitimacy 
that uses natural law as its basis, which in turn is recognized by human reason and 
codified into laws, and these laws are given legitimacy because the community 
accepts their accordance with reason and the overriding value that reason places upon 
the law to create a society in which the good of society and the maintenance of the 
state that upholds it are paramount. 
 
One may be tempted to suggest that Cicero’s view of law is inherently imperialistic 
and self-serving for a Roman aristocrat however when he claims for the virtuous law 
of nature that it “cannot be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, nor can 
it be totally rescinded. We cannot be exempted from this law by decree of the Senate 
or the people…There will not be one law at Rome and another in Athens…but all 
peoples in all times will be embraced by a single and eternal and unchangeable 
law.”149 It is important to note that although he subscribes to natural law doctrine 
along with its inherent difficulties in assuming reason as a given, and more 
troublingly the conclusions of reason as also foregone conclusions, Cicero never 
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suggests that the particular edicts of any regime are eternal or universal, nor does he 
argue that institutions and state organs are themselves likewise eternal and/or 
universal. The very structure of his work in The Republic recognizes the development 
of different types of regimes and that they are derived from local experience as well 
as universal values. 
 
This lesson has particular relevance to various development projects that emphasize 
what Frank Upham calls the “Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy.” This concept, according to 
Upham is a concerted effort by development agencies to encourage/compel 
developing states to follow a formalist version of the Rule of Law in which there is 
“strict adherence to established legal rules and freedom from the corrupting influences 
of politics… promoters contend that such reforms are essential to establishing 
stability and norms that encourage investment and sustainable economic growth.”150 It 
has gained currency amongst powerful state actors and NGOs as a way of creating 
accountability in the use of development aid funds and in providing a means to create 
opportunities for economic investment (some may say exploitation) that should allow 
these states to eventually sustain themselves. Aside from Upham’s criticisms that the 
language used by development agencies on the Rule of Law tends to be composed of 
platitudes, exclusive, and evangelical, he highlights a danger that these development 
regimes pose that could have implications beyond simply offending cultural 
sensibilities. The very drive to create stability can in fact weaken existing, and 
therefore likely internally legitimized, societal structures. This potentially places at 
great risk “the existing informal means of social order, without which no legal system 
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can succeed… Legal anarchy can result in a society that has a new, formal legal 
system but lacks the social capital, institutions, and discipline to make use of it.”151 
 
In addition to being concerned with development, Rule of Law discourse is often 
conflated with security discourse, and although Cicero seems to think that providing 
for security is certainly essential, his main concern is that the government itself 
functions in a way that provides for the longevity and overall benefit of the state itself. 
This, he believes, provides the best chance at the good life for its citizens. Here it is 
useful to look at his On Duties, in which Cicero imparts various pieces of wisdom to 
his son. Regarding warfare and security he takes a moderate approach quoting the 
maxim: “Let arms yield to the toga, and laurels to laudation.”152 Discussing the 
pinnacle of his own career in averting civil war he goes on to say, rather immodestly,  
 
Through my vigilance and my counsel the very arms swiftly slipped and fell from the 
hands of the most audacious citizens. Was any achievement of war ever so great? What 
military triumph can stand comparison? I am allowed to boast to you, Marcus my son. 
For yours it is both to inherit my glory and to imitate my deeds… Therefore the 
courageous deeds of civilians are not inferior to those of soldiers. Indeed the former 
should be given even more effort and devotion that the latter…In this field the civilians 
who are in charge of public affairs provide no less a benefit than those who wage war. 
And so it is by their counsel that a war may be avoided and terminated, and sometimes 
declared…We must therefore value the reason which makes decisions above the courage 
which makes battle; yet we must be careful to do that because we have reasoned about 
what is beneficial, and not merely for the sake of avoiding war. Moreover, war should 
always be undertaken in such a way that one is seen to be aiming only at peace.
153
 
 
Providing security and leadership for the state requires both wisdom and practical 
experience. Upon examining this text one sees traditional security terms like 
vigilance, triumph, and declaration of war. On the other hand, the emphasis is clearly 
on political resolution of conflicts within proper channels and this endeavor will only 
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be successful if vigilance is accompanied by “counsel” and the “courageous deeds of 
civilians.” This is why reason is to be valued above courage because it is only reason 
that can provide the wisdom needed to decide whether to undertake battle in the first 
place and to do so only when aiming at peace and the benefit of the state rather than 
personal glory. As if to ensure this message hits its mark, Cicero warns that “The 
dangers attending great undertakings fall sometimes upon their authors and sometimes 
upon the nation. Again, some are called to put their lives at risk, others their glory and 
the goodwill of their fellow-citizens. We must, therefore, be more eager to risk our 
own than the common welfare.”154 
 
Thus, unlike his hero Plato, Cicero’s ideal ruler is the Wise Politician rather than a 
Philosopher King. Both may have similar knowledge and regard for philosophy, but 
the former has the benefit of applying philosophy in an earthly context and 
understands the value of accommodation and compromise in keeping the various parts 
of government and society in sync. That is why the ideal ruler is not an unattainable 
mystic but someone who can actually “offer himself as a mirror to his fellow-
citizens.”155 
 
This balancing of sectors within society and government should create a symphonic 
harmony of interests that restrains any one group from dominating the others, whether 
in society or government. 
Just as with string instruments or pipes or in singers’ voices a certain harmony of 
different sounds must be maintained… and as that harmony, though arising from 
management of very different notes, produces a pleasing and agreeable sound, so a state 
by adjusting the proportions of the highest, lowest, and intermediate classes, as if they 
were musical notes, achieves harmony. What, in the case of singing, musicians call 
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harmony is, in the state, concord; it constitutes the tightest and most effective bond of 
security (emphasis mine).
156
 
 
Note that this metaphor says that society’s classes should be adjusted in proportion 
“as if they were musical notes.” This implies that the means for creating stability and 
the “tightest and most effective bond of security” is the subtle raising and lowering of 
groups, or very gradual and incremental adjustments so as not to create a jarring 
discord, in order to create a society that is cohesive, a recognizable entity in its own 
right as much as the instruments by which its politics and relationships are played out. 
These instruments then must be the mechanisms by which the state is organized and 
creates and enforces legislation, in short, its constitution. 
 
Ultimately, this is why the mixed constitution is the only one which potentially 
satisfies Cicero’s desire for the longevity, stability, and justice that can allow the 
accepted rule of law to embed itself firmly within a society and avoid stasis. Although 
fragmentary, he explicitly states this preference in Book 2 of The Republic saying “the 
best possible political constitution represents a judicious blend of these three types: 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.”157 Brian Tamanaha describes the essence of 
Cicero’s constitutional contribution to the Western tradition as one in which this 
mixed constitution allocated more power to rule to the best citizens, who are the most 
educated and wise, as they “have the capacity to discern the requirements of natural 
law that should govern society.”158 
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1.2. Monte-skewed, Constitution as Character or Caricature?- 
Montesquieu’s Vision of National Spirit and National Law 
 
 
A casual reading of Montesquieu’s 1748 The Spirit of the Laws could easily lead one 
to conclude that this work is typical of its time in its treatment of the issue of culture 
and governance, particularly in its deterministic statements on non-Western peoples 
and the effects of climate, religion, and culture upon the types of constitutional 
regimes that exist and can possibly exist. Although many critiques of this work by an 
18
th
 Century French aristocrat are undoubtedly deserved, it is nonetheless vital to 
understand the impact his writings have had upon the development and understanding 
of constitutionalism in the West and the Western understanding of its potential 
elsewhere. Melvin Richter contends that contrary to what some of his critics say,  
in both his Considerations and the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu moved toward a 
qualified determinism that made room for positive intervention and correction of abuses, 
injustices, or practical defects by legislators and statesmen. Increasingly, his argument 
took the form of pointing out that the causes of all human practices may be understood by 
analysis both of physical nature and by the study of history, government, law, and 
society.
159
 
 
Richter himself is forced to admit, however, that although there “are a number of 
national character sketches scattered throughout Montesquieu's work. On the whole, 
they are difficult to reconcile with the project of arriving at a science based on a few 
laws applicable to all societies.”160 Despite this, Donald S. Lutz argues, “The culture-
power-justice nexus that characterizes modern constitutionalism was first dissected by 
Montesquieu, and an examination of his approach to constitutionalism provides a 
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useful window into why we developed the political technology of constitutional 
democracy and why the future of this technology is not a foregone conclusion.”161  
 
Furthermore, Montesquieu is credited (along with Gravina) of another key 
innovation, which is to separate civil society and the State. This is in direct contrast 
with Aristotelian
162
 and Ciceronian thought, indeed with ancient and medieval 
thought generally, which saw the economic, political, and social as all part of the 
same polis or societas civilis.
163
 It is this separation that allows for the specifically 
cultural to be analyzed for its effects on the governmental or political. As long as they 
were conflated into one concept this was impossible. Foreshadowing and laying the 
groundwork for later thinkers like Hans Kelsen,  
 
in strict contradiction to the law-of-nature school, which assumes a uniform, everlasting 
law to be inferred once for all from a supposed contract which is essentially identical 
throughout the whole world, Montesquieu teaches that law depends on multifarious 
conditions and varies at once with these conditions. This idea of the correspondence of 
law with outward circumstances perhaps marks the greatest progress effected by a single 
man in legal science.
164 
 
The main concern then, of Montesquieu’s work is to demonstrate the way in which 
the national spirit creates and animates the legal framework and its operation. Briefly, 
he notes that, “Many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the 
government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a general spirit is formed 
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as a result.”165 This general spirit then informs not only the mechanisms of the state, 
but its telos as well. In Book 11, Chapter 5 he gives some examples of the specific 
purposes of certain historical states as follows: 
 
Although all states have the same purpose in general, which is to maintain themselves, yet 
each state has a purpose that is peculiar to it. Expansion was the purpose of Rome; war, that 
of Lacedaemonia; religion, that of the Jewish laws; commerce, that of Marseilles; public 
tranquility, that of the laws of China; navigation, that of the laws of the Rhodians; natural 
liberty was the purpose of the police of the savages…166 
 
 
Even a cursory examination of this excerpt reveals two essential qualities about 
Montesquieu’s vision of constitutionalism. The first is that he is attempting to address 
the concept of governance on a global and timeless level, as noted by his reference to 
“all states” and his inclusion of regimes from widely ranging historical eras and 
geographical regions. His wide reading is very useful in citing observable “facts” that 
can justify broad statements about the State generally and states specifically. The 
other tendency that evidences itself is an attempt to apply this same knowledge in a 
focused manner to distil the character of a given nation to its essence. Hence, he 
makes reference to the purpose of Rome being expansion; the Jewish laws, religion; 
etc.  
 
Taking a cue from the scientific revolution, Montesquieu shows how he arrives at his 
characterizations of national character by analyzing observable factors that influence 
this character, and consequently the state that develops from it.
167
 These factors 
include the manner of achieving subsistence or the occupation of the people, the 
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primary religion practiced, the way in which equality and liberty are conceived and 
exercised, and the tolerance and type of tyranny that may be present. From these he is 
able to not only paint a portrait of a general national spirit, but also of the type of 
government or constitution best suited to, and most likely to emanate from, that 
group. 
 
One of the most easily observable aspects of a society is the way in which its 
members maintain subsistence and potentially achieve wealth. Closely related to this 
is the climate and terrain this group occupies. To this effect, Montesquieu states that 
“The goodness of a country’s lands establishes dependence there naturally.”168 This 
statement is far from revolutionary. However, he continues by discussing a variety of 
climates and terrains and the types of societies and political arrangements that develop 
in them. He explains the connection as follows: 
 
The laws are very closely related to the way that various peoples procure their 
subsistence. There must be a more extensive code of laws for a people attached to 
commerce and the sea than for a people satisfied to cultivate their lands. There must be a 
greater one for the latter than for a people who live by their herds. There must be a 
greater one for these last than for a people who live by hunting.
169
 
 
 
This arrangement is clearly hierarchical and may display a degree of prejudice toward 
commercial societies. The constitutional component of this passage though is notable 
in the emphasis on the economic function of society, which is seen in the whole 
context of the work to be itself a function of both the climate/terrain and the national 
mores. It is interesting that Montesquieu should spend so much time discussing the 
climates of Asia, America, and Europe and the effect of living on the plains (prone to 
attack and despotism) versus living in the mountains (independent and fiercely free), 
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when he ultimately declares other causes to be more decisive in creating social 
arrangements and institutions.
170 
Karl Kriesel, in his profession as a geographer, notes 
that the determinist label given to Montesquieu on account of the sections of Spirit of 
the Laws on climate is both misleading and unfair. He recounts Montesquieu’s own 
defense of his work and himself when called to testify at the University of Paris on 
charges of being irreligious, that although he did indeed write that “There are climates 
where the impulses of nature have such a force that morality has almost none,” that 
this in no way indicated that he dismissed the role of morality in the world. Rather, in 
the chapters on climate he discussed climate, and in the chapters on morality he 
discussed morality. Furthermore, Kriesel argued, when taken as a whole work, The 
Spirit of the Laws “presents a perpetual triumph of morality over climate, or rather 
over the physical causes in general.”171 This leads Kriesel to give him the label of 
“possibilist,” rather than determinist. 
 
Moving beyond the simplistic discussion of climate and terrain, the fruits of these 
seemingly odd chapters become more apparent. Because climate and terrain influence 
the way people engage with the land and what occupations they undertake, it also 
influences the way that they conceive of property. This, in turn, drastically impacts 
not only the type, but even the amount, of law that will be necessary to govern a given 
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people.
172
 Even societies that do not have a great deal of formal law are still governed 
by a sort of law. “One can call the institutions of these peoples’ mores rather than 
laws.”173 
 
In discussing mores, it is natural to also examine their more formal incarnation in 
religion. The importance of religion in Montesquieu’s thought is that it is extremely 
prejudicial in determining whether a regime is more or less likely to be despotic. He 
begins the section of Spirit of the Laws that deals with religion (Part 5) by noting the 
utility of religion. Interestingly, his emphasis is on its usefulness in reining in the 
ruler(s) rather than its effects on the morals of the citizenry as evidenced in his 
contention that “Even if it were useless for subjects to have a religion, it would not be 
useless for princes to have one and to whiten with foam the only bridle that can hold 
those who fear no human laws.”174 This of course assumes that the prince is not bound 
or restrained by human law as he ideally would be in a mixed constitutional system. It 
also implies that religion is particularly useful in regimes that tend toward despotism, 
as it is the only conceivable check upon the supreme power of the head of state.
175
 
 
Conversely, religion can exercise its own sort of despotism and Montesquieu is 
clearly reticent of the conflation of religious and civil law. “Human laws made to 
speak to the spirit should give precepts and no counsels at all,” he writes.176 Likewise, 
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“religion, made to speak to the heart, should give many counsels and few precepts.”177 
In other words, the purpose of law is to tell people what they must do rather than what 
they should do, and the purpose of religion is primarily, though not entirely, to advise 
people on how they should live in order to live better. He gives as an example how the 
Christian counsel on the value of celibacy resulted in its being mandated for an entire 
class of people with the result that “the legislator tired himself, he tired the society, 
making men execute by precept what those who love perfection would have executed 
by counsel.”178 Clearly, the political state is not meant to be perfect, but simply good 
in the sense that it allows one to pursue the good life, “for perfection does not concern 
men or things universally.”179 
 
As regards political subjects, Montesquieu argues that the people themselves should 
seek a religion given by God, but where not able they should have a system of belief 
that conforms with the dictates of morality.
180
 In its ideal form, that is, outside of a 
particular tradition or religious revelation, this can be seen in Stoic philosophy. The 
use of Stoicism brings together the principles of the Rule of Law as properly aspiring 
to emulate an eternal law and the formation of the character of a people worthy of 
wise rule as it seeks only to work for “men’s happiness and (to exercise) the duties of 
society… Born for society they believed their duty was to work for it…it seemed that 
only the happiness of others could increase their own.”181 Here can be seen a 
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preference for a society in which the individual good is subordinated to the greater 
social good. If a society were to be based on Stoicism this would have the benefit of 
being good for the individual as well, as they would count the happiness of others as 
important as their own, and thus increase their personal happiness.  
 
In accordance with this ideal, religion and civil law should and do act in conjunction, 
whether in Protestant, Catholic, “Mohammedan,” or other forms. The relationship 
between these two factors is inversely proportional for Montesquieu who says that: 
“As religion and civil laws should aim principally to make good citizens of men, one 
sees that when either of these departs from this end, the other should aim more toward 
it; the less repressive religion is, the more the civil laws should repress.”182 This sets 
up an interesting and ironic formula in which strict religious dogma could be argued 
to be a force for political liberalism.
183
 As evidence of its validity, he cites the case of 
Japan, where there are “almost no dogmas” and a concept of “neither paradise nor 
hell,” which requires law of “extraordinary severity” that is “executed with an 
extraordinary punctiliousness.”184 In the next breath however, Montesquieu seems to 
change his mind as to the causal nature of this relationship. Rather than seeing Islam, 
with its strict beliefs, as a religion which leads to greater political freedom, he notes 
that one of these beliefs is predestination (he conveniently omits significant Christian 
allegiances to this idea, most notably amongst Calvinists), and this belief stems from 
“laziness of the soul.” On this dubious basis, he recommends that law be used to 
arouse these drowsy religious sluggards. He does not elaborate on what this would 
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mean in practice however, leading one to argue that on the whole, Montesquieu 
provides theoretical support for arguments like Kedourie’s that cite the “Arab mind” 
and other such deterministic/Orientalist factors in explaining the failure of 
constitutionalism. If however, one leaves out what Montesquieu specifically says 
about the values of one religion versus another, the actual theoretical framework of a 
successful constitution simply calls for a morality that is in line with the immutable 
values of Stoicism and the like, and where these values are religious they should 
encourage industry in business and restraint in manners. This would not seem to 
negatively prejudice non-Christian societies against very strong constitutional 
regimes. Indeed, Christianity and Islam both meet an important religious criterion for 
Montesquieu in that they have doctrines of both heaven and hell, or reward and 
punishment. Balancing these two ideas alleviates the danger of certain salvation 
which leads to “scorn for death.” After all, “How can one constrain by the laws a man 
who believes himself sure that the greatest penalty the magistrates can inflict on him 
will end in a moment only to begin his happiness?”185 Of course in reality, radicals of 
any religion seem to embrace this certainty nonetheless to often disastrous effect as 
evidenced by the ongoing appeal of martyrdom. 
 
Religious ideals aside, Montesquieu is primarily concerned with happiness in the 
present life. This happiness varies as much as people vary, and as such is a function of 
both equality and liberty. Montesquieu’s definition of equality is illustrative of this 
nuanced view. He states: “As far as the sky is from the earth, so far is the true spirit of 
equality from the spirit of extreme equality… It seeks not to have no master but to 
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have only one’s equals for masters.”186 This definition is notable in that it allows for a 
variety of political forms, assuming that the different classes of society have some 
degree of autonomy from one another. Indeed, he notes that “Men are equal in 
republican government; they are equal in despotic government; in the former, it is 
because they are everything; in the latter, it is because they are nothing.”187 What 
Montesquieu calls “extreme equality” would seem to be something akin to Burke’s 
“levelling” and amounts to a type of anarchy that he clearly believes will result in a 
Hobbesian State of Nature where all are equal by virtue of their equal ability to kill, 
and equal susceptibility to being killed. His definition of equality is thus tied into 
liberty such that people are considered free if they are only under the dominion of 
their peers. Given his apparent agnosticism on which form of government is best in a 
universal sense, this view could hold true in societies as simple and essentially 
egalitarian as hunter-gatherer tribes
188
 or as stratified as a monarchy, so long as the 
powers of the various social classes are restrained and balanced by one another. 
 
Where power within the State becomes imbalanced or unreflective of the national 
character, Montesquieu argues it gives rise to tyranny. Of tyranny, he states that there 
are “two sorts,” “a real one, which consists in the violence of the government, and one 
of opinion, which is felt when those who govern establish things that run counter to a 
nation’s way of thinking.”189 His argument nicely supports present-day “realists” who 
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contend that Western nation-building exercises are counter-productive and often 
doomed to fail. Whereas today’s commentators might cite ongoing instability in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, he appealed to the classics citing,  
 
The Parthians could not tolerate this king who, having been raised in Rome, made 
himself affable and accessible to everyone. Even liberty has appeared intolerable to 
peoples who were not accustomed to enjoying it. Thus is pure air sometimes harmful to 
those who have lived in swampy countries.
190
 
 
 
Tyranny is thus not a condition only of actual oppression, but one in which a legal 
framework is imposed upon a social structure for which it is not fit for purpose. This 
could easily form the basis of an argument against imperialism of both political and 
cultural forms, and of the need for political change to change in response to social 
change, rather than attempting the reverse. The result of either form of tyranny will 
often be violence. Here again, he cites the example of Japan (an ironic example given 
its post World War II transformation into a parliamentary democracy by virtue of 
military dictat). In contrast to the extreme number and severity of laws and 
punishments under the Imperial government and feudal lords, he argues the following: 
 “A wise legislator would have sought to lead men’s spirits back by a just tempering of 
penalties and rewards; by maxims of philosophy, morality, and religion, matched to this 
character; by the just application of the rules of honor; by using shame as punishment, 
and by the enjoyment of a constant happiness and a sweet tranquility.”191  
 
 
Upon examination of this passage, he reveals himself to be heeding his own advice, 
despite prescribing societal fixes from the outside. The means he recommends to 
establish peace and rule of law include concepts rooted in traditional Japanese culture 
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like philosophy, morality, honor and shame. Likewise, one of the societal rewards he 
proposes is tranquility. This demonstrates that his view of the “spirit” of the law does 
not prohibit criticism and constructive dialogue from within or from without a society. 
It does indicate, though, that any change should be gradual, evolutionary, and should 
not upset the delicate balance achieved through the accretion of influences from 
climate, terrain, history, culture, religion, etc.  
 
 
Ultimately then, The Spirit of the Laws can be seen as a sort of sociological account of 
a wide array of constitutions and corresponding nations/people groups. The 
development, maintenance, and alteration of these systems is clearly portrayed as an 
organic interaction of many disparate influences which can reinforce or 
counterbalance one another, but which nonetheless should be changed with the utmost 
care. Its inherent conservatism serves to actually restrain any type of ruler by virtue of 
its incredible breadth of national case studies which all reinforce Montesquieu’s 
maxim that “The legislator is to follow the spirit of the nation when doing so is not 
contrary to the principles of government, for we do nothing better than what we do 
freely and by following our natural genius.”192 This idea of the natural genius, in 
counterpoint to those who would simply label Montesquieu a deterministic 
Eurocentrist, is one that opens the possibility of any group of people developing a rule 
of law that is uniquely tailored to their circumstances, customs, and concerns. Is this 
not, in essence, the very definition of what political freedom aims to accomplish? To 
the moralist, the bureaucrat, and the despot, Montesquieu makes this admonition: 
 
“If there were in the world a nation which had a sociable humor, an openness of heart; a 
joy in life, a taste, an ease in communicating its thoughts; which was lively pleasant, 
playful, sometimes imprudent, often indiscreet; and which had with all that, courage, 
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generosity, frankness, and a certain point of honor, one should avoid disturbing its 
manners by laws, in order not to disturb its virtues.”193 
 
This endeavor of avoiding “disturbing the manners” of a state is one which is greatly 
aided by the next constitutional concept being discussed, the Separation of Powers 
doctrine. 
1.3. One Body, Many Members- The “Specialization” of Powers as a 
Mechanism of Restraint in the Federalist Papers 
 
It may be useful to approach the doctrine of separation of powers by looking to the origin 
of that idea in the interaction of intellectual theory and practical problems during the 
American revolutionary era.
194
  
 
The impulse to separate comes from within the departments: powered by the allegiance 
of individuals, each department pushes outward and expands to the limits of its power. 
Imagine that the departments were parts of a machine-as the Framers were wont to do 
and that each part represented an expandable chamber sharing a wall with another part. 
In such a scheme, each chamber's internal expansion serves to limit the reach of the 
power of its coordinate branch. Interest fuels both this hydraulic pressure and its restraint 
by expanding the chamber to limits set by the expansion of neighbor chambers. In such a 
scheme, the interior structure of the departments has been "so contrived" that its "several 
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in 
their proper places. (Quoting Federalist 51)
195
 
 
In sharp relief to Montesquieu’s concern that a society not be corrupted by law, is the 
recognition of later thinkers that society is almost never monolithic and nearly always 
contains majority and minority factions. In democracies then, it becomes an urgent 
matter for the government to ensure protection of minority rights whilst still 
respecting the will of the majority. This effort is usually given the neat doctrinal title 
of Separation of Powers. For the purposes of this discussion, it is important mainly for 
its unique ability to self-regulate the use and abuse of state power with minimal use of 
explicit legal limitations on that same power. As the quote above suggests, the issue 
of the separation of powers is not simply one of assigning specific roles to the discrete 
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branches of government, but rather is one of assigning power in such a way that no 
societal group can hold a preponderance of power over the others.
196
 It is also meant 
to create specific proficiencies in the various departments so that they can specialize 
in the sphere assigned to them by the constitutional framework. 
 
Just as a physical body is threatened when one group of cells multiply beyond their 
proper bounds resulting in cancer, so too is a government threatened when one 
specialized branch grows beyond its proper bounds. The question, however, is one of 
determining where those proper bounds lie, where they overlap, and to what extent 
government functions can or should be shared. 
 
Of all the constitutional concepts discussed thus far, the idea that government power 
should be structured into separate departments that could check one another’s power 
is arguably the latest to reach anything approaching its present form. Ancient theorists 
certainly philosophized about the government having different organs, but this was 
typically done in such a fashion as to ensure that the government would be efficient 
and just. Plato’s Republic has its philosopher kings, but it is not assumed that they 
need to have their power limited. If the virtuous are ruling, then why limit that 
virtue?
197
 Likewise, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan features a frontispiece depicting a 
body politic rendered in actual corporeal form, with a king as its head and the 
assembled masses below him. The king is transcendent, and within the rest of the 
body there is no indication of any social groups or governmental divisions. To his 
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mind, the paramount value delivered by the State is the protection of life and limb, 
which is achieved only through complete public submission to the will of the 
sovereign.
198
 
 
The framers of the American Constitution were well aware of the historical 
development of government and the role they would potentially be playing in it. 
Alexander Hamilton himself boldly asserted this contention in Federalist No. 9, 
saying: 
The science of politics, however, like most other sciences has received great 
improvement… The regular distribution of power into distinct departments- the 
introduction of legislative balances and checks- the institution of courts composed of 
judges, holding their offices during good behaviour- the representation of the people in the 
legislature by deputies of their own election- these are either wholly new discoveries or 
have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, 
and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained 
and its imperfections lessened or avoided.
199
 
 
It is clear from this excerpt that the principle of separation of powers was at the 
forefront of the process that yielded the particular institutions and powers enumerated 
in the Constitution. Clearly this division is one that aims, in a traditional sense, to 
achieve justice in minimizing harm and maximizing public good within government. 
That this principle should be so explicitly discussed in The Federalist Papers is 
somewhat surprising given that there is nothing actually written in the Constitution 
about this idea. It is implicit in the institutional arrangements, which themselves are 
worded in language designed to be vague enough to allow for flexibility. In his 
discussion of the term and its development, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
says: 
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The principle of the separation of powers was set forth in the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts well before it found its way into the federal 
document… with an economy of expression many would urge as a model for modern 
judicial opinions, the principle of separation of powers is found only in the structure of 
the document, which successively describes where the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, respectively, reside. One should not think, however, that the principle was any 
less important to the federal framers. Madison said of it, in Federalist No. 47, that “no 
political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of 
more enlightened patrons of liberty.”200 
 
 
The adoption of the present US Constitution was an occasion of immense public 
debate and brought forth a whole series of arguments for and against the new 
institutional arrangements, with the primary concerns being to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of both authoritarian rule and mob rule. Equally important was to establish a 
more firmly federal union than that created by the Articles of Confederation, 
particularly one that would take into account the lessons gained from the functioning 
of the various state constitutions.  
 
As the oldest written constitution still in use, the US Constitution was to have 
significant ramifications for all subsequent constitutional orders, particularly as the 
US came to a position of international dominance in the post-World War II era. This 
in turn, greatly affected constitutionalism in a general sense with the post-war era’s 
corresponding proliferation of constitutionally-conceived international institutions 
(the UN, the IMF, GATT, etc.). The Federalist Papers, written by James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton, are arguable the most famous and influential set of documents to 
emerge from the effort to enact the US constitution. In these essays, they marshal an 
array of theoretical support from classical and Enlightenment sources, in addition to 
existing constitutional documents, to answer specific objections that had been raised 
against establishing the stronger institutional framework that the new constitution 
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embodied. In a sense then, the discussion of the Separation of Powers doctrine that is 
found in their words is one that is both the culmination and protector of the previously 
mentioned principles of constitutional orders being based upon the rule of law and in 
keeping with national character.  
 
1.3.A. Why Separate Power?- Maintaining Proper Organ Function in a 
Republican State 
 
Before the principle of separation of powers can be assessed in relation to the 
questions enumerated above, it is first necessary to examine what Madison and 
Hamilton saw as the key components of the state and their respective roles. According 
to Madison,  
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society… In a society under the 
forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy 
may truly be said to reign… even the stronger individuals are prompted by the 
uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as 
well as themselves.
201
  
 
This view is in stark contrast to the classical view that assumes rulers are virtuous 
rulers. The entire point, it seems, in creating countervailing forces in government is to 
ensure that the edifice of government itself creates and sustains a just order despite the 
self-seeking inclinations of human nature. The channeling of wills toward the public 
good occurs at two levels. On the one hand,  
among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it (the United States) 
embraces, a coalition of the majority could seldom take place on any other principles 
than those of justice and the general good; and the being thus less danger to a minor from 
the will of the major party, there must be less pretext also, to provide for the security of 
the former, by introducing a will not dependent on the latter; or in other words, a will 
independent of the society itself.
202
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The first check on tyranny then is the very requirement of majority rule in passing 
legislation. Although one person’s will may easily be corrupted and selfish, the 
Framers are more optimistic about the collective sensibilities of a community leading 
to just laws, particularly when aired in consideration of the facts afforded by a free 
press and the debate afforded by freedom of expression. The second barrier to tyranny 
is cryptically referred to as “a will not dependent on the latter.”  What constitutes this 
“will independent of society itself?”203  
 
In answer to this question Madison continues, saying “It is no less certain than it is 
important… that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practicable sphere, the 
more duly capable it will be of self government. And happily for the republican cause, 
the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious 
modification and mixture of the federal principle.”204 Again, it is clear that Madison 
thinks the very diversity of society will lend itself to self-government, but more than 
that, that this system can be further improved by “modification and mixture of the 
federal principle.” The federal principle is entirely concerned with dividing powers 
between bodies with their own spheres of sovereignty, and his allusion to a mixture 
foreshadows both Madison’s and Hamilton’s later discussion of overlap between 
branches of government.  
 
Having looked at the forces that restrict government as a whole, it is now possible to 
examine the way each branch of government is viewed both functionally and formally 
by the Framers. In his essay, “The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and 
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Federal Courts,” William Gwyn discusses this doctrine’s two competing camps as 
composed of “formalists” and “functionalists.” 
The former are inclined to limit each branch of government to the exercise of a power 
assigned to it by the Constitution, unless that document has explicitly permitted an 
exception. The latter are inclined to take a flexible approach, emphasizing the need for a 
blending as well as a separation of powers, and insisting on a careful examination of each 
intrusion by one branch into the primary function of another in order to determine 
whether one has prevented the other from effectively exercising its function. The 
functionalists perceive the formalists as overly literal in their interpretation of the 
Constitution at the expense of governmental effectiveness. The formalists see the 
functionalists as substituting their personal judgments for the clearly stated requirements 
of the Constitution, placed there by the Framers to satisfy the prescriptions of the 
hallowed doctrine of the separation of powers. Although, as it will become evident, my 
own sympathies lie with the functionalists, one of the major conclusions of this essay is 
that any use of the separation of powers doctrine by American courts is bound to be 
unsatisfactory, no matter what approach is taken, because the doctrine is 
indeterminate.
205
 
 
Gwyn’s claim that the doctrine is indeterminate could be more strongly stated to the 
effect that this indeterminacy is intentional. This is because the simple division of 
government into Executive, Legislative and Judicial was not deemed sufficient to 
check power. Experience under The Articles of Confederation in various states had 
shown how contrary to earlier concerns with abuses of executive power in the 
monarchical regime, in the new republican form of government it was the legislative 
branch that most required limitations. In Federalist 48, Madison asks 
Will it be sufficient to mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the 
Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the 
encroaching spirit of power? … some more adequate defence is indispensably 
necessary… The legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its 
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
206
 
 
 The terms used here paint a vivid image of the entire ship of state being sucked into a 
legislative Charybdis. Once a government cedes too much power to the legislature, it 
will be unable to steer itself away from disasters that occur due to legislative excesses 
imposed upon the society by the majority party on any given issue. There seems to be 
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a belief that the Executive and Judicial powers are less susceptible to this same kind 
of gravitational pull for a multitude of reasons. First of all, the Executive is the most 
visible manifestation of state power. As such, the acts of this branch are bound to be 
more public and therefore there will be less temptation for it to usurp power 
improperly. Likewise, the Judiciary operates under very clear boundaries. It can only 
take cases brought to it by outside parties; it has only negative power in that it can 
only rule on the application and constitutionality of law; and finally, its members are 
under less public pressure to conform to majority will.
207
 This is why Madison is at 
pains to explain that  
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other 
circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less 
susceptible of precise limits, it can with greater facility, mask… the encroachments 
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.
208
 
 
Notice that he does not say that it can potentially encroach on the other departments, 
but instead that there are encroachments that “it makes.” The more power a 
department has the more force it exerts on the entire state. Madison’s observation that 
by its very nature the Legislative power cannot easily be limited to any precise sphere 
is especially significant because of its primary function being to exercise the positive 
power of creating new law and modifying existing law. 
 
Historically-speaking, this fear of the legislative body, was founded by a situation in 
which 
Events in a great many of our jurisdictions must have brought clearly to the attention of 
leaders in the period from I775 to I790 the dangers of legislative supremacy in general, 
and "legislative justice" in particular. Popular rule on a large scale was a novel 
experiment in any case, and one can appreciate the a priori apprehension of those who 
carried it on. And experience strengthened the apprehension. Laws favoring debtors and 
dealing arbitrarily with criminals produced specific constitutional prohibitions. And 
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exercises of "judicial power" by the legislatures, with similar effects, must have helped to 
impress many of the fathers with the importance of erecting an independent judiciary, 
with its own inviolable province. Such a judiciary would have, as well as the power to 
disregard unconstitutional statutes, the exclusive power to determine legal 
controversies.
209
 
 
The issue of giving to courts the power to determine the “legal controversies” 
mentioned by Malcolm Sharp is a vital institutional check because the only other 
possibilities would either involve the legislative branch being judge in its own case, or 
the Executive would make a summary judgment and give the clear appearance of a 
power grab. 
 
Alexander Hamilton mentions this historical experience in Federalist 71. Here again, 
the image created by his words is deeply evocative of navigational peril,  
The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been fully displayed 
and illustrated by examples, in some preceding numbers. In governments purely 
republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people, in a 
popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves… and as 
they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to 
make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of 
the Constitution.
210
 
 
Clearly the elite men writing the Constitution had no desire for a proliferation of 
redistributive policies or laws that would weaken their rights as property owners and 
creditors. Here can be seen yet another example of the interests of one large numerical 
minority superseding the interests of the poorer masses. Ultimately, so long as the 
rules were applied universally, the fact that they favored the elite did not contradict 
the imperative to apply a consistent and just rule of law. Stability was ultimately a 
greater good than democracy in its pure form.
211
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In Federalist 49, Madison justifies the primacy of stability by reminding those who 
would vote on ratification of a unified federal constitution that  
the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the 
constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, 
is derived; it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same 
original authority. Not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-
model the powers of government; but also whenever any one of the departments may 
commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. 
 
He goes on to demonstrate why this approach does not in fact work by referring to the 
constitutional protections of Virginia, which require that if 2/3 of two out of the three 
branches concur the constitution needs changing or a breach of power correcting, that 
they can call a convention of the people to undertake the needed changes. Madison 
finds this procedure is well-intentioned, but flawed as a branch that was gaining in 
power may be able to leverage another branch into concurring with it that change is 
needed. It would also destabilize the government by decreasing the longevity of, and 
hence the respect for, its institutions and traditions, leading him to state that “The 
danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public 
passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional 
questions, to the decision of the whole society.”212 
 
Madison elaborates that constitutional revisions have thus far been successful but 
should not be undertaken lightly as the reframing of constitutional questions has been 
precipitated by extreme danger to the social order and a universal trust in national 
leaders who proposed principles opposite to those responsible for the unrest. He 
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hopefully concludes that “The future situations in which we must expect to usually be 
placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is 
apprehended.” 
 
Thus, rather than having a clean delineation of powers, the writers of the Constitution 
purposefully shared powers between the branches. Indeed, as Victoria Nourse argues, 
Every time we use the term "separation of powers," we invoke a common, yet tacit, 
narrative of power-a narrative constructed upon the idea of legal authority: we imagine 
the executive, judicial, and legislative powers divided and neatly arranged among the 
departments… (A) different narrative of power, one based on the idea that power is as 
much constituted by the political relationships the Constitution creates as by the legal 
authority it bestows… argue(s) that the separation of political power is as, if not more, 
vital to the continued separation of our governmental institutions as the separation of any 
particular function or the allocation of any particular legal authority.
213
 
 
This is why, in defending the Constitution from detractors who decried the way 
responsibility for foreign affairs and other duties were shared, Madison uses 
Federalist No. 47 to cite the man his contemporaries most respected on matters of 
governance, Montesquieu. Perhaps the most relevant part of Montesquieu’s work to 
the early Americans was his examination of the English constitution and its virtues. 
He particularly praised the way in which power was divided between the Crown, the 
Parliament, and the Courts. Madison is keen to point out, however, that 
 
He did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no 
controul over the acts of each other. His meaning… can amount to no more than this, 
that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which 
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free 
constitution, are subverted.
214
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Madison then gives examples from all the state constitutions of how separate powers 
have functions which overlap and support one another, but clarifies that he is not 
advocating any particular state constitutional model from these examples.
215
 
 
To see how this principle works in practice, one can contrast the discussion of the 
judiciary in various parts of The Federalist Papers with writings about the negotiation 
and adoption of treaties, the process of impeachment, and the executive veto. In 
Federalist 71, Alexander Hamilton asks the rhetorical question “To what purpose 
separate the executive, or the judiciary, from the legislative, if both the executive and 
the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the legislative?” He 
continues that, “It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be 
dependent on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the 
fundamental principles of good government; and whatever may be the forms of the 
Constitution, unites all power in the same hands.”216 The dichotomy between 
subordination and dependency can easily be understood to mean that all offices and 
departments in government are equally bound to follow the law, but that does not 
mean that those offices outside the legislative branch should be individually 
financially dependent upon the legislature.  
 
Likewise, “It is impossible to keep the Judges too distinct from every other avocation 
than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a 
situation to either be corrupted or influenced by the executive.”217 Again, the ability 
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of any branch to bring pressure to bear on another is clearly at the forefront of the 
founders’ concerns. This particular danger is one remedied by making only the 
appointment of justices subject to the other branches of government. That is why they 
are nominated by the Executive and confirmed by the Legislative. Once appointed 
however, their terms are either for life, or for a fixed length of time that is not 
dependent upon any individual lawmaker’s or executive’s will. 
 
In justifying the life terms for judicial appointments during times of “good 
behaviour,” Hamilton argues that “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will 
always be that least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will 
be least in capacity to annoy or injure them.” By far the most passive of government 
branches, “(it) has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either 
of the strength or the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution 
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; 
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of 
its judgments.”218 
 
All of these statements are fundamentally concerned with isolating the judiciary from 
the influence of the executive and the potential avarice of the legislature. They 
indicate an understanding of judicial review that is highly limited by the lack of 
specific powers granted to the courts, the custom of generally deferring to the popular 
will expressed in legislation or through the executive, and by the inherently reactive 
nature of courts. Justice Scalia reflects the continued dominance of this strain of 
thinking in contemporary conservative circles when he discusses the centrality of 
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judicial standing in establishing jurisdiction. In order for a party to have standing to 
file suit and pursue a case before the courts, it is necessary for the party to 
demonstrate “he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury 
as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest 
common to all members of the public.”219 This standard is sufficiently high to allow 
only cases with demonstrable impacts on individual citizens to have much chance of 
ever being heard and ruled upon in open court. If the courts adhere to this view, they 
are greatly self-limiting the scope of their own influence. 
 
Of course, this view of the weak judiciary is one that is, and has been, sharply 
challenged. Appeals to halt “judicial activism” and “legislating from the bench” are 
frequently heard in public discourse. Certainly, the 20
th
 century saw a number of 
decisions that indicated a desire on the part of justices to pursue societal goods 
through the court system, such as desegregation, which simply could not be uniformly 
achieved through the democratic process, yet nonetheless led to a close adherence to 
the constitutional ideal. Interestingly, Hamilton seems to have anticipated this 
problem when he writes 
In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration, which directly 
empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the 
constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect, than may be 
claimed by the courts of every state. I admit however, that the constitution ought to be 
the standard of construction for the laws, and that wherever there is an evident 
opposition, the laws ought to give place to the constitution. But this doctrine is not 
deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention; but from the 
general theory of a limited constitution.
220
 
 
What this statement indicates is that there is a working understanding of the 
constitution as an instrument that limits governmental power by its nature rather than 
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by statute. The phrase “spirit of the constitution” that is used to describe the measure 
against which laws might be interpreted seems to be intentionally employed to evoke 
Montesquieu, yet the next sentence, in which Hamilton lays out what “ought” to be 
the standard used by the courts, instead used the formulation “the construction for the 
laws.” The former phrase is clearly dealing with the fuzzier problem of interpreting 
the “spirit” or intent behind a law, whilst the latter focuses on the letter of the law, or 
its “construction.” Why does he seem to give precedence to literal interpretation? 
Doesn’t this approach lend itself less to flexible governance and more to rigid 
orthodoxy? To answer this question it is helpful to reference the earlier quote from 
Federalist 71 in which he claims the role of the justice should be exclusively “that of 
expounding the laws.”221 The very practice of rendering judgment is one of intrusion 
into the purview of the business of the legislative and executive branches. This 
requires that the standard of conduct and impartiality that judges adhere to be 
unimpeachable.  The minute this character is damaged it fundamentally undermines 
the legitimacy of the law itself. Similarly, once judges stray from interpreting the 
words “as written,” it is impossible to draw the line between judging and legislating. 
This leads to exactly the type of conflation of powers that the framers are seeking to 
avoid.  
 
Other sharing of roles between the branches is quite acceptable, indeed desirable, 
according to the Federalist’s writers. On international treaties, it is the awkwardness 
of treaty-making itself that is the cause of the difficulty in assigning the power to any 
one segment of government. Alexander Hamilton explains that 
The power of making treaties… relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, 
nor to the enaction of new ones and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its 
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objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations… agreements between sovereign and 
sovereign. The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to 
belong properly neither to the legislative nor to the executive.
222
 
 
Any student of the US government is well aware that the solution to this problem was 
to assign a role to both the executive and legislative branches concerning treaties. The 
executive negotiates as a unitary actor, making it easier to achieve clarity on terms. 
The Senate votes to ratify or reject the treaty, adding an element of democratic 
accountability to any agreement between “sovereign and sovereign,” which is crucial 
when the American sovereign is ostensibly “the people.” This is furthermore 
appropriate because a treaty is a binding contract, which is a documentary and legal 
effort most closely related to legislating, whereas the implementation of the 
agreement in good faith is primarily an executive function.  
 
This power-sharing arrangement was put to an early test during the Washington 
administration, when several mariners were captured by North African pirates. 
President Washington sought to create a peace treaty with the Barbary Powers. The 
President was highly conscious of the various checks and roles assigned to the various 
government branches on foreign affairs. He knew it was the Executive that conducted 
treaty negotiations and provided for defense, but that the House funded these 
endeavors, and that the Senate had to advise and consent on treaty ratification. 
Washington was further aware that information was a tool of power and that by 
providing more or less information to the public and/or the Congress he would be 
setting precedents for the obligations of disclosure that were not specifically provided 
for in the Constitution. Using the powers of his executive office to obtain information 
necessary for promoting the national defense, and relaying it to Congress, President 
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Washington conscientiously avoided the appearance of imperiousness by proposing 
his terms in secret to Congress, incorporating their feedback, and relaying his altered 
plans to his diplomatic staff. Although it took several years and what amounted to a 
substantial bribe to appease terrorists, the end result was an enduring agreement that 
protected American flag ships and sailors in the Atlantic. This episode highlights the 
view that the idea of separation of powers is one in which the overlap in delineated 
powers means that in practice the constitution leaves tremendous room for discretion 
on the part of the Executive in the use of information and conduct of negotiations, and 
equally wide latitude for the legislature to demand information and approve or deny 
funds for treaty obligations as they see fit.
223
 
 
Another sanctioned overlap of institutional responsibility concerns impeachment. One 
of the terms of the Constitution that came under vehement opposition was the use of 
the Senate as a judicial body on matters of removing executive officers, up to and 
including the president him or herself.  In Federalist 56, the objections are 
summarized as follows: 
The first of these objections is that the provision in question confounds legislative and 
judiciary authorities in the same body; in violation of that important and well established 
maxim, which requires a separation between the departments of power. The true meaning 
of this maxim…has been shewn to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of 
those departments for special purposes, preserving them in the main distinct and 
unconnected. This partial intermixture is in some cases not only proper, but necessary to 
the mutual defence of the several members of the government against each other.  
 
Hamilton’s immediate response to his critics is that, 
 
(The) powers relating to impeachments are… an essential check in the hands of that body 
(the Legislative) upon the encroachments of the executive. The division of them between 
the two branches of the legislature; assigning to one the right of accusing (the House of 
Representatives), to the other the right of judging (the Senate); avoids the inconvenience 
of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of 
persecution from the prevelancy of a factious spirit in either of those branches.
224
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Although there are potentially any number of further objections that can be raised to 
the institutional provision for impeachments, it is obvious that the goal of placing this 
power in legislative hands, and further splitting it functionally between accusatory 
power in the House (they legally have judicial standing) and judicial power in the 
Senate (they have jurisdiction), is to place a powerful check upon abuses of power in 
the executive branch. It reinforces the principle that the same party cannot act as 
prosecutor and judge in the same case. To those who object that the judiciary is still 
available to fulfill its customary function it needs only to be pointed out that the 
justices who would have standing in this type of case are nominated and appointed by 
the executive and would therefore presumably face a blatant conflict of interest in 
judging cases of this type. 
 
Finally, the issue of the veto provides what is perhaps the most straight-forward check 
on the dreaded potential of legislative excesses. Again writing in Federalist 71, 
Hamilton says of the Executive: 
They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and 
to keep things in the same state, in which they may happen to be at any given period, as 
much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favourable to greater stability in the 
system of legislation.
225
 
 
Quite simply, the President is bound to act in the best interests of all citizens rather 
than any particular constituency. This negative power is limited to stifling attempts to 
change or write new legislation and is inherently conservative. The value of this lies 
yet again in preserving “stability in the system of legislation,” because “the 
representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that 
they are the people themselves… and as they commonly have the people on their side, 
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they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other 
members of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.”226 The two-
thirds super-majority required to override the veto allows for cases in which there is 
overwhelming consensus in the legislature to overcome even executive disagreement 
with the law. This provides a consistent method of viewing the role of majorities in 
affecting government based on the presumption that it would be difficult for so large a 
number to agree on something inherently unjust and/or bad.
227
 
 
Taken in its totality, the argument for ratification of the Constitution in the Federalist 
Papers is one which expresses  
two related aspects of the new American conception of politics that emerged from the 
experiences of the interregnum period. First, that the people, and not the institutions of 
government, are sovereign. The Constitution after all begins with ‘We, the People.’ 
Second, that no institution of government is, or should be taken to be, the embodiment of 
society expressing the general will of the people.
228  
 
Only by creating a (tri)alectic of power between the three branches of government, 
can the rights of minorities be reconciled with the will of the majority in a way that 
allows the State to navigate toward an ostensibly just destination, though it may 
repeatedly tack right and left to get there. 
 
1.4. How the West was Run- Notions of a Constitutional Civilization 
 
The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather 
by its superiority in applying organized violence. 
 
When Samuel P. Huntington made this statement, he was referring primarily to 
violence of a literal, military sort. Taken in another sense, however, it could be argued 
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that the entire development of Western governance, at least internally, is one of 
restricting latent violence in society and between competing groups in any given state. 
Whether implicitly or explicitly, it is the channeling of social energies and conflicts 
into an institutional framework that has been the goal of most thinking about 
governing since at least the era of the ancient Greeks. The frameworks have grown 
more nuanced and complex as societies have grown in population and diversity, but 
the tri-partite constitutional concerns with the rule of law, political and institutional 
authenticity, and restricting government power by separating the functions and forms 
of that power into discrete branches have remained consistently present, albeit in 
radically different forms. Western ideology has also traditionally been universalist in 
its outlook, and this is reflected not only in various national constitutions, but also in 
the very titles of documents like “The Universal Declaration on Human Rights.” The 
question that remains for comparative purposes is whether these qualities are indeed 
unique to Western civilization. Huntington’s assertion that, "The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. The clash of 
civilizations will dominate global politics," may very well be true if the West is as 
unique he proposes. This is not, however, a foregone conclusion. The following 
chapters will directly address these same constitutional principles in an Islamic 
context in order to ascertain the validity of Kedourie and Huntington’s theses 
regarding the compatibility of constitutional and Islamic thought. 
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Chapter 2: From Medina to Modernity- Assessing the 
Foundational Legacy of the Constitution of Medina  
 
Surely the Constitution of Medina provides valuable information on the founding of the Ummah 
and its nature. There is nothing in the document concerning the Ummah which contradicts what 
the Qurʾan says. The two sources are mutually confirmatory in many respects, and they 
supplement each other. The Constitution spells out in greater detail than the Qurʾan the political 
structure of the Medinan community and the agreed upon military aspects of life, such as 
‘neighbourly protection’, blood-wit, alliances, clients, and so on. The religious nature of the 
Ummah is, of course, to be learned above all from the Qurʾan, but the practical detail needed for 
a fuller picture must come from other contemporary documents.
229
 
 
There is little debate that Muslim civilization came into being under the inspiration 
and instigation of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. His first foray into government 
dates back to the very early days of his prophetic career, after the migration (hijra) to 
Medina in 622 CE.
230
 So fundamental is this event, that it marks the beginning of the 
Islamic calendar system, which demonstrates the utter centrality of the relationship of 
faith and the establishment of the Muslim community in Islam. Although the earliest 
accounts of his government in Medina exist outside the Qurʾan, the reporting of Ibn 
Ishaq in his Life of Muhammad is taken to be authentic.
231
 If that is the case, then the 
very existence of a written covenant between Muhammad and his followers, including 
those who were not Muslims, provides the possibility of examining the principles 
which formed the core of Islamic government at its conception and which, given the 
status of Muhammad as exemplar for present-day Muslims, arguably establishes a 
legitimate basis for an authentically Islamic constitutional paradigm. 
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The idea of a Muslim constitutional tradition can be problematic in the light of 
orthodox Muslim understandings of the utter sovereignty and agency of God over the 
entire world, governments and governed alike. Leaving the nature and extent of God’s 
sovereignty to the theologians, this examination of Muhammad’s covenant with the 
residents of Medina is one which argues that where there is assent and accountability, 
there is, at least in a practical sense, agency. The very existence of this agreement, the 
fact that it lays out explicit expectations of the duties of various tribes and their rights 
to the benefits of society, its vision of the rule of law, all indicate that practicing 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic states must codify and negotiate the various 
challenges of government, within the framework of a transcendent Law (shariʿa). 
Although this means there will be reticence on behalf of some in claiming to be 
establishing constitutional law, even laws generally, which are seen as the exclusive 
province of God, it is nonetheless accepted that day to day questions of governing will 
require additional statutes to be passed. It is on this basis that the various schools of 
Islamic law developed their fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and it is this understanding of 
law which allowed Muslim rulers to “implement sharīʿa” through promulgating the 
necessary qānūn (statute) or using siyāsa (statecraft or management).232 
Assessing the unique constitutional characteristics of Muhammad’s covenant will 
reveal that this document, while not a proper constitution in the modern sense of the 
term, is concerned with particular duties and rights and defines its polity (umma) in 
sometimes surprisingly contemporary ways.
233
 Thus the text in question is being 
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analyzed in terms of the political ideas and theory that inform it and which have been 
subsequently shaped by it. This section will narrow its focus to the following 
constitutional values. Firstly, how the Constitution defines and derives its legitimacy. 
Secondly, how it defines its subjects. Finally, how it engages with the rights and 
duties actually being codified. From this initial examination it may be possible to set 
the stage to identify future avenues of discourse for scholars of constitutionalism and 
government more generally, including Islamic views of the rule of law, the character 
of government and governed, or the role that religion can, does, or should play within 
the apparatus and limits of the state.  
2.1 The Origins and Lawfulness of the Constitution of Medina  
 
Before analyzing the text itself, it is important to understand the context in which it 
was created and the ways in which it derived its legitimacy. The Constitution of 
Medina is a document, or possibly amalgamation of documents, which is recorded in 
Ibn Ishaq’s Life of Muhammad, and serves as the earliest known model of Islamic 
government.
234
 More importantly, it originates from the time when Muhammad 
himself was leader of both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities of Medina, 
which makes this text an obvious potential exemplar for those wishing to govern in an 
Islamic fashion. It also accounts for the possibility of an Islamic pluralism that allows 
for peaceful religious coexistence within a Muslim state. Due to its longstanding 
existence as a document independent of the Qurʾan, yet one which nonetheless is 
compatible with it, the Constitution of Medina can potentially serve as an exemplary 
and foundational constitutional text for even those Muslims for whom their religious 
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identity is more cultural and historical.
235
 It can accommodate a wide variety of 
interpretations, as to who can be included in the umma, what the rights and duties of 
the ruler and ruled are, and what the fundamental role of the state is. In other words, 
just as the Magna Carta serves a mythical role in Western jurisprudence that far 
outstrips the particularities of its provisions, so too might the Constitution of Medina 
provide a model of basic societal values, customs and institutions for Muslim 
societies. 
 
One important caveat about the Constitution of Medina must be made before further 
discussion of its features. The works of Uri Rubin and R.B. Serjeant show that to call 
it a constitution at all is simply a convenience rather than an accurate descriptor. 
Furthermore, there is debate amongst scholars as to whether the ‘Constitution’ was 
written as a unitary document. Documentary evidence supports the contention that it 
originates from the period just after the hijra to Medina, when Muhammad became 
judge and arbiter of that city. Furthermore, much of the text finds echoes in the 
Qurʾan itself, with many passages being nearly identical. However, in his 1978 
journal article, R.B. Serjeant lays out his proposed original composition and discusses 
the authenticity of the Constitution of Medina in great detail. He makes the following 
claims: 
The eight documents of which it is formed are doubtless traditional in pattern and 
diction, not at all novel to the age, and comprise the following distinct elements. 
A. The confederation treaty  
B. Supplement to confederation treaty A (These two pacts A and B are to be 
considered as al-Sunnat al-Jdmi‘ah cited in the arbitration treaty between ‘Alli [sic] and 
Mu’awiyah.) 
C. Treaty defining the status of the Jewish tribes in the confederation 
D. Supplement to the treaty (C) defining the status of the Jewish tribes 
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E. Reaffirmation of the status of the Jews 
F. Proclamation of Yathrib a sacred enclave (haram) 
G. Treaty concluded prior to Khandaq among the Arabs of Yathrib and with the 
Jewish Qurayzah, to defend it from Quraysh of Mecca and their allies 
H. Codicil to the proclamation of Yathrib a sacred enclave (haram) 
The two early versions of the text at present known to me are that of Ibn Ishaq which is 
the basis of the version given below, and that of Ab-i ‘Ubayd which is defective. The 
late copy of Isma‘il b. Muhammad Ibn Kathir has also been consulted. Ibn Ishaq’s 
text… looks substantially reliable and correct…236 
 
Contradicting this point of view, Michael Lecker contends that Serjeant’s argument is 
unconvincing as it is based on ‘ethnological data relating to contemporary Yemen, in 
addition to comparative evidence from the primary sources.’237 The fact that the 
document is comprised of these complementary and contemporaneous elements, 
whether or not it is a unitary work, means that the discussion that follows will look at 
this text as presented by Ibn Ishaq in the singular form which it ultimately came to 
possess.  
 
The Medinan period occurred after intense persecution of Muhammad and his 
followers in Mecca forced them to uproot and settle elsewhere. Having heard of his 
skills as an arbiter and his reputation for fairness, he was invited to Medina to act as a 
judge (hakam) to mediate disputes between the various clans and clan chiefs.
238
 In 
Western terms, Muhammad was primus inter pares (first amongst equals) and the 
intent of the invitation did not include changing the status quo of power relationships 
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within Mecca beyond recognizing him as a prophet able to give rulings on behalf of 
God.
239
 
 
In much the same way that the Roman Republic gradually ceded its authority quite 
willingly to the able and magnetic Caesar, so the Arab tribes of Medina, and 
eventually of the whole Arabian Peninsula, accepted the rule of a conscientious, able, 
and charismatic Prophet. What makes the Constitution of Medina so interesting to 
study is that it originates in a period where the political authority of Muhammad was 
relatively rudimentary. Although the actual document cannot be seen to have played 
any formative role in Muslim regimes after the time of Muhammad and the rightly 
guided Caliphs, one may still ask if this very early covenant’s core values of limited 
pluralism, tolerance and minority autonomy
240
 were the foundations of what would 
later become a framework and finally an entire politico-religious structure, one that 
would survive the death of its founder to eventually hold sway over most of the over 
1.6 billion self-identified Muslims who still acknowledge Muhammad’s authority to 
this day? 
 
To begin with, Ibn Ishaq simply relates that ‘The apostle wrote a document 
concerning the emigrants and the helpers in which he made a friendly agreement with 
the Jews and established them in their religion and their property, and stated the 
reciprocal obligations.’241 This seems an odd introduction for something that could 
potentially be referred to as a type of constitution. In the first place, it only mentions 
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an agreement between the ‘emigrants and the helpers’ and the Jews, rather than with 
the people of Medina, as one might expect. It clearly delineates a separate identity 
between the Muslims and the Jews rather than a unified populace. What one may 
assume is that this served the purposes of Ishaq’s narrative in explaining the eventual 
falling out between Muhammad and the Jews, an assumption bolstered by the fact that 
Muhammad himself went on to contradict this division when he asserted that various 
groups of Jews are ‘one community with the believers’.242 The precise nature of the 
community aside, the authority by which Muhammad propagated this covenant with 
the various Medinan communities is one which is based primarily on secular and pre-
Muslim customs that are then imbued with religious meaning. The existence of clan 
and tribal chiefs who acted as community judges was nothing new, nor was the 
recognition of someone as having the gift of prophecy or the ability to transmit 
revelations from God. The innovative part of the equation occurs in the exclusivity of 
Muhammad’s message. He alone was the current Prophet and his God alone was God. 
At first glance this would seem to primarily create division. Instead it was a 
mechanism through which the old divisions created by the worship of different deities 
could be overwritten and subsumed under a universal and inspirational calling to 
serve the one God of all people. This leads Muhammad to create a new umma 
(literally ‘people’) that is comprised not of blood ties but of spiritual brotherhood. 
Frederick Denny notes the following in his article ‘Ummah in the Constitution of 
Medina’: 
The ummah of the Constitution is made up of believers and Muslims, and quite 
possibly Jews as well (although they may constitute a separate ummah ‘alongside’). All 
the kinship groups mentioned are subsumed under this ummah idea, a very significant 
fact. But why are the believers distinguished from the Muslims? ... It is probable that 
muʾminūn throughout the document means just what it means in the Qurʾan: 
‘believers’. … This preponderance of muʾmin may indicate an early date for much of 
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the Constitution, before muslim was used as the name for the followers of Muhammad, 
or at least before it gained a clear technical sense limited to the followers of 
Muhammad. Of course, it had a deep religious sense before the time of the 
Constitution, describing the human approach to God pre-scribed in the Revelation.
243
 
 
This group then, constitutes another layer of identity that contains many of the same 
tribal obligations and expectations that existed previously, except that these 
obligations have gone from exclusively within one’s clan and tribe to a potentially 
universal scope. It is particularly interesting to see that the term muslim was not one 
necessarily exclusively used for those who accepted Muhammad as prophet, but 
rather included all those who submitted to God in the way his and earlier prophetic 
traditions required. Rather than being the exclusive provenance of committed 
followers of Muhammad then, the community at Medina and subsequent Islamic 
regimes (including that of the religiously tolerant and pluralistic Mughals on the 
Indian sub-continent) can be legitimately described as belonging to all who show 
submission to God, which again is a potentially universal ideal, depending upon how 
submission is defined. 
 
Ultimately, the authority which undergirds the Constitution of Medina is 
simultaneously spiritual and secular, traditional and radical.
244
 Muhammad’s genius is 
clear in the way he transformed his role as God’s vessel and voice into judge, apostle, 
general, and exemplar of the faith. He could have, like the Christian Apostle Paul, de-
emphasized temporal identities in order to place the focus solely on one’s spiritual 
identity.
245
 Instead, Muhammad was happy to keep the existing social order intact as 
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it provided him with opportunities for mass conversions by entire tribes, an 
infrastructure that managed law and order within smaller more manageable groups, 
and a steady stream of soldiers who could assist him in defense and in his conquest of 
the Arabian Peninsula. His unity was also one of believers, but this did not negate 
their previous social relationships. Indeed, those ‘that have kinship by blood are closer 
to one another in the Book of God than the believers who are not kindred.’246 
 
Thus, it is unsurprising that he opens his contract by saying, ‘This is a document from 
Muhammad the prophet governing the relations between the believers and Muslims of 
Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed them and joined them and labored with 
them.’247 He goes on to acknowledge Jews belonging to groups like Banu al-Najjar, 
al-Harith, etc. Amongst Muslims he specifies the Banu ʿAwf, the Quraysh and others. 
The invitation to arbitrate disputes between these tribes was precisely the opening in 
the tribal power structure that would allow Muhammad and his message to become its 
center. If God spoke through Muhammad, then who could disobey his revelation 
requiring all disputes between the tribes to be referred to God, and consequently to 
Muhammad?
248
 This revelation is then codified in the Constitution of Medina when 
Muhammad explicitly states to all the Medinans, Muslim or not, that ‘Whenever you 
differ about a matter it must be referred to God and to Muhammad.’249 The authority 
of the state thus rests on its adherence to the message and example of Muhammad 
which is a direct revelation of the very word and will of God himself. A citizen could 
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conceivably accept and follow this human example, even if he or she did not share his 
beliefs in whole or part. 
 
Of course, constitutional documents are never merely statements of authority or 
legitimacy. They are traditionally conceived as social contracts between both ruler 
and ruled or the government and the governed. In order to assess the legacy of this 
foundational text, it is therefore vital that one ascertain exactly which groups in 
society are being addressed. Who are the subjects or citizens who will be bound by 
the constitution? 
2.2 Defining the Subject: The Object(s) of Authority in the Constitution 
of Medina 
 
As alluded to earlier, the Constitution of Medina is a document that subverts, elevates, 
and recreates tribal identities and obligations by placing them largely intact under a 
new umbrella identity. Uri Rubin argues that ‘the name of the new unity declared by 
the “Constitution” is “umma”. Western scholars… were aware of the fact that it must 
be examined according to its meaning in the Qurʾan, where, in most relevant cases, it 
has a pure religious connotation.’250 Rubin goes on to point out that in the opening of 
the constitution it states that ‘They are one umma to the exclusion of all men’, which 
in its original form joins umma with  a ida. In all nine instances where the phrase 
umma  a ida, or singular people, occurs in the Qurʾan it always ‘denotes people 
united by a common religious orientation.’ In other words, the Muslims and the Jews 
of Medina comprise a unified body that shares the same religion in distinction to those 
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who practise other faiths.
251
 So, in the first instance, the people with whom 
Muhammad makes his covenant are qualified for ‘citizenship’ based upon their 
faith.
252
 
 
Lest one doubt the inclusion of the Jews, he continues by saying ‘To the Jew who 
follows us belong help and equality. He shall not be wronged… The peace of the 
believers is indivisible.’253 Those who are not of the monotheistic Abrahamic faiths 
(with the exception of some peaceful henotheists) are not included in the social 
contract and regardless of their tribal ties to those within Mecca exist definitively 
outside of the protection of the community at large. Muhammad could not be any 
clearer on this point when he writes that ‘Believers are friends one to the other to the 
exclusion of outsiders.’254 
 
In addition to being a community or umma based upon faith, Medina was also a polity 
based upon the establishment of sacred territory, or haram. This basis finds echoes in 
the West in Hobbes and others who locate the basis of obligation between a citizen 
and the state in the state’s role in protecting and preserving the lives of its citizens. 
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Thus Rubin notes that some traditions hold that Muhammad declared Medina to be 
sacred, therefore elevating it to the same religious status as Mecca, before the crucial 
battle against Mecca just two years after the hijra. This would mean that the natives of 
Medina, or Yathrib, would be expected to protect and defend their sacred ground in 
the same manner that the Quraysh would protect the holy precincts of Mecca.
255
 This 
basis of community originating from a desire to band together for the common 
defense is a regular feature of constitutional documents. What is interesting is that 
Muhammad’s declaration of haram endows it with religious significance it would not 
otherwise have and reasserts the centrality of religious belief and faith in the 
formation of his polity. He goes on to assert: 
The Jews must bear their expenses and the Muslims their expenses. Each must help the 
other against anyone who attacks the people of this document… The Jews must pay 
with the believers as long as war lasts. Yathrib shall be a sanctuary (haram) for the 
people of this document.
256
 
 
Like any other constitution then, this document creates an us and a them, allowing for 
the new umma to express itself not only by its positive affirmation of monotheism and 
residence in Medina, but also in its opposition to polytheism and its defense against 
outsiders and attackers.
257
 
 
The emphasis on common religion and territory in the Constitution of Medina should 
not completely obscure its continued recognition of pre-existing family and tribal 
relationships, which continued to be relevant well after Islam became the established 
faith of Arabia. As mentioned previously, it consistently refers to groups based on 
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tribal identity, particularly when it discusses Jewish clients of various Arab tribes.
258
 
The Quraysh and Thaʿlaba are distinguished from other tribes. In essence, the polity 
Muhammad sought to establish could be expressed in three iterations, a tribal polity, a 
territorial polity, and finally and most importantly, a religious polity.
259
 
2.3 Rights, Duties, and Their Respective Parties 
 
The rights and duties spelled out in the Constitution range from the specific and time-
bound to the universal and timeless. In Muhammad’s contract there is far less 
emphasis on the duties imposed on Muhammad than on those required of the people 
of Medina. Instead the obligations spelled out are primarily those owed by one 
particular group within society to another. The duties and rights delineated here can 
be split into those dealing with internal disputes and crimes and those dealing with 
external threats and war. The definition of internal and external is, as already 
discussed, both territorial and spiritual and both requirements must be met for the 
provisions of this document to be in force. 
 
Internal duties include payment of blood money, avenging those wrongfully killed, 
providing hospitality and taking unresolved disputes to Muhammad. These imply the 
right of individuals to be recompensed for damages or deaths regardless of cause, 
along with the rights of people to obtain hospitality when in need and to have access 
to a judge to resolve disputes.
260
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In reference to outsiders, the Constitution states “A believer shall not slay a believer 
for the sake of an unbeliever, nor shall he aid an unbeliever against a believer” (a 
negative duty). No matter what tribal affinities one may have, that of belief 
supersedes any other. In a similar manner, “believers must avenge the blood of one 
another shed in the way of God” (a positive duty). This defensive obligation extends 
to a territorial definition when Muhammad specifies that the “contracting parties are 
bound to help one another against any attack on Yathrib.” The focus on war extends 
to raiding parties and offensive battles which present the opportunities for spoils from 
which “everyone shall have his portion from the side to which he belongs.”261 
 
If this document is to be considered truly constitutional, however, it must place some 
sort of restraint upon the ruler so that the contract itself is truly binding and cannot 
simply be changed by the will of the ruler. This criterion is clearly not met in the text 
itself. Aside from requiring Muhammad to fulfill his role as judge, the only other 
requirement placed upon him is to give his permission for parties to go out to war and 
by inference to protect ‘the good and God-fearing man’ since God is their protector 
and he, Muhammad, is ‘the apostle of God’.262 However, one could easily argue that 
this restraint is implicit and must be understood in the context of the ruler being 
subject to the Qurʾan, and therefore limited in many substantive ways. At the very 
least, the Constitution of Medina certainly does not advocate autocracy and its nod to 
minority autonomy limits power implicitly, much as the authors of the Federalist 
Papers argue that the very division of power into different branches acts as a check 
upon potential abuse of that power in any one of the branches.  
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2.4 Qurʾanic Government: An open book? Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and the 
argument for Muslim self-determination 
 
 
It may seem somewhat counterproductive to entertain al-Raziq’s notions of the 
relationship between the Qurʾan and the state in an analysis of the “Constitution of 
Medina.” His 1925 Islam and the Bases of Power caused an immediate stir and 
encountered criticism from a variety of quarters, even from Muslim modernists like 
Rashid Rida, and in the process lost him his post and judgeship at al-Azhar.
263
 
However, despite the fact that his argument revolves around emphasizing 
Muhammad’s role as Prophet, and delegitimizing arguments that he was also a ruler, 
its general contours dovetail nicely with the constitutional values latent in the Medina 
document and it also illustrates the way in which the document could be seen to 
advocate certain values, without necessarily arguing for religiously-based institutional 
arrangements.  
 
In direct contrast to what many Orientalists claim about the nature of Muhammad’s 
leadership, and indeed what many Muslim thinkers also claim, al-Raziq creates a 
dichotomy of power before analyzing the particular type of power Muhammad 
exercised, saying that study to determine whether or not Muhammad was a king or 
not “falls outside the area of those beliefs which the ‘ulama have treated and on which 
they profess well-established opinions. It belongs more to the area of scientific 
research than to that of religion. Let the reader follow us without fear and with a 
tranquil soul.”264 What is clear is that this scholar from the renowned al-Azhar is well 
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aware that his audience may view this parsing of power as heretical and/or 
unorthodox. Placing political discussion in the realm of science, rather than as a social 
or religious concern is essential because it places the conversation back within the 
bounds of independent reasoning and means that any solutions proposed are simply 
contingent ideas for a very particular time and place, avoiding any claims or 
competition with the timeless sharīʿa. One may be tempted to think that his 
discussion will obscure the historical record of Muhammad’s leadership or that he 
will be forced to deny certain events, but instead he fully embraces the Qurʾanic and 
the hadith accounts of his life. He argues that Muhammad’s primary role was as a 
Messenger from God, and that “The Message also requires its carrier to have the kind 
of strength, which will prepare him to influence the minds of the people so that they 
will heed his call… ‘We have sent no apostle but that he should be obeyed by the will 
of God.’ (Qur’an, Sura 4, Verse 64)”265 In other words, it is obvious that as one who 
would convey God’s final and perfect revelation Muhammad would have to have 
many attributes of leadership. Indeed,  
 
The Messenger may tackle the politics of his people as a king would, but the Prophet has 
a unique duty which he shares with no one, namely to communicate with the souls 
embedded in bodies, and to remove visual obstacles in order to look upon the hearts 
embedded in chests. He has the right, nay, he must open up the hearts of his followers in 
order to reach the sources of love and hate, of good and evil, the passages of thought, the 
places of obsessions, the origins of intentions, the repository of morality… He directs the 
politics of the worldly living and that of the next world.
266
 
 
What al-Raziq does in this passage is to elevate the role of Messenger above any other 
earthly role, including that of king, which means that anyone who ascribes political 
roles to Muhammad is consequently diminishing his status. This is augmented by his 
claim that Muhammad’s call was “a religious call, full of religiosity, untainted by a 
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tendency to kingship or a call for government.”267 Given that the Caliphate had 
become a rather obvious contrivance by the time it was abolished in the year prior to 
this book’s publication, it is not surprising that al-Raziq would view government as a 
taint. In many respects, this line of logic makes perfect sense if someone wished to 
protect a perfect revelation from dilution or infection. Once one begins to mix 
kingship with the role of Prophet, one is very possibly mixing the sacred and the 
profane. The one exception to this, according to al-Raziq, is the leadership of 
Muhammad because he had qualities that far surpassed those of kings, whilst at the 
same time subsuming the roles of a king within a larger religious duty. However, this 
does not mean that those who came after him maintained this same calling from God. 
In effect, the general focus on al-Raziq’s advocacy for a completely open approach to 
government in Muslim states and his denial of a political role for Muhammad misses 
the larger point that he is delegitimizing the very idea of deputyship or the Caliphate. 
Muhammad is no longer in the world or of the world, and so his leadership has passed 
and his special role as Prophet and lawgiver cannot be replicated.
268
 
 
Lest one be tempted to doubt the religious bona fides of his argument, he marshals a 
vast assortment of verses from the Qurʾan to support his contentions, as seen in the 
following passage: 
 
The Glorious Qur’an supports the view that the Prophet, peace be upon him, had nothing 
to do with political kingship. Qur’anic verses are in agreement… “He who obeys the 
Messenger obeys God; and if some turn away (remember) we have not sent you as a 
warden over them.” (Sura 4, Verse 80)… “So follow what is revealed to you by your 
Lord, for homage is due to no one but God, and turn away from idolaters. Had He willed 
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it, they would not have been idolaters. We have not appointed you their guardian, nor are 
you their pleader.” (Sura 6, Verses 106-107)… “Say: ‘O people, the truth has come to 
you from your Lord, so he who follows the right path does so for himself, and he who 
goes astray errs against himself, and I am not a guardian over you.’” (Sura 10, Verse 
108)… “We are cognizant of what they say; but it is not for you to compel them. So keep 
on reminding through the Qur’an whoever fears my warning.” (Sura 50, Verse 45) 
“Remind them: you are surely a reminder. You are not a warden over them, other than 
him who turns his back and denies, in which case he will be punished by God with the 
severest punishment.” (Sura 88, Verses 21-24)269 
 
This laundry list of scriptural verses may not be the typical manner of conducting a 
political philosophy debate, but al-Raziq is clearly engaging with an audience he 
knows will be critical on their home turf. He is more than able to summon the 
authority of the Qurʾan to make his points, as his opponents are able to summon other 
verses that may contradict him. In either case, he creates a win-wins scenario for 
himself because one must conclude that either he is right and that Muhammad was a 
Messenger, and a very special one, but not a king, or one must conclude that the 
Qurʾan leaves the issue of the nature of Muhammad’s authority up for debate, even as 
it very consistently locates the source of that authority in God. This is an essential 
result for al-Raziq’s argument for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates that the 
authority of the state is not bound with its religion, and as such leaves open the 
possibility of popular sovereignty as a source for government legitimacy. Secondly, it 
relegates the political to a lesser sphere subject to the religious rule of God, which 
would make it tantamount to heresy for a ruler to claim to be God’s or Muhammad’s 
deputy. 
 
On the off chance that he hadn’t made his point thoroughly enough, al-Raziq 
continues by relating a compelling story from Ahmad bin Zayni Dahlan’s Biography 
of the Prophet in which a man fearfully approaches Muhammad and is told by him, 
“‘Be calm, for I am no king nor a subduer, for I am the son of a woman of Quraysh 
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who used to eat dried meat in Mecca.’”270 This story is filled with pathos and a 
reminder that what sets Muhammad apart from other figures is his lack of a claim to 
personal authority. He resolutely and consistently insists authority and sovereignty are 
not his possessions and this story communicates a view of himself as a social equal 
with this man, even if he was his superior in religious terms. Interestingly, it also 
includes a reminder of his tribal identity, which is another signal that one need not 
abandon all references to identity outside of his or her faith. Immediately following 
this recounting from the sunna, al-Raziq relates the hadith that Muhammad was given 
a choice between being a king-prophet or a worshipping prophet. After the angel 
Gabriel signaled that he should be humble, he chose to be a worshipping prophet, 
leading al-Raziq to conclude that “this makes it very clear that the Prophet, peace be 
upon him, was not a king, and did not seek kingship, nor did he, peace be upon him, 
desire it.”271 
 
In assessing the relevance of al-Raziq’s work to present debates about the relationship 
between Islam as a religion and the proper role of the state in Muslim societies, it is 
helpful to look at what some relatively early commentators had to say. His work is 
generally mentioned only in passing and it would be a worthwhile undertaking, albeit 
well beyond the scope of this work, to give it a more sustained and methodical 
analysis. However, based on rather limited secondary material, the following 
observations can be made. Firstly, that the “significance of Raziq’s theory lies in 
permitting the heads of Muslim states to conduct foreign relations in accordance with 
rules and practices not necessarily derived from the sacred law, since this matter lay 
                                                          
270
 Ibid., p. 34.  
 
271
 Ibid., p. 34. 
P a g e  | 126 
 
outside the domain of religion.”272 Whatever one may think of his ideas, Muslim 
leaders have more or less been acting in de facto agreement with this point, the 
primary exception of course concerning the state of Israel and its advocates. Secondly, 
according to Gudrun Kramer, the very outrage and rejection provoked by his 
argument spurred other thinkers to reformulate and clarify what they meant by 
claiming that Islam was both “religion and state (al-islam din wa dawla).” This lead 
to broad consensus amongst otherwise quite divergent thinkers that there are “two 
differentiated spheres of human life and activity: one revolving around faith and 
worship and the other revolving around worldly affairs, both of them subject to the 
precepts of Islam.” What is perhaps most surprising and closely related to the aim of 
al-Raziq’s work is that she argues they further agree that “the hallmark of the truly 
Islamic system (al-nizam al-islami) is the application of the sharīʿa and not any 
particular political order- the historical caliphate included.”273 It appears that al-Raziq 
may have lost the ideological battle and failed to convince his fellow scholars that 
Islam was a religion and not a system of government, yet that he still managed to win 
the war simply by “causing a sensation” and provoking such a fierce response.274 
Some would take this reaction to mean that al-Raziq’s work represents “a radical 
reinterpretation” of the Qurʾan, but the subsequent, seemingly unconscious, 
agreement with some of his key points on the part of his critics suggests that this is 
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not a radical departure from established understandings, so much as an unusually 
frank account of the state of Muslim political thought as actually practiced.
275
 
 
When analyzing the Constitution of Medina, it is clear that it addresses the particular 
concerns of a particular people in a particular place and time. Despite this, it retains a 
remarkable degree of relevance to present constitutional discourse as a founding 
document of Islamic protections of the rights and duties of individual citizens. 
Furthermore, as the discussion of al-Raziq’s work shows, it has the potential to 
highlight the unique nature of Muhammad’s role, whilst simultaneously pointing out 
how his example of leadership relied more on persuasion than coercion, and that there 
is a great deal of latitude in how one structures a Muslim state so long as that structure 
exists within the larger sphere of the values and commands of the Qurʾan.276 
 
The power of the Constitution of Medina mainly lies in its constituent parts being 
authored by Muhammad himself. One can see that the symbiosis of religion and 
political power existed from the very origins of Islam, but that in its earliest form its 
definition of umma was far more inclusive and pluralistic. No matter how hard one 
looks, it is impossible to find in the Constitution of Medina a ready-made system of 
government that would work today, but one does find well-established, time-tested 
principles that have achieved wide acceptance and legitimacy amongst diverse groups 
of Muslims. This can be seen historically in the millet system of minority autonomy 
operated by the Ottomans and more recently in the religious freedom and political 
rights given to Copts in Egypt. Furthermore, when paired with modern thinkers like 
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al-Raziq, the Constitution of Medina points to the possibility that what many Western 
scholars have seen as a shocking lack of political theory within early Muslim writing 
and philosophy is perhaps instead an intentional oversight designed to emphasize the 
sacredness of the Message of Islam and the distinctness of the Messenger of Islam so 
that no subsequent revelations or revealers could claim their full mantle of authority. 
 
It is to a detailed, philosophical analysis of how this authority should be exercised and 
derived in al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State, to which this thesis now turns.277  
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Chapter 3: Al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State and Al-
Mawardi’s The Ordinances of Government-The Rule of Law 
in Muslim Philosophical and Juristic Thought 
 
3.1 Al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State and the Personification of the 
Rule of Law 
 
Ironically, despite the genius of Muslim philosophers, their impact on Islamic thought was 
marginal. If the use of reason in scholastic theology had been suspect, how much more was 
philosophy, which, in contrast to theology, took reason and not revelation as its starting 
point and method….more often than not they were viewed as rationalists and non-believers. 
Philosophy never established itself as a major discipline. In contrast, Muslim philosophy 
had a major impact on the West. By transmitting Greek philosophy to medieval Europe, it 
influenced the curriculum of its universities and the work of such scholars as Albertus 
Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Roger Bacon.
278
 
 
 
Given the rather disappointing junction of Islamic philosophy and political-
theological acceptance mentioned above, one could be forgiven for questioning the 
inclusion of al-Farabi in a discussion of Islamic constitutionalism. If his and his 
colleagues’ impacts upon Islamic jurisprudence and politics were so minimal, why is 
there such enthusiasm for studying their work on the part of Western scholars? 
Indeed, Patricia Crone, in her substantial study, God’s Rule: Government and Islam, 
says of al-Farabi: 
A historian of mainstream Islam is apt to dismiss all philosophers as marginal… One does 
not often encounter the philosophers or their ‘political science’ in sources written by these 
scholars. In fact, one does not encounter al-Farabi anywhere at all. But after al-Farabi’s 
time, attempts to fuse philosophy with the religious sciences began to be made… and 
though some rejected such efforts as attempts to undermine Islam from within, there can be 
little doubt that the appeal of philosophy widened. Even religious scholars and theologians 
took to reading it, be it for purposes of instruction or refutation.
279
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Although these questions are certainly valid, particularly in the case of those claiming 
to be presenting an “Islamic view” of a matter, the aims of this chapter are 
substantially humbler. Rather than presenting a constitutional discourse that 
represents itself as valid in Islamic terms, this and the following sections will simply 
state a case for the types of concepts and thinkers that could be included in a 
constitutional discourse that is derived from Islamic sources and geared towards local 
needs, which may include tacit or explicit nods to Islam in the constitution of the state 
and its values and institutions. It is also useful to look at thinkers whose work shares 
some vocabulary and background knowledge with those common in Western political 
thought.  As the person who is arguably the most directly responsible for introducing 
ancient Greek thought back into European scholarship, al-Farabi is an ideal candidate 
for comparative analysis.
280
 By examining his work On the Perfect State (Ahl al-
Madina al-Fadila), it will be possible to draw direct comparisons to classical 
conceptions of the good life, virtuous ruler, and the ultimate aim of the state in 
relationship to creating and sustaining virtuous citizens. Furthermore, by following up 
this examination with a complementary analysis of Muslim jurist al-Mawardi’s The 
Ordinances of Government, it will be possible to make an initial assessment of the 
compatibility and relevance of Muslim philosophy with more prevalent forms of 
political thinking found in the jurists and the mirror of princes literature.  
 
Before examining his work in detail, a brief biographical sketch of Abu Nasr al-
Farabi is necessary to put his work in context. He was born in Turkestan (modern day 
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Kazakhstan) in circa 870 AD and was most likely an Imami Shiite. He was brought 
up and educated in Baghdad, was taught philosophy by a Christian, and “was friendly 
with the Christian Aristotelian and translator, Mata ibn Yunus. He lived in Baghdad, 
but did not belong to the court, bureaucracy or any literary group; he worked on his 
own.”281 This may explain why his work retains a distinctive quality to this day, and 
why he is considered the founder of Islamic al-‘ilm al-madani (political science).282 
 
Eventually, he did take up a place at court in Aleppo in the court of the Imami 
Hamdanids and produced, amongst other works, the Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila during 
this time (942/3 AD).
283
 His work is essentially Aristotelian but is heavily influenced 
by Platonic ideals and the neo-Platonism of late antiquity and early Christian thought. 
As Patricia Crone (and others) sees it, the fascination al-Farabi held with Plato was 
largely due to its apparent commonalities with Islamic assumptions. In Plato, he 
could compare the colonizing experience of the Greeks and the early followers of 
Muhammad, and view Muhammad himself through the lens of a founder or lawgiver. 
“Moreover, the early Greeks shared the early Muslim view that membership of a 
particular polity… was a precondition for human perfection/salvation.”284 She also 
contends that his work equates the Prophet with “the lawgiver,” the sharīʿa as “the 
                                                          
281
 Black, Antony. The History of Islamic Political Thought : From the Prophet to the Present. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001. p. 61. 
 
282
 Crone (2004), p. 167. This may also explain his aforementioned attractiveness to Thomas Aquinas. 
The neo-Platonist streak in Farabi’s writings is strong and would have been appealing to many early 
Medieval Christian thinkers. 
 
283
 Black (2001), p. 61.  
 
284
 Crone (2004), pp. 171-2.  
 
P a g e  | 132 
 
law (namus), or constitution (sira, siyasa), the Muslim community as his polity 
(madina), and not least, of the philosophers as the true legatees of its founder.”285 
 
3.2. Al-Farabi’s Ideal Ruler, The Incarnate Rule of Law 
 
The beginning of al-Farabi’s discourse On the Perfect State begins, like many 
philosophical works, with definition of key terms. Crucially, the subject of this 
inquiry, the medina or city/state, is defined as thoroughly Islamic, even sharing a 
common root with the word Muslim (one who submits) and Islam (submission or 
peace). He reminds his reader of the definition given the term by the popular and 
trusted reporter, 
 
Abu Ishaq- may God give him support-  (who) has said: The word al-Madina is derived 
from a root which denotes submission, obedience, compliance, and concurrence <of 
people> in obeying a strong ruler who governs them fully while upholding their rights 
and accepting the obedience which they owe to him.
286
   
 
 
It is important to note that the rule of law presented here is deeply personified. This is 
in keeping both with Shiite proclivities to emphasize the role of the Imam in 
salvation, and with a Platonic ideal of philosopher-king. It also uses the constitutional 
dichotomy of rights and obligations in describing the relationship of the ruler as one 
who “governs fully while upholding their rights.”  The personification of the rule of 
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law and the state is carried further in Chapter 15 of his work (the previous chapters 
are largely concerned with metaphysics, the “First Cause,” etc.) as seen below: 
 
The excellent city resembles the perfect and healthy body, all of whose limbs co-operate 
to make the life of the animal perfect and to preserve it in this state. Now the limbs and 
the organs of the body are different and their natural endowments and faculties are 
unequal in excellence, there being among them one ruling organ, namely the heart, and 
organs which are close in rank to that ruling organ, each having been given by nature a 
faculty by which it performs its proper function in conformity with the natural aim of that 
ruling organ… The same holds good in the case of the city. Its parts are different by 
nature, and their natural dispositions are unequal in excellence: there is in it a man who is 
the ruler, and there are others whose ranks are close to the ruler… these are the holders of 
the first ranks… the limbs and organs of the body are natural, whereas, although the parts 
of the city are natural, their dispositions and habits, by which they perform their actions 
in the city, are not natural but voluntary…287   
 
 
This biological anthropomorphism of the city is familiar in its acceptance of social 
hierarchies as natural and in its assumption that the manner in which these hierarchies 
are composed is based on natural variation in “excellence.” Importantly, this is 
qualified by a nod to human agency in the promulgation of and obedience to the law, 
as indicated by his claim that “their dispositions and habits, by which they perform 
their actions… are not natural but voluntary.”288 This means that society is not simply 
composed of structural/institutional components, but that it is also socially 
constructed and dependent upon the accumulated acts of its individual members for 
its creation and maintenance. 
289
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The ruler, in particular, is absolutely vital to the state: 
 
In the same way (as the heart rules the body) the ruler of this city must come to be in the 
first instance, and will subsequently be the cause of the rise of the city and its parts and 
the cause of the presence of the voluntary habits of its parts and of their arrangement in 
the ranks proper to them; and when one part is out of order he provides it with the means 
to remove its disorder.
290
  
 
 
In his commentary on this work, translator Richard Walzer points out that al-Farabi is 
following Plato in making the primary object of his political science the definition of 
the “right ruler.”291 This is because, for al-Farabi, the ruler is the very genesis of the 
state and all of its subsequent parts and social relationships.  One point Walzer omits 
in this brief comment, is that the ruler is also given the ongoing duty of providing for 
public order through correction of any elements that would throw the apparatus of 
state out of proper balance. This power could even be interpreted to include that of 
deciding on the life or death of a subject.
292
 
 
Furthermore, the ruler is on-going exemplar for his subjects and establishes the 
overall aims of the state as a whole.
293
 The question remains as to what qualifications 
confer legitimacy and ability on the ruler to undertake such an ambitious task of 
founding, maintaining, and ruling a state rightly. Here al-Farabi states that, 
“(r)ulership requires two conditions: (a) he should be predisposed for it by his inborn 
nature, (b) he should have acquired the attitude and habit of will for rulership which 
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will develop in a man whose preborn nature is predisposed for it.”294 Again, the 
importance of both nature and nurture can be seen, although in this case, the nurture 
would appear to be self-nurture in the form of consistently acting virtuously. The art 
of the ruler “must be an art towards the aim of which all the other arts tend, and for 
which they strive in all the actions of the excellent city.”295 What exactly this art is, is 
never stated, but from later passages it becomes clear that it is the art of fulfilling 
one’s role in society, and the subsequent acts and attitudes this requires (which are 
discussed further on). Nowhere in this passage does al-Farabi state how this ruler is to 
acquire power over those less virtuous, or indeed whether this power is a pre-requisite 
for the virtuous man to also be Lawgiver and Ruler. Ann Lambton mentions that in 
his other works, including his Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, he says that “ ‘The 
prince or the imam is prince and imam by virtue of his skill and art, regardless of 
whether or not, anyone acknowledges him… whether or not he is supported in his 
purpose by any group.’”296 Though the idea that a leader could exist without any 
followers is one that is certainly odd in some respects, al-Farabi seems to view this 
possibility as one that is at minimum beneficial to this philosopher-king.
297
  
Thus he is… a wise man and a philosopher and an accomplished thinker who employs an 
intellect of divine quality, and through the emanation from the Active Intellect to his 
faculty of representation a visionary prophet: who warns of things to come and tells of 
particular things which exist at present. 
 
This man holds the most perfect rank of humanity and has reached the highest degree of 
felicity… He is the man who knows every action by which felicity can be reached. This 
is the first condition for being a ruler. Moreover, he should be a good orator and able to 
rouse [other people’s] imagination by well-chosen words. He should be able to lead 
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people well along the right path to felicity and to the actions by which felicity is reached. 
He should, in addition, be of tough physique in order to shoulder the tasks of war. 
This is the sovereign over whom no other human being has any sovereignty whatsoever; 
he is the Imam; he is the first sovereign of the excellent city, he is the sovereign of the 
excellent nation, and the sovereign of the universal state (the oikumene).
298
    
 
 
Here can be seen an explicitly Islamic reference to the Imam and one which clearly 
identifies the imam with the Platonic ruler. Walzer makes a point of mentioning that 
the term had a variety of uses in the intellectual debates of al-Farabi’s day. Amongst 
the identifications given to it were the Prophet Muhammad and his successor, the 
Caliph.
299
 The usefulness of this dual meaning is that the righteous ruler need not be 
immortal for the continued existence of the excellent city. His successors can utilize 
his teachings and examples, particularly his “representation” of truth as given in his 
role of “visionary prophet,” to maintain right rule.300 
 
Following a discussion of the 12 essential qualities of a founding ruler, Al-Farabi goes 
on to explore the six qualities found which must exist in subsequent sovereigns. These 
are as follows: 
(1) He will be a philosopher. (2) He will know and remember the laws and customs 
(and rules of conduct) with which the first sovereigns had governed the city, 
conforming in all his actions to their actions. (3) He will excel in deducing a new law 
by analogy where no law of his predecessors has been recorded, following for his 
deductions the principles laid down by the first Imams. (4) He will be good at 
deliberating and be powerful in his deductions to meet new situations for which the 
first sovereigns could not have laid down any law; when doing this he will have in 
mind the good of the city. (5) He will be good at guiding the people by his speech to 
fulfill the laws of the first sovereigns as well as those laws which he will have deduced 
in conformity with their principles after their time. (6) He should be of tough physique 
in order to shoulder the tasks of war, mastering the serving as well as the ruling 
military art.
301
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Importantly, all these qualities need not be present in one person alone. Rather, when 
there is “philosophy in one man and the second quality in another man and so on, and 
when these men are all in agreement, they should all together be the excellent 
sovereigns.”302 Many of the existing practices of Muslim societies can also be seen in 
this passage.
303
 Notably, the ability to “know and remember the laws” when combined 
with “deducing a new law by analogy” is in conformity with conventional Islamic 
jurisprudence. It also injects the potential for dynamism and change in what could 
otherwise be a very static society. If the successors of the ideal ruler are also 
philosophers, which is, after all, requirement number one on his list, then al-Farabi is 
confident they will be able to face “new situations” for which no law could exist as 
they were unforeseen. For present-day political theorists, this opening for innovation 
is one that could potentially answer many doubters of Islam’s ability to adapt to 
changing times and social conditions. In other words, under Farabi’s scheme the gates 
of ijtihad would never be closed so long as societies exist because they will 
necessarily face novel situations and conundrums which will need to be reconciled 
with the ongoing fundamental values and goals of that society. 
 
Ralph Lerner observes that this passage is indicative of the fact that: 
for Farabi as for Plato, the possibility of a succession of such true princes remains doubtful 
at best. Yet the confluence of such rare qualities- in an individual or in a small number - is 
the condition for the perpetuation of the founder's handiwork. One may say of such a group 
or series of fully qualified princes that they form, as it were, a single soul, a single prince.
304
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If one allows that al-Farabi did in fact believe that the existence of the excellent city 
was, in fact, possible, and if one agrees with Walzer that his ideal city is largely based 
upon the premise that Muhammad is such a lawgiver and communicator of 
transcendental truth to the masses, then the fact that he absolutely requires continued 
rule by wise philosophers could lend itself to an argument for a government based 
upon consultation and assent. The Islamic idea of shura, or consultation, is one which 
is complemented by the act of bay‘a, or “pledging allegiance,” in which new rulers 
must be legitimized through public acclamation after a process in which the elders 
and/or wise confer to select a ruler. This longstanding tradition, placed in a more 
modern context, could easily be coupled with this philosophical argument from al-
Farabi to provide both a historical and theoretical justification for democratic, or at 
least democratically accountable, government.
305
 
 
3.3. The Universal Mandate of the Excellent City 
 
The need for the co-existence of innovation and application of the principles of 
excellent rule is seemingly anticipated by al-Farabi. This can be demonstrated in his 
view that the excellent city is potentially one that is universal and eternal because he 
takes the unorthodox view that all of the excellent rulers, even those living at the same 
time, are “like one single soul… they are all of them in the same way like one single 
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king and their souls like one single soul.”306 Rather than some type of relativism or 
imperialism, the motivation and justification for his universalizing tendencies could 
result from what Patricia Crone refers to as “al-Farabi’s belief in the universal nature 
of philosophy (which) accounts for his strangely context-free presentation.” Some 
could see this as a flaw in his work, but it has the advantage of offering a high degree 
of intellectual freedom and interpretation to the reader. Indeed, “one is free… to 
envisage him (the Lawgiver/Prophet) as Muhammad, but one can also identify him as 
Moses or any other prophet familiar to Islam, or as a past or future philosopher.”307 
 
With all this emphasis on the ruler, it is fair to ask, “What of the ruled?” The 
continuation of the rule of law within the excellent city is achieved by the inhabitants 
embracing two complementary identities.  They “have things in common which they 
all perform and comprehend, and other things which each class knows and does on its 
own. Each of these people reaches felicity by… what he has in common with the 
others and what the people of his class to which he belongs have on their own.”308 
This would seem to be a lesser happiness than that experienced by the imam, but 
happiness nonetheless and the best such people can hope to attain. He does not 
address whether it is free will alone, or also coercion, which provides the impetus to 
keep each of these people in their proper social sphere. There is also no justification 
for why what they share in common with others in their class provides happiness, so 
one must reason that al-Farabi assumes commonality to lead to social understanding 
on a more profound level, which would in turn lead to increased happiness. Likewise, 
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the exclusive properties that distinguish each class also provide them with a type of 
joy and fulfillment. This could be a simple recognition that people like to feel unique, 
and yet part of some larger group, or it could be an answer to the question of what 
force keeps people in line. In this case, it could be that social groups like their 
distinctions and take such comfort in their internal relationships, that these 
distinctions become both mutually constituted and self-reinforcing. 
 
3.4. The Transcendental and Eternal Nature of the Rule of Law 
 
Al-Farabi’s view of the rule of law’s centrality to existence extends, as seen 
previously, to the metaphysical and spiritual. For the citizens blessed enough to 
belong to the “excellent city,” he envisions an afterlife in which the following occurs: 
The enjoyment which results from that disposition of the soul (to do what is right) grows 
in strength and the delight which he feels in himself at having it increases and his love for 
it expands. The same is true of the actions by which felicity is attained: the more they 
increase… the stronger and more excellent and more perfect becomes the soul whose 
very purpose is to reach felicity, until it arrives at that stage of perfection in which it can 
dispense with matter so that it becomes independent of it, neither perishing, when matter 
does, nor requiring matter to survive.
309
 
 
This transcendental state is one that is not merely non-physical, but one in which 
perfection exists in degrees. At first glance, the concept of perfection being more or 
less perfect seems to be an oxymoron. If one thinks of logic from a mathematical 
perspective however, as many philosophers have done, a simple analogy presents 
itself. This conception of Farabi’s is much like that of differing degrees of infinity. All 
infinity is infinitely large, yet it is still logical to argue that the distance from one to 
infinity is greater than the distance from 10 to infinity, even though both differences 
are infinitely large.  The great difference of course, is that for mathematicians this line 
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of reasoning does not carry any type of normative weight. For al-Farabi and other 
philosophers, it is a crucial means by which the idea of a perfect vision of the afterlife 
can be reconciled with the idea of rewards based upon how one lived temporally. 
Although on certain points he is unorthodox in terms of traditional Muslim 
understandings of the afterlife, al-Farabi does still situate his musings within the 
general beliefs in eternal reward for a life well lived, and in differing degrees of 
eternal bliss.
310
 
 
 
Interestingly, he also ascribes a very communal idea of “felicity” to the afterlife that is 
arguably in keeping with the Islamic ethos of emphasizing the umma over the 
individual. As he sees it, 
 
When one generation passes away, their bodies cease to exist and their souls are released 
and become happy and when other people succeed them in their ranks, these people take 
their place and perform their actions. When this generation passes away as well and is 
released [from matter], they occupy in their turn the same ranks in felicity as those who 
passed away before, and each joins those who resemble him in species, quantity and 
quality… The more similar separate souls grow together and join one another- in the way 
that one intelligible joins another intelligible- the more increases the self-enjoyment of 
each of them. Whenever any member of a later generation joins them, the enjoyment of 
the new arrival increases when he meets those departed before him, and the joys of the 
departed increase when the new arrivals join them, because each soul thinks its own 
essence and thinks the like of its own essence many times, and thus the quality of what it 
thinks increases.
311
   
 
 
Immediately notable in this passage is the absence of God and divine judgment. This 
perfect state seems to be a self-regulating and perpetuating system of pure 
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enlightenment. Does this mean the excellent city is likewise a type of perpetual 
motion machine, which when put into operation creates a structure in which its 
residents, so long as they do not rebel against it, are pre-destined to eternal felicity?
312
 
Note how his vision includes class distinctions that persist into eternity because of 
how physical life shapes the soul, and how he assumes that similar souls will 
associate, and implies that dissimilar souls will not. Is this an inherently non-
egalitarian vision of perfection? Perhaps it is not. It is relatively simple to see how if 
one bases equality on equal enjoyment rather than equal rank or status, that eternal 
felicity could be more or less enjoyed as much as one is capable of enjoying it. Does 
this serve to provide especially strong motivation for the ruler/lawgiver to strive for 
the very highest forms of perfection since he will presumably be joined in aeternum to 
souls of similar “quality”? This seems more likely. After all, what ruler would not 
wish to think himself worthy of continued exalted capabilities and rank in the 
afterlife? However, the question remains as to what happens to the people of the other 
cities that do not meet the standard of “excellent”? 
 
The blunt verdict al-Farabi enters on the destiny of those who live outside the bounds 
of the excellent city is that “Since the actions of the people in the other cities are bad, 
they produce bad dispositions of the soul in them… the more a man persists in those 
actions, the more deteriorates the disposition of his soul.”313 
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It is noteworthy that once again he does not rely upon the judgment of God as a 
mechanism of punishment or correction. Depending on one’s point of view, his 
perception of the soul of the inhabitant of the non-excellent city is conceivably even 
harsher than that of more orthodox Islamic conceptions of God’s wrath and 
punishment, or it could be viewed as even more cynical about the opportunity such 
people have for redemption. His view of the symptoms of the diseased soul is that it 
leads to a situation in which  
They often enjoy (emphasis mine) the dispositions which they acquire from those 
actions. People who are physically ill, like many of those smitten with fever, their 
sense-perception being spoiled, enjoy flavors which are not normally enjoyable and 
feel discomfort at things which are normally pleasant, or fail to taste the flavor of sweet 
things which are normally pleasant: in the same way people whose soul is diseased, 
their faculty of representation being spoiled by will and habit, enjoy bad dispositions 
and bad actions and either feel discomfort at good dispositions and actions and 
excellent things in general or do not have them within the grasp of their faculty of 
representation at all.
314
 
 
Al-Farabi uses an analogy any medical doctor would find familiar, describing how  
There are among the physically diseased some people who are unaware of their illness 
and some who fancy in addition that they are in good health; they fancy this so strongly 
that they do not listen at all to the words of a doctor. In the same way people whose soul 
is diseased are unaware of their illness or fancy in addition that they are virtuous and 
healthy in their souls and hence do not listen at all to the words of a man who leads them 
in the right path, teaches them and puts them straight.
315
  
 
Clearly, even in the presence of the virtuous lawgiver or prophet, these people would 
be unable to accept the corrective measures he would propose and consequently are 
thoroughly unredeemable. They are also, to al-Farabi’s mind at least, delusional in 
their self-perception, which means that the state of their soul is one of deterioration 
and their state of mind is fundamentally one of ignorance about the all-important state 
of their souls.  
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What is the destiny of these sad, depraved souls? Eschewing traditional accounts of 
eternal punishment and Hell, al-Farabi argues instead that because the souls of people 
from bad cities are not perfect, they “necessarily require matter for their preservation, 
since no trace of truth whatsoever except the first intelligibles has been imprinted on 
them.” This leads to a cycle of metaphysical decay that mirrors the process of decay 
experienced in a dead body until, in the end, the best possibility remaining for these 
people is that the material matter of which they were composed becomes part of a 
human being once again. Their souls however, are a lost cause. “These are the men 
who perish and proceed to nothingness, in the same way as cattle, beasts of prey and 
vipers.”316  
 
How is this relevant to an Islamic view of the rule of law? It demonstrates an 
orthodox acceptance that the fate of individual souls is based upon individual merit 
and right conduct, but these individuals exist in a state where God is ultimately and 
thoroughly sovereign, causing each and every action in the world to occur, good or ill. 
Each individual is judged and rewarded or punished according to his or her acts. This 
means that despite al-Farabi’s very unconventional representation of the afterlife, it is 
still in general philosophical accordance with wider streams of Islamic thought. It also 
crucially gives a nod to the idea that the real rule of law is the will of God, which is 
likely to give his thought at least some additional credibility in Muslim quarters. 
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There does seem to be one class of person for whom al-Farabi foresees a fate worse 
than non-existence, and that is for the ruler of “people of the cities which have gone 
astray: the man who led them astray and turned them away from felicity… is himself 
one of the people of the wicked cities; therefore he alone… will be wretched.” This 
seems to be some sort of state of eternal misery that could be equivalent to a type of 
Hell, especially when he continues by saying that “the others will perish and 
ultimately dissolve in the same way as the people of the ignorant city.”317 
 
One final possibility for the afterlife, that is both intriguing and less determinist, is 
mentioned in al-Farabi’s discussion of what happens to “people of the excellent city” 
when they are “compelled and forced to act like people of the ignorant city.” Because 
they are aware of the fact they are being forced to do something bad, and because they 
feel discomfort and are acting against their will, the commission of these non-virtuous 
acts “will not harm” them. This situation occurs either when “the man under whose 
rule (the virtuous man) lives is one of the people of the cities opposed to the excellent 
city or when he is compelled to live in the places of the people of the non-excellent 
cities.”318 
 
What seems to be represented here is an affirmation of the traditional Shiite doctrine 
of dissimilation (taqiyya), which allowed them to act as though they were Sunni for 
the sake of their own protection, so long as they were compelled to do so, without 
incurring guilt. There is also a recognition that it is possible for a virtuous person to 
exist within a context which is not “excellent.” This clearly demonstrates that 
although the community to which people belong has an extremely influential role in 
                                                          
317
 See pp. 273-275, for a discussion of how the misery of the willfully bad city increases infinitely. 
 
318
 Ibid., p. 277. 
P a g e  | 146 
 
their temporal and eternal well-being and happiness, it is ultimately the individual 
who does or does not attain true knowledge and excellence. Here again, broader 
Islamic tradition is reflected, which undoubtedly places a heavy emphasis upon the 
benefits and relative ease of living in a Muslim society for one who wishes to live 
lawfully, yet which does not preclude the possibility of individual believers being able 
to live rightly outside of that context. What al-Farabi achieves in this schema is a 
remarkable balance in weighing the influences of nature and nurture, the individual 
and society. This vision is one which is thus steeped in the ethos reflected from the 
earliest times of the Muslim community in which the people were both one umma 
accountable for their public acts and maintaining an Islamic society and 
simultaneously individuals accountable for their private deeds and inward belief. 
 
Al-Farabi’s contentions on the afterlife and how it is attained are thus arguably more 
just than many fundamentalist visions because one is neither guaranteed eternal joy, 
nor is one bound for non-existence merely based upon the accident of where he or she 
was born. It also places his thought well within classical Western philosophy and 
political thought, which is no surprise given his profound admiration and detailed 
study of Aristotle’s work, and in light of the role he personally played in reviving 
Greek thought for the Arabic-speaking world in a manner that would eventually lead 
to its reintroduction in Europe thanks to the Moorish conquest of Spain.
319
 
3.5. General Observations on a Farabian Rule of Law 
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Ultimately, for al-Farabi as for many ancient thinkers, the presence of the rule of law 
is one that exists on a metaphysical and essential level of reality, which then 
determines the shape and form and operation of laws in the physical and social 
worlds. This is a classical view of natural law, which finds that a lack of rule of law is 
one that occurs not in fact, because the law is transcendental, but rather in 
apprehension, because people are not able to reason clearly enough to discern the 
truth of its existence and the individual mandates it requires of the one who wished to 
live well and earn “eternal felicity.” The Islamic twist on this concept that gives his 
thought unique merit and distinguishes it from the Greeks that he clearly admires and 
imitates, is the emphasis on the individual lawgiver as embodied in the person of the 
prophet (and by extension The Prophet, Muhammad) and the apprehension of true law 
by the masses as occurring symbolically through a simplified version of the truth 
delivered by the prophet as “revelation.”320 
 
Unusually, al-Farabi does not believe that this revelation needs to be the same in all 
places and times for its truth-revealing potential to work. Indeed he recognizes the 
individuality of different nations and peoples and makes the following case in regards 
to their particular revealed truths: 
 
The philosophers in the city are those who know these (truths) through strict 
demonstration and their own insight… But others know them through symbols which 
produce them by imitation, because neither nature nor habit has provided their minds 
with the gift to understand them as they are. Both are kinds of knowledge, but the 
knowledge of the philosophers is undoubtedly more excellent… Now these things are 
produced by imitation for each nation and for the people of each city through those 
symbols which are best known to them. But what is best known often varies among 
nations, either most of it or part of it. Hence these things are expressed for each nation 
in symbols other than those used for another nation. Therefore it is possible that 
excellent nations and excellent cities exist whose religions differ, although they all 
have as their goal one and the same felicity and the very same aims.
321 
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The argument that different revelations, so long as they have the “same aims” and 
“felicity” as their goal, can lead a people on the path to excellence is one that would 
not necessarily be expected by an observant Muslim. Whether or not his co-
religionists agreed, as many undoubtedly did not, al-Farabi opens up an important 
philosophical door which strongly contradicts claims that Islam and Western thought 
are bound for any sort of “clash.” Taken further, it could, in fact, open the door for a 
state that is both Islamic and pluralist, which is one of the biggest objections raised by 
people who both advocate and abhor the idea of an Islamic state.  
 
Another potential application of al-Farabi’s thought would be in recognizing the 
distinctions within what is traditionally referred to as the House of Islam (Dar al-
Islam) and to give validity to the variations that exist in Islamic belief and practice, 
which vary radically from one another. Islamic government in Saudi Arabia looks 
very little like Islamic government in Malaysia or Pakistan, yet each of these states is 
a self-proclaimed “Islamic” state. Perhaps the use of natural law doctrines could be 
helpful in explaining how regimes could take on different forms and yet still conform 
to the overarching dictates of justice required by the sharīʿa. Al-Farabi clearly sees 
revealed law as a more readily understandable and palatable form of the law of God 
and nature. The law of the land could be seen as simply a further distillation of the 
essential justice and goodness needed to maintain the state. Al-Mawardi, on the other 
hand, approaches the creation of the good state from the opposite tack of a 
juristic/institutional approach that de-emphasizes the personal qualities of the ruler in 
exchange for placing a much stronger spotlight on the role of law, custom, and 
religious practice. The next section of this chapter looks at his work in order to assess 
a more prevalent form of Muslim political thought and also to place al-Farabi in a 
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wider context in order to ascertain to what extent the philosophical model exists either 
in tandem or in opposition to the juristic model of state and societal organization. 
 
3.6. Al-Mawardi’s Ideal Regime in the Real World- An analysis of The 
Ordinances of Government 
 
Al-Mawardi has said: “Praise the Lord, who has clarified the faith and favored us with 
the comprehensive Book, who has issued us His commands and so delineated the 
boundaries of right and wrong that they have become the ultimate ordinance in this 
world, whereby the welfare of men is assured and the foundations of truth are firmly 
established. It is He who has entrusted leaders with the implementation of His just rules 
and with the conduct of affairs in the manner He has so magnificently planned…”322 
 
 
The market supervisor should exercise his discretion regarding what is harmful or 
harmless, because that belongs to reasoning based on custom rather than juridicial 
reasoning. The difference between the two kinds of reasoning is that juridicial reasoning 
is that in which a principle is observed which has been established by canon law, while 
customary reasoning is that in which the principle observed is established by custom… 
The market supervision office is one of the bases of religious affairs. The sovereigns 
used to attend to it in person owing to the public good and rich personal reward it brings. 
However, when the Caliph turned away from it, and delegated it to the insignificant, so 
that it became open to profiteering and corruption, it became less important and lost the 
respect of the public. Still, a rule does not become invalidated because it has been 
violated. Scholars have failed to detail its rules which should not have been so 
inadequately treated. Most of this book we have written contains matter that has been 
either omitted or inadequately covered by other scholars. So, we have mentioned what 
they ignored and detailed what they only casually dealt with.
323
 
 
In stark contrast to the free-form and highly abstracted language of al-Farabi’s 
treatise, al-Mawardi begins and ends his work on government with a solid grounding 
in the day to day running of the Muslim state as seen in the passage above. This is no 
attempt to derive right rule by observation of the cosmos or one’s innermost musings. 
Mawardi’s work is thoroughly steeped in references to the Qurʾan, the life of 
Muhammad, and to the work of various jurists in each of the main Sunni legal 
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schools. As this analysis will show, Mawardi’s writing is also infused with a concern 
for the derivation, use, and delegation of power. This power preoccupation is the 
foundation of his vision for a timeless rule of law that can undergird the multitude of 
constantly shifting regulations and political actors in any real state. His own doctrine 
is of the Shafi‘ite school, but this does not prevent him from mentioning Hanafi, 
Hanbali, Maliki, and other interpretations throughout his work.
324
 Furthermore, there 
is an unrelenting concern with the practical and mundane affairs of the daily business 
of governing that permeates his writing, constantly connecting eternal and 
transcendent truth to the fine details of society and how it does business, entertains 
itself, defends itself, and cares for its least fortunate. For Mawardi, the devil is not in 
the details. Rather, the devil is in not giving detail its due respect and ensuring that the 
requirements of the eternal law are firmly fixed within the interpretation of that law in 
everyday life. 
 
As evidenced in the passage above, Mawardi’s conception of the relationship between 
the ruler and religion is well within the “medieval Sunni tradition.” This tradition 
posits that “the state provides for the necessary legality and material conditions for the 
religion to flourish.”325 Here again is a conception in which the rule of law as 
conceived politically is one which is made subject to a transcendent rule of law as 
represented by the sharīʿa. Mawardi had the intellectual luxury of having experienced 
no rule outside nominal caliphal rule, meaning that his conception of political 
legitimacy could not admit of the possibility that it may cease. That being said, he 
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nonetheless knew very well that an overwhelming number of claims had been made 
on the part of would-be caliphs and that it was impossible for all of these rivals to be 
equally legitimate.  
 
Interestingly, Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi lived merely one century after al-Farabi. 
Born in 974AD and living until 1058AD, he was the son of a rose-water merchant in 
Basra during the reign of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad.
326
 His life was one 
immersed in the power struggles of this time, with near constant political upheaval 
arguably wielding a particularly strong influence upon his thought. The following 
assessment of his work will discuss Mawardi’s conception of the institutional nature 
of the Caliphate and its preeminent position in his formulation of power, making note 
of his emphasis on the need for the Caliphate to continue in order for any government 
to claim the mantle of Muslim and “legal,” in the sense of complying with the eternal 
dictates of sharīʿa. 
3.7. Mawardi’s Institutional Caliph- The Agent of Sovereignty  
 
As is the case with many works on government, a great deal can be gleaned from the 
structure of Mawardi’s argument. His primary goal in every section of his work is to 
enshrine the contention that the Caliphate, or Imamate, is “a main point laid down by 
the principles of the creed… all public matters are guaranteed by it… Its rules must 
then be given priority of mention over other statutes of government…”327 If one were 
to put a Foucault-style gloss on this statement, it could be said that the Caliphate is the 
channel through which all power moves in the Muslim state. Power is not quantified 
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in the sense in which modern realists like Morgenthau would visualize it, but rather it 
derives from God and is meant to be used in accordance with His design for society. 
The settled nature of the debate on power’s origins means that the process by which 
power is exercised is placed at the forefront of Mawardi’s discussion. Much as 
government functions in constitutional monarchies are undertaken in the name of a 
titular head of state, it is the Caliphate alone, which is the “focal point of the Islamic 
governmental, constitutional, and legal system, all important functions of the state are 
derived from it.”328  Thus this work begins by laying out the qualifications of electors, 
followed by those for one who would be Caliph, along with the mechanisms by which 
the Caliph may be legitimately chosen and remain in power.  
 
The qualifications for electors in Mawardi’s scheme are simultaneously idealist and 
practical. In an ideal sense, electors must evidence three qualities: probity, knowledge 
leading to recognition of those qualified to be a candidate, and prudence and wisdom 
to “choose the best candidate and the most capable and knowledgeable in managing 
state affairs.”329 On a practical note, he mentions that though there is no legal reason 
for it, residents of the capital city are customarily given precedence in selection of a 
new ruler simply because they are first aware of the death of the previous Caliph and 
are most likely to be acquainted with the candidates qualified to take on the post.
330
 
Mawardi’s formulation thus incorporates the ideal of a virtuous elite citizen qualified 
to find and elect a capable ruler alongside the reality that this group will likely be 
limited to those in the closest proximity to power.  
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This list of qualifications would seem to open the possibility of being an elector to 
virtually any well-educated and devout member of the community. It is not difficult to 
envision even this very traditional juristic approach to electing a new ruler being 
amenable to reinterpretation along constitutional, even democratic, lines. One could 
simply advocate that the public goods of education and well-ordered society would 
prepare most people for such a role as responsible citizens. Likewise, with modern 
communication capabilities, virtually all people have the chance to observe and judge 
those in power. However, there are significant qualifications that must be made in 
such an observation. Mawardi’s system itself is not one which is democratic or which 
aspires to be. This, much like the appropriation of concepts of shura and other 
Muslim terms by liberal thinkers of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, would be a deliberate 
attempt to reinterpret and recontextualize a more venerable and respected concept or 
thinker.  
 
The conservatism of Mawardi’s thought comes to the forefront in his list of the ten 
public duties required of the caliph. These are delineated as follows: 
First, he must guard the faith, upholding its established sources and the consensus of the 
nation’s ancestors, arguing with emerging heretics or suspicious 
dissenters…administering to them the legal penalties, so that the faith should remain 
pristine… Second, he must enforce law between disputing parties…Third, he must 
protect the country and the household…Fourth, he must dispense the legal 
punishments… Fifth, he must strengthen border posts (by both equipment and 
soldiers)…Sixth, he must fight those who resist the supremacy of Islam… until they 
convert or sign a treaty of subjection, so that God’s claim to have a faith superior to any 
other is established…Seventh, he must collect the legal taxes and alms…Eight, he has to 
estimate payments and allocations… and pay them neither before nor after the appointed 
time…Ninth, he must appoint men who are reliable and sincere and of good counsel to 
…take care of the funds he charges them with in order to ensure efficiency… Tenth, he 
has personally to oversee matters and study the conditions of the people in order to 
manage public policy and guard the faith instead of relying on delegation of authority 
while he is preoccupied with pleasure or worship…331 
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Taking these stipulations in turn, what emerges is a sort of Leviathan figure who 
must, above all else, avoid civil strife. Hence, the ruler’s first role is to “guard the 
faith.” His authority is thus derived from his duties, the foremost being a religious 
duty to ensure the protection of the sacred in the midst of the mundane. Notice too 
that this faith is singular and unitary, and no mention is made of variants of Islam, let 
alone other religions that may be practiced by his subjects. The second through fifth 
points are largely concerned with the more traditional contention that legitimacy is 
maintained, if not derived, from the successful protection of life, limb, and property of 
one’s subjects. The sixth point comes back to religious duties, being a statement of a 
kind of jihad and a reminder that non-Muslims will be subject to dhimmi status and its 
attendant jizya. The seventh through ninth points are very practical concerns with the 
efficient and just administration of the state and a reminder that the paying of alms is 
not merely a social but a religious duty.  
 
Most interesting for the present discussion of the rule of law is his tenth stipulation. 
Here, Mawardi creates what is effectively a duty imposed on the ruler himself, as 
opposed to a duty he enforces through the coercive power of the state. Namely, 
“personally to oversee matters and study the conditions of the people in order to 
manage public policy and guard the faith instead of relying on delegation of authority 
while he is preoccupied with pleasure or worship.” This implies several important 
things. First, the Caliph is ultimately responsible for what occurs in his domains, thus 
he must be personally involved in their day to day affairs. Secondly, he rules not only 
on God’s behalf, but also on behalf of his fellow Muslims and other subjects, making 
it attendant upon him to know the “conditions of the people.” Thirdly, this 
management of public policy and protection of the faith are to take absolute priority 
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over his own personal good, whether the mundane good of pleasure or the sacred 
good of worship. One can see in this statement that Mawardi’s approach to rulership 
and power bears more than a passing resemblance to Hobbes, yet predates him by 
several centuries. The reason this is worth pointing out is that just as Hobbes has been 
used variously to justify despotism and liberalism, so too can Mawardi’s description 
of caliphal duty be used to further despotic or constitutional ends. If one considers 
that the Caliph does not rule by hereditary right, but by the will of God and the 
expressed will of electors, and that his duties to guard the faith and the faithful 
supersede his prerogatives for personal pleasure, then what emerges is a system which 
simply accommodates itself to the political realities on the ground, whilst 
simultaneously mustering all the gentle and not so gentle reminders of the duties and 
obligations of rule that it can. All of this, again, is marshaled in the effort to ensure 
that the overarching good of Muslim unity and purity of faith are maintained at 
virtually any cost.
332
 
 
Indeed, Mawardi’s advocacy for the primacy of the power of the sultan (by virtue of 
his legitimation by the caliph) extends beyond those who would elect the caliph, 
beyond the duties of the caliph, which could be seen as a mundane political activity 
by some thinkers, and includes even the conduct of Friday prayers in the mosques. 
Calder relates that “He distinguishes between the post of prayer leader in relation to 
communal prayer, Friday prayer and supererogatory prayer:”  
The appointment of an imam to lead the communal prayer is dependent on 
the type of mosque in which prayer is held. There are two types : masdjid 
sultdniyya and masdjid 'dmmiyya [government mosques and public mosques]. 
The sultdniyya mosques are those . . . for the supervision of which the sultan 
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is responsible. No-one may be appointed (intiddb) to the imamate [in such 
a mosque] except one appointed (nadab) and invested (qallad) by the sultan 
. . . Once someone has been invested [in a post] he has more right than any 
other to lead the prayer even if others are better or more knowledgeable than he.
333 
 
Thus, in Mawardi’s formulation of the rule of law, even in its cosmic sense, all social 
practices, even those which are part of the Five Pillars of Islam, must be stamped with 
the worldly legitimacy of the caliphal institution in order to be valid. Ironically, this 
rather dogmatic assertion of the sultan’s ultimate authority to appoint imams, and the 
further insistence that they be given priority over any other prayer leader in a given 
mosque is meant to cut through the inevitable disputes as to the proper conduct of 
prayer depending upon which school of fiqh one subscribed to. Briefly, the immediate 
aim of unity and peace within a Muslim state took priority over sorting out doctrinal 
disputes. This end justified the means of achieving it, even if those means amounted 
to little more than despotism. 
 
From the appointment of electors, to the assumption of caliphal duties, to the just 
administration of the market place and the mosque, Mawardi’s vision of power is one 
which permeates every layer of society, and one in which that power itself is 
permeated with the divine, the execution of divine commands and the prevention of 
what is divinely forbidden. This rule of law is one which is inherently concerned with 
binding Muslims together under one political power, even one which is admittedly 
nominal, and which seeks to subvert doctrinal disputes to the larger good of unity in 
order that the Message of Islam can be more effectively spread and lived in the real 
world. It bears remarkably strong resonances with those of Hobbes, who lived through 
similar times of social, political, and religious upheaval, and like Hobbes, his primary 
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concern is the stability of the state, in this case the meta-state that was the House of 
Islam. 
 
Mawardi can be a bit of a political philosophy Rorschach test. Conservative religious 
thinkers can easily point to his juristic focus and advocate a traditional approach to the 
enforcement of sharīʿa and the need to reestablish a universal Caliphate. Liberals 
could likewise point to his various admonitions that the Caliph had to protect and look 
after his religion and his subjects, and could even argue this is a very basic type of 
social contract (albeit one without recourse to elections or other means to get rid of a 
poor Caliph unless this be brought about through invasion or another type of demise). 
 
The desire to understand the rise and fall of these various states, the characteristics of 
their peoples and leaders, and in particular the role played by cultural identity and 
cohesion in gaining and maintaining political power is what motivated the work of 
Ibn Khaldun, whose encyclopedic examination of the known world, particularly of the 
medieval Islamic world, was unprecedented in scope and insight, leading many 
present-day scholars to refer to him as not merely a historian, but also as “the father of 
sociology.” It is his distinctive views of the bonds and characteristics that create and 
bind nation and state to which the next chapter will turn. 
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Chapter 4: Ibn Khaldun and the Centrality of Asabiyya- The 
role of “group feeling” in creating, ruling, and sustaining the 
state 
 
In his recent book African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam, Abdullahi An-
Na‘im laments the treatment of non-Western thinkers in the global scholarly canon, 
saying, “In contrast to the foundational significance of Plato, Marx, or Vico as 
theorists of society, politics, or history in general and not just of or in the West, this 
level of recognition is not given to Ibn Khaldun as a philosopher of history.” Not only 
is he not necessarily recognized as a key philosopher of history writ large, but “to the 
few who know his work at all in the global academy, Ibn Khaldun is seen as a 
sociologist of the Arab world.”334 An-Na‘im’s concern may be partly ameliorated by 
the work of Western scholars like Antony Black, whose The History of Islamic 
Political Thought actually concludes with the sentence: “Ibn Khaldun should be read 
by every modern social scientist of his understanding of the kind of society that 
existed in the Islamic world from the seventh to seventeenth century, and to some 
extent beyond.”335 Although this call for wider study of Ibn Khaldun is surely 
justified, it is unfortunate that even it finishes with a reminder of the “Islamic” nature 
of his work. Indeed, commentators like Mahmoud Dhaouadi have noted that like 
Western sociologists, Ibn Khaldun uses “a dualist typological approach 
(Bedouin/sedentary).”336 This examination of his work, and specifically of his use of 
the concept of asabiyya or “group feeling” as an explanatory element in the 
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legitimacy, power, and survival or fall of political actors and groups, seeks to redress 
in some small way the relative lack of study he has received in the global academy. 
From a close look at his Muqaddimah, or Introduction, to his much larger work which 
sought to be a universal History, it may be possible to derive new insight into the 
characteristics of a ruler or ruling group that allow them to achieve a degree of 
constitutional legitimacy, be it in a Muslim context or otherwise. 
4.1 Ibn Khaldun’s dualistic approach to the study of history and society 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s opening words in The Muqadimmah are startling when one considers 
that he was writing during the 14
th
 Century AD, a time characterized by social and 
cultural stability and massive political upheaval, violence, and instability.
337
 He 
begins his History with a categorical critique of history as it had been done to date and 
with an explicit definition of his own view of what history is and was as follows: 
 
Analogical reasoning and comparison are well known to human nature. They are not safe 
from error… Often, someone who had learned a good deal of past history remains unaware 
of the changes that conditions have undergone. Without a moment’s hesitation, he applies 
his knowledge (of the present) to historical information, and measures such information by 
the things he has observed with his own eyes, although the difference between the two is 
great. Consequently, he falls into an abyss of error.
338
 
It should be known that history, in matter of fact, is information about human social 
organization, which itself it identical with world civilization. It deals with such conditions 
affecting the nature of civilization as, for instance, savagery and sociability, group feelings, 
and the different ways by which one group of human beings achieves superiority over 
another…. And with all the other institutions that originate in civilization through its very 
nature.
339
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Here can be seen his view of how not to do history, and conversely a dual approach to 
how history should be studied. Prior to beginning his own account, he attacks the use 
or misuse of historical information in drawing lessons from a past that is inherently 
different from the present to which they are being applied.
340
 Indeed, he reasons that 
“Times differ according to differences in affairs, tribes, and group feelings, which 
come into being during those (times). Differences in this respect produce differences 
in (public) interests, and each (public interest) has its own particular laws.”341 
 
Aside from its intended audience of fellow historians, Ibn Khaldun’s statement could 
certainly also serve as a cautionary element for politicians seeking to justify their acts 
with the drawing of historical parallels. (The overuse of World War II metaphors 
immediately comes to mind.) On the issue of how history should be undertaken, what 
comes first is an examination of personal and group characteristics that cause a group 
to become superior. Second is an analysis of institutions and how they originate. It is 
not difficult to see the immediate application of such an approach to a consideration 
of constitutional issues, Western, Islamic, or otherwise.   
 
For present purposes, Ibn Khaldun’s division of history into these two categories will 
be utilized in order to assess to what degree he offers an original view of the 
constitution of the state and its leadership, and what the significance of his thought is 
for constitutional thought in an Islamic sense. Does his work remain bound to a highly 
personified vision of law in the vein of al-Farabi, or is his view of legitimacy and rule 
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one that is more broadly applicable to societies and leaders that would not qualify for 
al-Farabi’s seal of excellence? If so, that certainly makes his work potentially more 
applicable to practical politics and takes it out of the purely theoretical and 
philosophical realm. Likewise, the original insights he offers the thinker of 
constitutionalism and the state more generally speaking will also be considered. 
4.2 The centrality of asabiyya in Ibn Khaldun 
 
Any discussion of Ibn Khaldun’s thought necessarily centers on the concept of 
asabiyya, which has been rendered as “group feeling” in the translation of his text 
used here, and is otherwise also translated as “tribal affiliation.”342 For Ibn Khaldun, 
this quality is one that is absolutely essential politically and it is literally the cohesive 
force, or social glue, that holds families, tribes, and regimes together. Hayden White 
points out that this central concern is also strongly rooted in an examination of the 
relationship between the physical and social environments people inhabit. He claims 
that “The first part of the Muqaddimah is devoted to the most thorough examination 
of the relation between environment and society in historical literature between 
Herodotus and Montesquieu.”343 On his use of asabiyya in relation to the rise of a 
group and its leaders, several interesting insights emerge. 
 
The violent nature of political maneuvering is emphasized in the writing of Ibn 
Khaldun. Indeed, he argues that “Nothing can be achieved in these matters without 
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fighting for it, since man has the natural urge to offer resistance. And for fighting one 
cannot do without group feeling, as we mentioned from the beginning.”344 
 Using the work of an earlier historian as a foil, he highlights the centrality of 
asabiyya in successful conquest: 
At-Turtushi mentions that one of the reasons for victory in war is that one side may have a 
larger number of brave and famous knights than the other… The side that has more 
(according to him), even if only one more, will be victorious… but he is not right. What is 
the fact proven to make for superiority is the situation with regard to group feeling. If one 
side has a group feeling comprising all, while the other side is made up of different 
numerous groups, and if both sides are approximately the same in numbers, then the side 
with a united group feeling is stronger than, and superior to, the side that is made up of 
several different groups.
345
 
 
Group feeling in this view is at least partly a matter of unity in social identity. This 
unity, he argues, is far more powerful than historians have thus far given it credit for. 
Indeed, in critiquing At-Turtushi, Ibn Khaldun said that “he too failed to ‘verify his 
statements or clarify them with the help of natural arguments’ and so ‘did not realize 
his intention.’”346 In contrast, he offers an illustration of how his assertion works in 
practice, he gives the example of the earliest Muslim conquests, reminding the reader 
that: 
The members of the dynasty they attack may be many times more numerous as they… 
They are overpowered by them and quickly wiped out, as a result of the luxury and 
humbleness existing among them… This happened to the Arabs at the beginning of Islam 
during the Muslim conquests. The armies of the Muslims at al-Qadisiyah and at the 
Yarmuk numbered some 30,000 in each case, which the Persian troops at al-Qadisiyah 
numbered 120,000, and the troops of Heraclius, according to al-Waqidi, 400,000. Neither of 
the two parties was able to withstand the Arabs, who routed them and seized what they 
possessed.
347
 
                                                          
344
 Ibn Khaldun (1987), pp. 97-8. 
 
345
 Ibid., p. 230. 
 
346
 Malik, Mufti. (2009) “Jihad as Statecraft: Ibn Khaldun On the Conduct of War and Empire,” 
History of Political Thought. 30:3; pp. 395-6. 
 
347
 Ibid., p. 126. 
 
P a g e  | 163 
 
 
Clearly, if history demonstrates that armies can prevail against odds of 4:1 and nearly 
10:1, then Ibn Khaldun believes his contention should be taken seriously.
348
 He sees a 
lack of asabiyya as one of the greatest threats to any political order and goes to great 
lengths and much repetition in offering examples of its utility and necessity.
349
 One 
result of this is that he often glorifies and elevates the character of groups that would 
typically be treated as more primitive and uncivilized than those in settled urban 
kingdoms. Stephen Dale argues that Ibn Khaldun’s view of society is one which sees 
an ongoing antagonism between the Bedouin (and similar groups) and the sedentary 
urbanites. These groups are “natural” in the sense that they unavoidably arise from 
human association.
350
 As Ibn Khaldun sees it the reason these tribal groups are so 
tremendously powerful as conquerors is due to the fact that: 
The restraining influence among Bedouin tribes comes from their shaykhs and leaders. It 
results from the great respect and veneration they generally enjoy among the people… 
Their defense and protection (of their settlements) are successful only if they are a closely 
knit group of common descent. This strengthens their stamina and makes them feared, since 
everybody’s affection for his family and his group is more important (than anything else). 
Compassion and affection for one’s blood relations and relatives exist in human nature as 
something God put into the hearts of men. It makes for mutual support and aid, and 
increases the fear felt by the enemy.
351
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These societies are not only bound in a sort of social contract; they are bound in ties 
of blood and familial obligation. This is important because Ibn Khaldun sees these 
qualities as part of the very fabric of human existence, noting that they are “something 
God put into the hearts of men.” He affirms this elsewhere saying that “It is clear that 
it is in the nature of human beings to enter into close contact and to associate with 
each other, even though they may not have a common descent. However, such 
association is weaker than one based upon common descent, and the resulting group 
feeling is proportionally weaker too.”352 
 
Not only is it woven into human nature, it is also highly useful as it “increases the fear 
felt by the enemy.” It could be argued that the enemy discussed here is nearly always 
couched in terms of Bedouin vs. city-dweller. This relationship is not only 
antagonistic, but also evolutionary and teleological. The Bedouin, according to him, is 
prior in existence, but more than that, is necessary for the existence of the settled 
population. This is because these conquering tribes are forced to rule their conquests 
and take on the qualities of the very urban dwellers they defeated in prior generations. 
This is a fate they are seemingly unable to escape however, as it is their very purpose 
to seek dominion, which forces them to become “civilized.”353 
4.3 On the decline of asabiyya 
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In direct contrast to this characterization of the Bedouin, is his account of how urban 
regimes evolve and decay. The first thing that occurs is that power is consolidated, 
and the victorious tribe itself cedes power to its leaders, and eventually to a leader.  
 
Thus the aspirations of various group feelings are blunted. People become tame and do not 
aspire to share with the leaser in the exercise of control. Their group feeling is forced to 
refrain (from such aspirations). The leader takes charge all by himself, as far as possible. 
Eventually, he leaves no part in his authority to anyone else. He thus claims all glory for 
himself and does not permit the people to share in it… it is something unavoidable in a 
dynasty.
354
 
 
Again, there is a highly deterministic view inherent in Ibn Khaldun’s thought that 
does not envision any type of alternative path for those in power. Success is its own 
worst enemy.
355
 One could easily question why he is so deterministic on the question 
of power being taken over by individuals. Why is there no legitimacy or credence 
given to government by the few or by the whole tribe? It seems ironic that the 
cohesion of the group is so crucial to his thought, and yet the group is subsequently 
tossed aside in favor of strongman rule. Of course, it may simply be a reflection of the 
extent to which the idea of the Caliphate had permeated social thought, but in a 
thinker as original as Ibn Khaldun, this should not necessarily have meant his vision 
of rule would be constrained by this idea. Lest one doubt his insistence on this 
occurring, it is merely necessary to look again at his text, where he says that 
“Moreover, politics requires that only one person exercise control. Were various 
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persons, liable to differ among each other, to exercise it, destruction of the whole 
could result.”356 
4.4. Asabiyya as legitimacy and the dangers of dynastic rule 
 
 
It may be that his obsession with one man rule is simply a result of the society and 
time into which he was born. This is certainly why Allen Fromherz cautions his 
readers not to see Ibn Khaldun as “modern,” despite the many modern types of ideas 
that could be seen in his writings.
357
 The regimes he encountered were those run by 
men who claimed royal titles and privileges, sometimes based on family ties, at other 
times based on religious titles, but always centered on consolidation of power, at least 
in a formal sense, into the name and hands of individual rulers. This being the case, it 
is noteworthy that Ibn Khaldun has a philosophical and historical justification for this 
political arrangement that goes beyond merely accepting the status quo. His historical 
account states: 
Leadership exists only through superiority, and superiority only through group feeling. 
Leadership over people, therefore, must, of necessity, derive from a group feeling that is 
superior to each individual group feeling. Each individual group feeling that becomes aware 
of the superiority of the group feeling of the leader is ready to obey and follow him.
358
 
 
What he observes then, is that asabiyya is a force that exists within people 
individually as well as socially. Each individual person has agency and has to choose 
to assent to the rule of an asabiyya that is in some way “superior” to his own. This 
then could illuminate more constitutional applications of Ibn Khaldun’s thought 
because, despite the despotic nature of his rulers, they are nonetheless obeyed 
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willingly, at least at first. What makes one asabiyya superior to another though? To 
answer this question, Ibn Khaldun conceives another concept, namely “royal 
authority” which he derives from the following: 
By dint of their nature, human beings need someone to act as a restraining influence and 
mediator in every social organization, in order to keep its members from (fighting) with 
each other. That person must, by necessity, have superiority over the others in the matter of 
group feeling. If not, his power cannot be effective. Such superiority is royal authority. It is 
more than leadership. Leadership means being a chieftain, and the leader is obeyed, but he 
has no power to force others to accept his rulings. Royal authority means superiority and 
the power to rule by force.
359
 
 
Viewed in this manner, royal authority
360
 is “a goal to which group feeling leads.”361 
It is not enough to have a stronger asabiyya, however. The ruler with royal authority 
also has the “power to rule by force.”362 This power is not simply exercised; it is 
divinely derived and causes the ruler to become a mirror of the divine presence on 
earth, which (it needs not be said) makes it difficult to oppose.
363
 At this stage, the 
germ of a social contract present in the tribal assent to rule by one of their own is 
obliterated in pursuit of raw power.
364
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When the elements are combined in equal proportions, no mixing can take place. One (element) must 
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Dynastic rule is problematic for starters because “Islam does not consider 
preservation of (the ruler’s) inheritance for his children the proper purpose of 
anointing a successor. Succession to the rule is something that comes from God who 
distinguishes it by whomever He wishes.”365 In other words, there is no proper 
mechanism in this type of regime to ensure that the ruler has been tested and thus 
educated and approved for rule by God. Should anyone doubt his belief on the matter, 
he reiterates by saying, “Leadership must of necessity be inherited from the person 
who is entitled to it, in accordance with the fact, which we have stated, that 
superiority results from group feeling.”366 Only the possession of superior asabiyya is 
a legitimate claim to rule. Bloodline succession is explicitly rejected as the sole means 
of deciding succession, though it is important to recognize that it is not utterly 
forbidden should the descendant ruler actually possess the requisite character.
367
 
 
This dynastic civilizing process is so destructive that Ibn Khaldun declares that it 
absolutely limits the life cycle of any dynasty. The deterministic element of his 
thought comes to the forefront yet again in his explanation of why the typical regime 
                                                                                                                                                                      
be superior to the others, and when (it exercises) its superiority over them, mixing occurs. In the same 
way, one of the various tribal group feelings must be superior to all, in order to be able to bring them 
all together, to unite them, and to weld them into one group feeling comprising all the various groups. 
All the various groups are then under the influence of the superior group feeling.” 
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article “Ruling: Guardians and Philosopher-Kings” in The American Political Science Review, 83:4. 
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will only last for a few generations before it inevitably declines and is overthrown. 
His somewhat long generic account relates that: 
The fourth generation, then, is inferior to the preceding ones in every respect. Its member 
has lost the qualities that preserved the edifice of its glory. He despises (those qualities). He 
imagines that the edifice was built through appreciation and effort. He thinks that it was 
something due his people from the very beginning… and not something that resulted from 
group (effort) and (individual) qualities. For he sees the great respect in which he has is 
held by the people…He imagines that it is due to his descent and nothing else. He keeps 
away from those in whose group feeling he shares, thinking that he is better than they. He 
trusts that they will obey him because he was brought up to take their obedience for 
granted, and he does not know the qualities that made obedience necessary. Such qualities 
are humility (in dealing) with (such men) and respect for their feelings. Therefore, he 
considers them despicable, and they, in turn, revolt against him and despise him. They 
transfer leadership from his and his direct lineage to some other related branch, in 
obedience to their group feeling, after they have convinced themselves that the qualities of 
the (new leader) are satisfactory to them.
368
 
 
According to Michael Brett, this means that “Without deeds, the masses themselves 
are ignored, although it is their civilization that is the cultural achievement of the 
political adventure, and the subject of analysis in the Muqaddima.” Rather than focus 
on the benefits and achievements of this civilization, “Ibn Khaldun turns instead to 
the Bedouin rejected by that civilization, as the new nation growing up in the 
wilderness to eclipse the old, and bring the work back to its original starting-point in 
the Maghrib.”369 The important dynamic here is one in which the superior asabiyya of 
the ruler actually sets him apart from his group to such an extent that he loses touch 
with them and their values, causing him to make the deluded conclusion that it is his 
descent, rather than the innate quality of his ancestors, which legitimates his 
expectation of obedience.
370
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 Ibn Khaldun undertakes a more theological and Shiite oriented discussion of legitimate rule when he 
discusses the speculated overthrow of the “Antichrist” at the end of the world. He says: “If it is correct 
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4.5. Asabiyya as popular assent, potential constitutional implications 
 
Although a constitutional, representative view of government may not be present in 
latent form when Ibn Khaldun argues that the qualities of a legitimate ruler are 
“humility in dealing with such men and respect for their feelings,” his work could be 
used by modern thinkers to advance that cause. Even more significant is the fact that 
the mutual distaste the 4
th
 generation ruler generates causes his subjects to revolt and 
to subsequently “transfer leadership from his and his direct lineage to some other 
related branch, in obedience to their group feeling, after they have convinced 
themselves that the qualities of the (new leader) are satisfactory to them.” Despite his 
determinism and acceptance of despotism, Ibn Khaldun is ultimately adamant that 
rule is only sustainable by those who have some form of popular acceptance.
371
 
This principle even applies to religious leaders, especially those who take on political 
functions.  
Every mass political undertaking by necessity requires group feeling. This is indicated in 
Muhammad’s saying: “God sent no prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his 
people.” If this was the case with the prophets, who are among human beings those most 
likely to perform wonders, one would (expect it to apply) all the more so to others. One 
cannot expect them to be able to work the wonder of achieving superiority without group 
feeling.
372
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that a Mahdi is to appear, there is only one way for his propaganda to make its appearance. He must be 
one of them, and God must unite them in the intention to follow him, until he gathers enough strength 
and group feeling to gain success for his cause and to move the people to support him. Any other way- 
such as a Fatimid who would make propaganda for (the cause of the Mahdi) among people anywhere at 
all… by merely relying on his relationship to the family of Muhammad- will not be feasible or 
successful, for the sound reasons we have mentioned previously.” 
 
371
 See Ibn Khaldun (1987), p. 112, where he lays out the moral argument that: The existence of group 
feeling without the practice of praiseworthy qualities would be a defect among people who possess a 
‘house’ and prestige. All the more so would it be a defect in men who are invested with royal authority, 
the greatest possible kind of glory and prestige. 
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Every political undertaking requires asabiyya. This statement is not followed 
immediately by another about political rule, but instead is succeeded by one dealing 
with the legitimacy of prophets. Here can be seen a distinctive element in Ibn 
Khaldun’s work, that advocates the fusion of the roles of prophet and politician.  
Earlier he writes: 
Another sign (that a person has been chosen by God to reveal truth and lead people) is the 
prestige they have among their people… That means that (such a man) has group feeling 
and influence which protect him from harm at the hands of unbelievers, until he has 
delivered the messages of his Lord and achieved the degree of complete perfection with 
respect to his religion and religious organization that God intended for him.
373
 
 
A religion, then, is not merely about revelation and belief; it is also an “organization.” 
In other words, it too is a political institution. It is an institution that is mandatory for 
the ultimate success of the state because “Religious coloring does away with mutual 
jealousy and envy among people who share in a group feeling, and causes 
concentration upon the truth. When people come to have the (right) insight into their 
affairs, nothing can withstand them, because their outlook is one and their object one 
of common accord.”374 This statement recognizes the inherent danger in the idea of 
asabiyya, and offers religion and its corresponding morality as antidotes.
375
  
4.6 Blunting the double-edged sword, asabiyya in the context of shared 
faith 
 
Oddly, Ibn Khaldun himself offers up a strong religious critique of his advocacy of 
asabiyya, a critique from none other than Muhammad himself. He admits: 
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We find that Muhammad censured group feeling and urged us to reject it and leave it alone… We also 
find that Muhammad censured royal authority and its representatives… He enjoined friendship among 
all Muslims and warned against discord and dissension…376 
 
According to his own account, Muhammad asked his followers not simply to be 
careful with the exercise of group feeling, but rather “censured it” and “urged (them 
to reject it.” This would seem to leave little room for the type of advocacy Ibn 
Khaldun undertakes countless times in his Muqaddimah. Even here, however, he has 
a ready answer to the dilemma put before him; an answer based partly on an assumed 
ability to interpret the Prophet’s intent, and partly upon logic. 
When Muhammad forbids or censures certain human activities or urges their omission, he 
does not want them to be neglected altogether. Nor does he want them to be eradicated, or 
the powers from which they result to remain altogether unused. He wants those powers to 
be employed as much as possible for the right aims. Every intention should thus eventually 
become the right one and the direction of all human activities one and the same… when the 
religious law censures group feeling… (it) is directed against a group feeling that makes a 
person proud and superior…. On the other hand, a group feeling that is working for the 
truth and for the fulfillment of the divine commands is something desirable.
377
 
 
What the reader is left with, following this discussion, is a matter of prioritizing the 
ends over the means, and intention over orthopraxy. If one could only ensure that his 
or her motives were rightly aligned by obeying the religious regulations given in 
Muhammad’s revelation, then it would be possible to channel the power of asabiyya 
for good rather than evil. Ibn Khaldun makes no apologies for it, succinctly claiming 
that “Group feeling is necessary to the Muslim community. Its existence enables (the 
community) to fulfill what God expects of it.”378 This would presumably include its 
mission to preach Islam to the rest of the world and to set an example of Muslim unity 
to make this message more powerful and attractive. 
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The task of a community fulfilling “what God expects of it,” comprises the next 
section of this thesis, which will look at the Ottoman tanzimat reforms of the 19
th
 
Century and the ways in which they fostered a constitutional conception of limiting 
government power and sharing power amongst various stakeholders in the population. 
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Chapter 5: The Tanzimat Reforms and the rise of the Young 
Ottomans- reformism and modernization of political power 
 
5.1. The Tanzimat in Context 
 
One of the most intriguing periods of Islamic thought for constitutional purposes 
stems from 19
th
 Century modernization and reform movements that occurred 
throughout the Islamic world, particularly in those provinces nominally part of the 
Ottoman Empire. This vast realm, known colloquially by Europeans as “The Sick 
Man of Europe,” was under threat not only from European colonial encroachments 
and capitulations on the rights of foreigners within its bounds, but also from 
overwhelming internal atrophy in even the most basic government functions of tax 
collection, military defense, and burgeoning local nationalism that undermined the 
universalist and more traditional Ottoman notions of being the legitimate heirs of an 
Islamic empire. This identity was one that did not necessarily require particular 
citizens to be Muslim, but did anchor its claim for legitimacy on the caliphate and 
sharīʿa. In answer to the various threats to its survival, the bureaucrats running the 
Ottoman Empire promulgated a series of modernizing and sometimes liberalizing 
reforms aimed at using European technology and industrial advances to strengthen the 
economy and military of the Empire. These reforms, collectively called Tanzimat, 
were undertaken over a period of roughly 50 years (from 1826 to 1877) under the 
leadership of Grand Viziers including Reshid Pasha, who promulgated the Hatt-i 
Sherif of Gülhane, and Ali and Fuad Pasha, who together instituted the Hatt-i 
Humayun of 1856.
379
  
 
                                                          
379
 Weiker, Walter F. "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1968): 451-70. 
 
P a g e  | 175 
 
The focus of this section will be upon these two edicts, as it is these two sets of 
reforms in particular that are addressed in the later work of another eventual Ottoman 
Grand Vizier, Khayr al-Din Pasha (al-Tunisi). In assessing these brief documents it is 
important to bear in mind that for most of Ottoman history the Empire had been run as 
a loose bureaucracy funded by successful conquests. Once these ceased, revenue was 
raised via tax farming, an inefficient means of collecting money that was riddled with 
opportunities for abuse and corruption. On the political side of the Empire, the Sultan 
was the nominal successor to the earthly rule of Muhammad himself and wielded 
power that can only be described as despotic. It is only in this context that the radical 
nature of these reforms in defining, and thereby limiting the scope of Imperial power, 
can be fully appreciated. 
5.2 An examination of the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane 
 
As if to underline the despotic past just mentioned, the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane 
begins with the statement: 
All the world knows that since the first days of the Ottoman State, the lofty principles of 
the Qur’an and the rules of the Sheriat were always perfectly observed. Our mighty 
Sultanate reached the highest degree of strength and power, and all its subjects [the 
highest degree] of ease and prosperity.
380
 
 
 
Although the perfect observation of the sharīʿa is clearly aspirational at best, this text 
reveals that, at a minimum, the idea that the Empire observes Islamic law and fulfills 
its earthly purpose is central to its identity and mission. This is then linked with the 
Sultanate reaching “the highest degree of strength and power.” The question naturally 
arising from this is why, if it is also true that “all its subjects (have reached) the 
highest degree of ease and prosperity,” is reform necessary. Of course, the simple 
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answer is that Ottoman subjects were far from the top of the world’s wealthiest 
citizens, and that there was general unease about the state of the Empire and a lack of 
prosperity. The document continues by acknowledging the following: 
 
in the last one hundred and fifty years, because of a succession of difficulties and diverse 
causes, the sacred Sheriat was not obeyed, nor were the beneficent regulations followed; 
consequently, the former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and 
poverty. It is evident that countries not governed by the laws of the Sheriat cannot 
survive.
381
 
 
  
Notice that there is no admission of responsibility for this state of affairs on the part of 
the Sultan. The poor fortunes of the Empire are due to a lack of obedience to the 
sharīʿa and “beneficent regulations,” rather than due to simple mismanagement and 
corruption. Regardless of the lack of admission of culpability, Ottoman elites had no 
illusions as to the seriousness of the need for major change. As Ira Lapidus comments, 
“Russian advances in the Caucasus, the rise to power of Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt, 
and the Greek wars for independence again made the need for reform urgent.
382
 
Ironically, the initial push for reform was one that sought to centralize government to 
make it more efficient, which was also meant to strengthen the Sultan’s power to 
move beyond the largely nominal roles of Caliph and Commander of the Faithful, and 
to turn him into something resembling a European absolute monarch. This involved 
dismantling the janissary corps and co-opting religious courts and schools into the 
state. 
383
 Nonetheless, these reforms ultimately led to several liberalizing strains of 
thought, which guaranteed basic rights to all Ottoman subjects regardless of their 
religious or national background, which in turn made these subjects more like citizens 
in the modern and legal sense than they had ever been before.  
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The Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane reorganized and limited state power in four crucial and 
constitutional ways. Firstly, it established security of one’s person and private 
property for all of its subjects. Secondly, it created and defined the purposes of 
various state institutions that would collect taxes in a regulated and fair manner to 
ensure a reliable revenue stream. Next, it regulated military service to limited terms 
and in consideration of the numbers of soldiers individual localities could realistically 
be expected to contribute. Finally, it established the principle that criminal trials and 
sentencing should be held publicly and that punishing crime could only occur after 
due process. In each of these aims it is apparent that discontent and a lack of stability 
threatened the survival of the regime and these are all attempts to address the most 
pressing of those threats. 
 
This first task of creating and securing private property rights is one that would be 
familiar to any constitutional thinker in the Western tradition.
384
 Commerce and trade, 
along with hospitality, also form the backbone of Islamic culture. The edict 
recognizes this urgent need, reasoning that 
 
If there is an absence of security for property, everyone remains indifferent to his state 
and his community; no one interests himself in the prosperity of the country, 
absorbed as he is in his own troubles and worries. If, on the contrary, the individual feels 
complete security about his possessions then he will become preoccupied with his own 
affairs, which he will seek to expand, and his devotion and love for his state and his 
community will steadily grow and will undoubtedly spur him into becoming a useful 
member of society.
385
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There is a sense in this statement that subjects must become citizens and see 
themselves as stake holders in the Empire if it is to command their loyalty and 
support. Much as the bureaucrats running the affairs of the Empire had a vested 
interest in sustaining it, and as the janissary officers had an interest in expansion via 
conquest, it was hoped that people would see the Empire as a protector and 
benefactor, a sphere within which a person could pursue wealth with the reasonable 
expectation that it would be protected from arbitrary theft.  
 
Closely related to this protection of property is the regulation of taxes. The edict 
bluntly states that “Tax assessment is also one of the most important matters to 
regulate.” Stanford Shaw’s article entitled “The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax 
Reforms and Revenue System” gives a compelling account of why this was one of the 
areas in urgent need of rethinking. This is because the “tax system inherited by the 
Tanzimat was basically that developed during the sixteenth century in accordance 
with traditional Islamic financial practices.”386 These included a tithe on agricultural 
produce collected from timur, or fiefs, and iltizam, or tax farms in addition to fees for 
entering or leaving territories and towns, using the market, customs duties, and for 
non-Muslims, the jizya or head tax given in exchange for military protection and 
exemption from conscription.
387
 
 
In contrast to the earlier language deflecting blame for the Empire’s failures from the 
Sultan, this particular section of the edict is uncharacteristically direct in castigating 
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the existing practice of tax farming as “harmful” and something which “amounts to 
handing over the financial and political affairs of a country to the whims of an 
ordinary man and perhaps to the grasp of force and oppression, for if the tax-farmer is 
not of good character he will be interested only in his own profit and will behave 
oppressively.” Obviously, the lack of consistent tax revenue and complaints of 
subjects from various corners of the Empire had led the Grand Vizier and Sultan to 
conclude that the system was irreparably corrupted and unfair.
388
 Although the 
document is vague on the level of taxation and system of calculating taxes due, it does 
promise that everyone “should be taxed according to his fortune and his means, and 
that he should be saved from any further exaction.” In practice, this meant that 
taxation was made more urban and things like profit from one’s trade and craft were 
taxed, which necessarily meant that taxes would be more proportional to one’s ability 
to pay them than they were under the previous system of paying fees for simply using 
the marketplace or travelling.
389
 
 
Although this tax reform plan is one that could easily be used to enhance the despotic 
power of the Sultan, this centralizing vein of reform brings to mind a key 
constitutional idea, which is that before tackling the problem of tyranny in 
government, it is vital for a government to legitimize itself by protecting its 
subjects/citizens from the tyranny of a Hobbesian State of Nature in which life, limb, 
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and property are all at constant risk of attack.
390
 Only once some type of uniform 
definition of justice and protection of personhood and property are achieved can 
citizens participate in the creation of institutions to administer the state and in limiting 
the power these institutions exercise.
391
  
 
Likewise, the necessity of protecting one’s citizens and maintaining a military had led 
to the unintended consequence that conscription had become an extremely onerous 
burden on certain segments of the population. Muslim tradition did not allow for non-
Muslims to serve in the military, which reduced the number of men eligible to fight. 
Furthermore, those in military service were not given a clear idea as to when they 
could expect their obligation to have been met. This is evident from the wording of 
the decree which admits 
 
legislation will put an end to the old practices, still in force, of recruiting soldiers without 
consideration of the size of the population in any locality, more conscripts being taken 
from some places and fewer from others. This practice has been throwing agriculture and 
trade into harmful disarray. Moreover, those who are recruited to lifetime military 
service suffer despair and contribute to the depopulation of the country.
392
 
 
Clearly, if particular towns were losing substantial numbers of their young men to the 
military, especially in agricultural areas, it would be difficult for entire communities 
to survive, let alone prosper. Once again, this particular set of reforms strengthened 
the Sultan by allowing the government to regulate conscription according to its needs 
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and to do so in a way meant to foster domestic stability. It does however, carry the 
latent promise that individual citizens and localities matter and should have a voice in 
the conduct of the state’s affairs.  
 
Finally, a very brief section of the document focuses upon the criminal justice or 
penal system. All subjects are promised that “every defendant shall be entitled to a 
public hearing, according to the rules of the Sheriat, after inquiry and examination; 
and without the pronouncement of a regular sentence no one may secretly or publicly 
put another to death by poison or by any other means.”393 Although not exactly a 
liberal beacon, the wording of the protections given to those accused of a crime would 
seem to establish something very much like the Western concept of habeas corpus 
because an accused must be presented to a public court and cannot be secretly 
sentenced if found guilty. The mechanisms available to the courts and their 
composition are not specified here, but nonetheless this does represent a substantive 
check on state power simply by requiring a level of transparency in the justice and 
penal systems.
394
 
 
The closing section of this early Tanzimat edict gives further tantalizing promises of 
reforms yet to come, saying that other “decisions must be taken by majority vote.”395 
However, the crucial caveat is that this majority is not of voters, adult males, 
propertied male voters, nor of any citizen group, but rather simply of a council of 
advisers chosen by the Sultan and his Vizier. Though not an enormous restraint, it 
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does still allow for the leadership to consult one another and to potentially direct the 
sovereign will towards the public good. 
5.3 An Analysis of the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 
 
In 1856, yet another round of reforms were launched, some of which bring to fruition 
earlier promises only hinted at in the Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane. These largely follow 
the earlier set of reforms in terms of subject matter and aims, focusing on 
reorganizing the tax code, modernizing the military, standardizing the process of 
creating a state budget and using it for infrastructure, and enhancing equality before 
the law of non-Muslim subjects. These reforms, particularly those relating to the 
status of non-Muslims, are far more radical in their moves away from traditional 
notions of sharīʿa compliance and toward a Westernized conception of liberal 
equality.  
 
The tax reforms of 1839 attempted to overthrow the tax farming system in favor of 
one in which government agents would be directly responsible for collecting an 
established percentage of profits from urbanites and of the harvest yield from rural 
subjects. This had to be abandoned in the countryside, as discussed previously, and 
the tax farming system was temporarily reinstated. By 1856, the new system of direct 
collection had been refined and consolidated to the point where the government was 
prepared to move at last to abolish tax farming, stating: 
 
The system of direct collection shall gradually, and as soon as possible, be substituted for 
the plan of farming, in all the branches of the revenues of the State. As long as the 
present system remains in force, all agents of the Government and all members of the 
Meclis shall be forbidden, under the severest penalties, to become lessees of any farming 
contracts which are announced for public competition, or to have any beneficial interest 
in carrying them out.
396
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What is notable in this passage is the direct language aimed at rooting out potential 
conflicts of interest and corruption from within the corps of tax collection officers 
already in government employ. While this goal is laudable, it is largely a continuation 
of earlier reform. The innovation in this particular set of tax reforms is found just 
prior in the section dealing with the taxation of non-Muslims. Here, for the first time 
in the Ottoman Empire, it is declared that, “The taxes are to be levied under the same 
denomination from all the subjects of my empire, without distinction of class or of 
religion.”397 This represents a substantial break from tradition as the jizya tax levied 
on non-Muslims in exchange for military protection and exemption from military 
duties is one of the most venerable in Islamic tradition, tracing itself back to the days 
of Muhammad himself.
398
 The reason behind this change will become clear as the 
corresponding military reforms are examined. 
 
Like the jizya, the prohibition on non-Muslims serving in the military of an Islamic 
state is one which has long-standing acceptance dating back to Muhammad.
399
 The 
Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 makes a radical break from this tradition when it announces 
the following:  
 
The equality of taxes entailing equality of burdens, as equality of duties entails that of 
rights, Christian subjects and those of other non-Muslim sects, as it has been already 
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decided, shall, as well as Muslims, be subject to the obligations of the Law of 
Recruitment. The principle of obtaining substitutes, or of purchasing exemption, shall be 
admitted. A complete law shall be published, with as little delay as possible, respecting 
the admission into and service in the army of Christian and other non-Muslim subjects.
400
 
 
The connection between the tax reforms for non-Muslims and the reform of the 
military is thus made perfectly clear. It is also written in language that would find 
itself comfortably at home in the Western philosophical tradition of speaking of 
government in terms of reciprocal rights and duties. The appearance of the word 
rights itself should not be underestimated, as it implies that subjects of the Empire are 
not bound to arbitrary rule, but to an expectation of rule of law. Again, this reform 
like so many others acts as an important curb on the potential abuse of state power 
and acknowledges that individual and community rights are part of the social contract. 
For the first time, non-Muslims can serve in the military, and for the first time they 
are subject to recruitment quotas previously only applied to Muslims. This did not 
mean in practice that Christians were truly treated as equals once they entered the 
military. Roderic Davison notes that the idea of serving under Christian officers 
caused many Muslim military men to take umbrage.
401
 This state of affairs may not 
have been satisfactory to all parties as some inequalities can be personally beneficial 
(i.e. if one is a pacifist not wishing to fight in war). However, what is not clear in this 
passage is whether the “principle of obtaining substitutes, or of purchasing 
exemption,” applies to Muslims as well as to the non-Muslims who traditionally had 
this option. If the equality of burdens was truly being shared by this reform, then one 
would have to assume this was possible. 
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This set of military reforms, was only one of many changes to the law designed to 
provide a greater sense of Ottoman identity and citizenship.  Another basic, but 
essential, reform was the passage of a law which published and publicized the annual 
government budget.
402
 This corruption-fighting measure was twinned with a promise 
to ensure that public works “receive a suitable endowment, part of which shall be 
raised from private and special taxes levied in the Provinces, which shall have the 
benefit of the advantages arising from the establishment of ways of communication by 
land and sea.”403 This particular set of reforms accomplishes two important aims. 
Firstly, it ensures that Ottoman subjects have a clear idea of what their state is raising 
in taxes and spending on the public’s behalf. This type of information provides a 
means with which a person or group could usefully comment upon or perhaps even 
oppose the way in which the government is either taxing or spending. It also makes it 
less likely that various actors down the chain of command will be able to raid 
government coffers.
404
 Secondly, it brings disparate corners of the Empire together (or 
at least seeks to) by using well-tested means to create new avenues of commerce and 
communication, such as “the formation of roads and canals to increase the facilities of 
communication and increase the sources of the wealth of the country. Everything that 
can impede commerce or agriculture shall be abolished.”405 It could be argued that in 
present-day terms, the Ottoman Empire thus saw itself as a sort of Islamic type of 
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 See Paragraph 26 of the Hatt-i Humayun: “A special law having been already passed, which 
declares that the budget of the revenue and expenditure of the State shall be drawn up and made known 
every year, the said law shall be most scrupulously observed. Proceedings shall be taken for revising 
the emoluments attached to each office.” 
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 Hatt-i Humayun (1856), paragraph 25. 
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 This type of occurrence was widespread in some Ottoman provinces and plays a key part in the 
biography of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, whose work will be examined later. 
 
405
 Hatt-i Humayun (1856), paragraph 22. Of course, the section which promises to abolish “everything 
which can impede commerce or agriculture” would seem to be rather aggressive and unlikely, but the 
overall aim could not be clearer. 
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European Union, a commercial and cultural union of distinct nations, and like the EU, 
it sought to enhance the larger sense of Ottoman identity and to emphasize the various 
benefits of cooperation and union in terms of not only commerce, but also defense 
and international power.  
 
The tension between the need to maintain a distinctly Islamic identity and to find a 
way to include its non-Muslim subjects in a way that would ensure their loyalty was a 
vexing problem for an empire on the wane. Eastern European parts of the Ottoman 
domains were already host to friendly overtures from various Christian states, and 
other more distant parts of the Empire in North Africa were facing the threat of 
Western colonial expansion. This might explain why the vast majority of the 1856 
reforms were focused on the status and rights of non-Muslims. These reforms were of 
paramount importance in light of the massive number of non-Muslims, the majority of 
whom were Christians, living under Ottoman rule. Roderic Davison estimates that out 
of 35 million total subjects, fully 14 million of them were non-Muslims.
406
 This 
represents 40% of the total population. Davison assesses the importance of these 
particular Tanzimat reforms by saying “It is, therefore, one of the most significant 
aspects of Ottoman history in the nineteenth century that the doctrine of equality did, 
in fact, become official policy.”407 
 
The actual details of this equality are sketched out throughout the text and are relevant 
to each of the other sets of reforms already discussed. In fact, the document begins by 
reminding readers of the earlier Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane and promising to uphold and 
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more fully manifest its promises to all of the Ottoman Empire’s subjects, “without 
distinction of classes or religion.”408 Again, this is a radical departure from the entire 
legacy of the Ottoman Empire in promoting itself as a primarily Islamic state and 
shows that a more modern conception of the nation state as a secular entity was 
already forming well before Ataturk created Turkey as we know it today. The 
document continues in the next paragraph by promising to uphold the traditional 
autonomy of various religious minorities as represented in the ancient millet system, 
but adds to this a promise that these each of these groups will be invited “to examine 
its actual immunities and privileges, and to discuss and submit to my Sublime Porte 
the reforms required by the progress of civilization and of the age.”409 Although these 
representatives are not directly elected or chosen by any sort of democratic process, 
the fact that the Sultan is inviting feedback and consultation is a departure from 
despotism.  
 
In addition to the new military rights/duties and the change in tax status for non-
Muslims that have previously been discussed, the reforms seek to realize their equal 
opportunity rhetoric
410
 by opening up the bureaucracy, which is often considered to be 
the real power behind the Ottoman state, to members of any nation.
411
 The new 
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 Hatt-i Humayun (1856), paragraph 1. 
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 Ibid. paragraph 2.  
 
410
 See paragraphs 10 and 11, which read as follows:  
 
Every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my 
Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race, shall be for ever 
effaced from the Administrative Protocol. The laws shall be put in force against the use of any 
injurious or offensive term, either among private individuals or on the part of the authorities. 
  As all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominions, no subject of my 
Empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he professes, nor shall be in any way 
annoyed on this account. No one shall be compelled to change their religion. 
 
411
 The language used here in paragraph 12 is distinct. It says that employment in the state apparatus 
will be based not on nationality, but on merit. This reveals that the reforms are again aiming to create a 
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meritocracy would theoretically make a relatively prosperous lifestyle available to 
vast new swaths of the population, although, as later discussions of the Tanzimat in 
Khayr al-Din’s work will show, this was not necessarily a move that endeared the 
majority Muslim populations to the new reforms.  
 
The other sector of the state that is specifically mentioned in regards to minority rights 
is the court system, both civil and criminal. In order to protect the rights of both 
parties in a dispute, the Hatt-i Humayun establishes that when the religions of the 
parties are not the same, they will be given a public hearing before a “mixed tribunal.” 
When the parties share the same faith, they will be given the option of having their 
cases tried within their own communities, according to their own customs. This is 
very much like the Jewish, and in some cases sharīʿa, courts that are operating in 
some of today’s Western liberal democracies. This reaffirms traditional Ottoman rule 
in the sense of local autonomy
412
, and establishes a new principle that recognizes that 
communities may become more mixed as equality and commerce measures come into 
force, which will require a legal and justice system that has come to terms with this 
possibility.
413
 Additionally, as subjects are treated more like citizens and become 
                                                                                                                                                                      
more cohesive sense of Ottoman nationality to combat and compete more localized nationalities that 
were coming to the fore.  
 
412
 Starr, June. Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace of Justice. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992. She begins her book by quoting Serif Mardin’s observation that 
“For much of the population [in the Ottoman Empire], nomad or settled, rural or urban… cultural 
separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the periphery.” 
 
413
 To this effect, paragraphs 16 and 17 create new safeguards for all subjects, Muslim and non-
Muslim, saying:  
 
Penal, correctional, and commercial laws, and rules of procedure for the mixed tribunals shall be drawn 
up as soon as possible, and formed into a Code. Translation of them shall be published in all the 
languages current in the Empire. 
  
Proceedings shall be taken, with as little delay as possible, for the reform of the penitentiary system as 
applied to houses of detention, punishment, or correction, and other establishments of like nature, so as 
to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of justice. Corporal punishment shall not be 
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accustomed to thinking in terms of personal rights, the enforcement of those rights 
and the restriction of government powers to impede upon them become crucial. The 
penal reforms mentioned towards the end of this document are important not only 
because they go so far as to say that “everything that resembles torture shall be 
entirely abolished,” but the following paragraph makes the pointed assertion that 
“Infractions of the law in this particular shall be severely (punished)… in conformity 
with the Civil Code, of the authorities who may order and of the agents who may 
commit them.”414 It is only by holding government agents to account in this manner, 
that the government can consolidate the legitimacy of its rule and reforms. 
 
Given the highly segregated nature of religious groups and nationalities in the Empire, 
legitimacy of these reforms would also be highly dependent upon their endorsement 
by the relevant authorities.
415
 When the regime promised that “Proceedings shall be 
taken for a reform in the constitution of the Provincial and Communal Councils, in 
order to ensure fairness in the choice of the deputies of the Muslim, Christian, and 
other communities, and freedom of voting in the councils.,”416 they were taking yet 
another key step in providing new avenues of political participation and 
representation. Both of these forces empower the government by giving it legitimacy 
and popular reach, but also limit its power by tethering its acts in some way to the will 
of the people. Again, this was not anything like representative democracy, but was a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
administered, even in the prisons, except in conformity with the disciplinary regulations established by 
my Sublime Porte, and everything that resembles torture shall be entirely abolished.  
 
414
 Ibid. paragraph 18. 
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reform. 
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type of communal representation and would have allowed all Ottomans to feel they 
had a voice.
417
 
 
Although not directly related to the rights of minorities, or to limiting government 
power, one final note on this set of reforms is necessary. It is impossible to appreciate 
the goals and necessity of these types of reforms without recalling the extreme 
pressure European development and expansion were placing upon the Empire. Under 
pressure, the edict also includes the following provision: 
 
As the laws regulating the purchase, sale, and disposal of real property are common to all 
the subjects of may empire, it shall be lawful for foreigners to possess landed property in 
my dominions, conforming themselves to the laws and police regulations, and bearing 
the same charges as the native inhabitants, and after arrangements have been come to 
with foreign powers.
418
 
 
This capitulation to foreign pressure would result in further compromises that 
eventually allowed foreigners to escape Ottoman jurisdiction for criminal matters
419
, 
and the property rules eventually led to fiscal disaster.
420
 Although the many reforms 
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and rights being made by the Ottomans in the 19
th
 Century placed them more firmly 
within the European model of political thought and within the European political 
orbit, the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and various European powers 
were dominated by colonial designs and Ottoman decline, sped along by rapid 
industrial and military advances in Western Europe.   
 
5.4 Assessing the Mixed Legacy of the Tanzimat in 19
th
 Century Reform 
Movements 
 
Although the Tanzimat reforms were not ultimately successful in saving the Ottoman 
Empire from collapse, or perhaps reformulation may be a better term, it is worth 
pointing out that they nonetheless inspired a sea-change in the political aspirations of 
a whole variety of political thinkers and actors within the Ottoman orbit. In fact, there 
is a surprisingly close relationship between some of the leading figures of these 
movements and the Ottoman court.  
 
One of the best known of these Muslim modernists is Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, evidence seems to suggest that Afghani was not 
courted by Sultan Abdul-Hamid, so much as he himself sought to be brought into the 
sultan’s inner circle, even castigating reformers in his writing to curry favor.421 An 
alternative argument is that Afghani opposed the particular brand of Young Ottoman 
constitutionalism because it was secular and did not reflect the Muslim character of 
the majority of the Turkish and Ottoman people.
422
 In either case, his idea of an 
Islam-based nationalism was an alternative constitutional response to what were seen 
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to be fundamental flaws in the Tanzimat. Firstly, the rights expressed in these reforms 
are granted to the subjects by the ruler. They are neither “God-given” nor 
“inalienable” but rather a gift, and one which could potentially be revoked at that. 
Additionally, many of the Turks in the Ottoman court felt that the reforms were only 
beneficial to non-Muslims and thus found it impossible to support them.
423
 
 
Attempts to rectify these problems were proposed by the Young Ottoman 
constitutionalists, who brought about their own revolution within the system and 
managed for a time to implement a fairly liberal institutionalized government based 
upon the core value of liberty.
424
 A glance at their core constitutional argument is 
instructive in the manner in which they used the spirit of the Tanzimat as a platform to 
create what they felt was a balanced approach to personal liberty and the preservation 
of the Muslim nature of the Ottoman state. Their contentions were: 
A constitutional government meant a government run according to a fundamental law. 
The Ottoman state was an Islamic state, that is, its government was based on and 
regulated by the Seriat. As such, it was basically constitutional; but, because of the non-
observance of the Seriat, it had turned into an absolutism. The ummet should restore 
government and its rulers to a constitutional condition. Thic could be done only by 
making the ummet the supreme controller of the government, that is, by institutionalizing 
and assembly representing the people. The duties of this assembly were; (a) to supervise 
the revenues and the expenditures of the state; (b) to see to the full execution of the Seriat 
and the laws; and (c) to demand the modification of laws harmful to the interests of the 
country. The assembly, therefore, was not a body to make laws, or to execute them. Its 
members were rather “the defense lawyers of the people, so to speak.” The duty of the 
assembly was only to watch, check, and defend the interests of the people against the 
improper execution of the laws. It was a body to enlighten the ruler against the tyranny of 
the government, and the only means through which to voice the needs of the people and 
to check the government. This function of the assembly did not curtail the sovereign 
rights of the ruler. The enforcement of the Seriat, and the approval and execution of laws 
were within the authority of the ruler. The institution of this assembly with non-Muslim 
members was not contrary to the Seriat, because the assembly was not constituted to 
discuss or decide upon religious affairs… Muslims and non-Muslims were equal in terms 
of law…. In introducing the constitutional regime, there was no need to imitate the 
systems of European countries because the Muslim Seriat provided all the necessary 
principles amply and comprehensively.
425
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Comparing this set of constitutional contentions to the two reform decrees 
promulgated in previous decades shows a remarkably similar set of concerns. Both 
the original Tanzimat reforms and the constitutionalist response to them are concerned 
with somehow incorporating non-Muslims more fully into the state whilst protecting 
the Islamic nature of the state. Likewise, there is a fundamental understanding that 
basic economic justice and non-corrupt management of state coffers are essential for 
legitimacy and stability. Perhaps most interestingly, even the “secular” 
constitutionalists couch their diagnosis of the state’s ills in terms of non-compliance 
with the letter and spirit of sharīʿa. Thus it is clear that those on all sides of the reform 
debate, the relevant parties saw the preservation of at least a nominally Muslim state 
identity as absolutely crucial. Furthermore, both also hearken back to an idealized past 
in order to claim that all the tools needed in structuring this new constitutional regime 
can be reclaimed from within the Muslim historical and political tradition. In a time of 
waning empire and European encroachment and domination, the Caliphate 
represented “a self-confident Muslim ruler, independent of all foreign influences and 
interventions… he fostered everything that preserved, glorified, and justified 
tradition.”426 What emerges then is a picture of reform itself becoming an effort to 
preserve tradition against colonial and cultural imperialism, but the ideological nature 
of this reform was not up to the task of changing the material conditions that would 
actually determine the continued viability of the Ottoman state.
427
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5.5 Assessing the Contours of Islamic Constitutionalism- Distinctives 
and Commonalities 
 
Having looked at the Islamic interpretations of the rule of law, national character, and 
limiting government power in the works of al-Farabi, Ibn Khaldun, and the Ottoman 
Tanzimat reforms, respectively, it is clear that these thinkers have much in common 
with their Western counterparts. It is also clear that an Islamic constitutional narrative 
uses its own distinct vocabulary and historical points of reference in its effort to create 
meaning and legitimacy for its ideas. 
 
Assessing al-Farabi’s legacy alongside that of thinkers like Cicero or Aquinas is 
perhaps the most straightforward of all. As mentioned above, his work was crucial in 
reintroducing ancient Greek texts that had largely been lost after the fall of Rome 
back into European scholarship. His conception of the afterlife and its relationship to 
properly fulfilling one’s role in society is notable for its emphasis on social rather than 
individual life, and it employs almost identical imagery to that found in Cicero’s 
Dream of Scipio. In the case of Aquinas, it has been shown that much of his work is 
borrowed wholesale from al-Farabi, begging the question of whether Islamic thinkers 
need to Islamicize Western thought, or whether, in fact, Western thinkers as early as 
the Middle Ages were Westernizing political thought that had already been 
interpreted and mediated by its Arabic translators and torch bearers. His conception of 
the rule of law fits comfortably within the Western natural law tradition, yet contains 
enough distinct elements as regards the role of the Prophet/Lawgiver and adhering to 
the sovereign order embodied by nature and symbolized by God, that it remains true 
to many of the core tenants of Islam (at least on its surface). 
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Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, is a thinker whose departure from the established 
norms of doing historical and political analysis makes him a truly rare revolutionary, 
at least in scholarly terms. On the question of assessing people groups as nations, 
rather than as a united umma, and in regards to his association of climate to national 
character, his thought closely aligns with Montesquieu’s, though it predates it by a 
few centuries. The revolutionary aspect of his work, at least from the perspective of 
constitutionalism, is his concept of asabiyya and the central role it plays in both the 
cohesion and rise of social groups, along with the eventual downfall of comfortable 
urbanized regimes. His deterministic approach does seem to limit the possibilities for 
escaping the cycle of rise and fall, but if one assesses his work aside from its 
predictive elements, political rulers could potentially draw a variety of lessons about 
the sources of legitimacy for an Islamic regime. However, if one takes asabiyya 
outside its purely tribal origins and transplants it onto a faith group, then this unity by 
faith can be maintained through a close observance of the values and norms of that 
faith. This could be especially useful in post-conflict settings because his work does 
not shy away from discussing the role of violence, but it does provide a conceptual 
framework in which the Bedouin warrior ethic can be translated into a political 
movement. In fact, in looking at instances in which groups formerly involved in 
terrorist activity transitioned into peaceful political movements, most of them do not 
entirely dissociate from their earlier violent terminology, but they do demilitarize and 
make the fight one of political justice carried out through the institutions of the state. 
 
The Ottoman Empire is an institution that in some ways perfectly embodies and 
proves the argument of Ibn Khaldun. It was founded by a group of fierce warriors 
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whose success on the battlefield sustained its growth and prosperity for hundreds of 
years. It was urbanized in terms of its political leadership and bureaucracy, especially 
after winning Constantinople, but it was also still tribal and militaristic. Its class of 
janissaries maintained their influence in the state for as long as they proved mighty in 
way. The mamluk civil servant/slave class facilitated the maintenance of these hard-
won lands by ensuring that taxes were levied, and that Muslim leaders adhered to the 
party line of the sultans in their role as caliph. It also kept the tribal asabiyya of its 
conquered subjects alive by allowing various national, linguistic, and religious groups 
to attend to their own private and local community matters through the millet system. 
Once the machinery of conquest began to break down, the social fault lines that had 
been papered over by general prosperity and tolerance reemerged and, though it took 
far more than the four generations predicted by Ibn Khaldun, the Ottoman Empire 
which stretched across North Africa, parts of Southern and Eastern Europe, and 
modern-day Turkey, began its descent in earnest. 
 
It was in an effort to reverse this decline that the 19
th
 century sultans promulgated the 
Tanzimat reforms, which because of European military, economic, and political 
pressures necessarily reflected European ideas of equality before the law, fair 
taxation, and to an extent, participation. Oddly enough, though the Federalist Papers 
were written by men seeking to throw off imperial rule and the Tanzimat was written 
to save an empire, both groups of reformers were conservative revolutionaries seeking 
to salvage parts of their historical rights and identity, while at the same time throwing 
off the yoke of European oppression. It could be said that the representative elements 
of the Tanzimat were far too weak to really represent a liberal mode of governance, 
but when compared with voting rights in much of Europe in the early and mid-19
th
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century, they look far more robust. The level of toleration and inclusion of minority 
groups in this imperial system is also distinctive and more liberal than that of the 
nationalist European states. In trying to strike a balance between pan-Islamic identity, 
national/linguistic identity, centralization and local autonomy, the Ottoman reform 
project is truly breathtaking in scope. Though the empire did fall, it would be unfair to 
say that the reforms failed. Indeed, the seeds they planted in many ways came to 
fruition with the rise of Ataturk and the secular Islamic republic of Turkey. 
 
It is a similar dynamic of Westernization and retrenchment of Islamic and national 
identity, as expressed in the much smaller context of 19
th
 Century Tunisia, which this 
thesis will now examine, in order to provide the necessary historical context in which 
to understand the pioneering political theory of Tunisian statesman Khayr al-Din al-
Tunisi. 
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Chapter 6: Constitutional Conversations- The Fusing of 
Political Tradition in Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi’s The Surest 
Path 
 
The Turks of Tunis, confronted with a more stable and more firmly based civilisation, 
gradually became absorbed into the Tunisian population and founded what can be 
described as a national dynasty, that of the Husainid beys… the Turks nevertheless failed 
to impart any fresh impetus to the age-old Maghrib. In one as in the other, Berber inertia 
won the day, so that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the entire Maghrib was 
living, withdrawn into its shell, in accordance with standards that had held for thousands 
of years, and without having been able to evolve in the direction of statehood in its 
modern form.
428
 
 
This narrative of Tunisian history aligns nicely with conceptions of North Africa, or 
the Maghreb, as backward, intransigent, and immune to progress that have been 
espoused by various thinkers, including Charles Julien, who is quoted above. As seen 
in the previous chapter however, Tunisia has produced highly original and dynamic 
thinkers like Ibn Khaldun, so how could it be that thinkers like him could develop in a 
cultural vacuum of “Berber inertia?” The simple answer is that this view lacks nuance 
and often says more about the prejudices of the times and places in which it was 
advanced than it does about North Africa or North Africans. Indeed, the present day is 
not free from similar conventional wisdom, as the widespread shock at the ardent 
desire of average citizens in Arab states like Tunisia and Egypt to have democratic 
government illustrates. This chapter seeks to develop a contextual understanding of 
the political and social world that Khayr al-Din inhabited when he undertook his only 
work of actual political theorizing, The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the 
Condition of Countries. Written in 1867, it is the product of a very unique set of 
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circumstances and cannot be properly appreciated without a basic acquaintance with 
what those circumstances were.  
 
In keeping with the constitutional concerns of this book, particular attention will be 
paid to the Rule of Law in 19
th
 century Tunisia, in addition to its complicated and 
competing national character(s) and the limits facing various political actors in 
Tunisia at this time. As these dynamics are highly intertwined, the historical analysis 
that follows will proceed largely on chronological, rather than thematic, lines. 
Following this discussion, a brief biographical sketch of Khayr al-Din will examine 
the influences and pressures that factored into his conception and execution of his 
written work. Finally, a detailed analysis of The Surest Path will tease out the 
distinctive elements of Khayr al-Din’s political thought and seek to place them within 
the larger contexts of both Western and Islamic constitutionalism more generally.  
 
6.1. Divine Law and Secular Lawlessness- 19
th
 Century Tunisia and the 
Challenge of Progress 
 
This historical overview of Khayr al-Din’s Tunisia necessarily begins in the reign of 
Ahmad Bey (king). For starters, it was Ahmad Bey whom Khayr al-Din first served as 
a young mamluk and under whom he received his military and institutional training, 
both heavily influenced by the Bey’s experimental rule. His reformist measures 
defined the path Tunisia would take for much of the reigns of his next three 
successors. From 1837-55 he sought to undertake reforms that would strengthen his 
actual sovereignty and room for maneuver in his affairs with both the Ottoman Sultan, 
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to whom he was ostensibly subject, and with European powers seeking new avenues 
of commerce and colonization in the Maghreb. In each of these international 
relationships he was keenly aware of his relative weakness in relation to both military 
and trade capability. It is an effort to rectify these imbalances that came to absorb 
much of his energies over the course of his 18 years on the throne. In an effort to 
understand the particular types of reforms he undertook, one must first gain an 
appreciation for the influence of geography and climate upon Tunisia’s commerce, 
agriculture, and settlement.
429
 
Although clearly part of North Africa and the Arab/Islamic orbit, Tunisia has from 
very ancient times been firmly embedded in the Mediterranean world. L. Carl Brown 
goes so far as to say that “the life and times of Ahmad Bey can only be understood as 
a blend of medieval and modern, of Islam and the West.”430Another writer notes that 
Tunisia has 
“two faces on the Mediterranean, one to the north toward Europe and a second to the east 
toward the Arabo-Islamic heartlands. These two regions have exerted significant 
influences on Tunisia, often in competition with each other. Tunisia’s northeastern 
extremity, the Cape Bon peninsula, defines the approximate midpoint of the 
Mediterranean Sea. The narrow strait between the peninsula and the Italian island of 
Sicily links the eastern and western halves of the sea. Tunisia’s proximity to this 
chokepoint has given it strategic importance…”431 
 
These two faces are an important part of Tunisia’s identity to this day and represent 
far more than a simple geographic reality. In addition to representing its dual 
European and Arab political/cultural orbits, they could also represent its two 
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economies (one legal, one black market), its two ruling classes (elite and usually 
foreign mamluks ruling the cities and tribal chieftains exercising practical control of 
rural areas), or its two conceptions of law (divine sharīʿa and temporal regulation). As 
Julia Clancy-Smith points out regarding Tunisia’s strategic location and coastal 
outlook,  
Tunisia’s ancient, very intense involvement in the Mediterranean world is dictated by her 
geography. The coastline stretching from Cap Bon in the north to her southernmost tip 
invites “unregulated commerce,” or, from the state’s perspective, contraband.432 
 
The issue of smuggling is illustrative of larger problems with the rule of law in 
Tunisia, particularly in the 19
th
 Century when the sovereignty of the state itself was 
being contested internally by various tribal groups and externally by a variety of 
imperial designs. To make matters worse, the reign of Ahmad was a time of a total 
reevaluation of Tunisia’s orientation as a Muslim state, and involved a real struggle to 
accommodate his affinity for European ideas of enlightened monarchy, military 
strategy, and relationships between the ruler and ruled. The existence of Tunisia 
within the confines of the Ottoman Empire that had given formal recognition to the 
ideal of the universal caliphate headed by the Ottoman sultan, and which had afforded 
the beys a degree of autonomy, was threatened by the Ottoman Empire’s own struggle 
to survive along with the repeated imperial overtures made by France, Britain, and 
Italy.
433
 Ahmad could also not be expected to ignore the large French army camped 
just across his Western border in Algeria.
434
 Clearly, evaluating the rule of law in 19
th
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Century Tunisia requires that one first assess the various types and layers of law that 
were simultaneously at work in this small kingdom.  
 
A Brief Glimpse at the Beylik 
The Husaynid dynasty of which Ahmad Bey was a member, was founded in 1705 
under the threat of Tunisia being invaded by rival factions within the Ottoman 
Empire, one group emanating from Algeria, the other from Constantinople. The leader 
of the resistance to the Algerian forces, Husayn bin Ali, gave his name to this dynasty, 
which lasted uninterrupted until 1957. He and his descendants were not of native 
Tunisian stock, nor did they consider themselves to be so. As was common in the 
Ottoman Empire, they saw the natural order of rule as one which emanated from the 
imperial capital and seat of the caliphate, rather than from the people over whom they 
ruled. Ahmad Bey was the tenth ruler from this family and like many of his 
predecessors was the son of a slave mother and royal father. This practice kept the 
ruling family set apart from other Tunisian families, preserving the tradition of 
foreign control.
435
 
This practice did not result in much actual Ottoman sovereignty, despite the fact that 
the Beys were granted only the title of “pasha” or governor by the sultan. The 
Ottoman suzerainty that began in 1574 extended primarily to the recruitment of 
Tunisia’s bureaucrats from Turkey’s pool of mamluks, and to occasional supplies of 
troops, tribute, and pledges of allegiance to the Sultan. Day to day affairs were left 
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more or less to the beys and their associates as Tunisia was too far and relatively 
unimportant to much concern Constantinople.
436
  
As mentioned earlier, this absence of concrete Ottoman power was a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, the bey could more or less do as he wished and had more 
actual monarchic power than many of his European colleagues did. Conversely, he 
had little reassurance of consistency or practical help from the Ottomans in fending 
off unwanted European overtures and resisting French encroachment in Algeria 
spilling over the border into his domains. Thus the approach adopted by Ahmad Bey 
in the mid-19
th
 century could best be summed up as “If you can’t beat them, join 
them.” He launched far-reaching reforms in the way the military was trained, ensuring 
that they were educated in European tactics and formations. He purchased expensive 
new military technology from the Europeans so that his soldiers could more 
effectively mount a display of force when necessary, and he engaged in massive 
restructuring of Tunisia’s trade relationships, taking in large quantities of imported 
European goods and ensuring that the agricultural sector was geared to exporting the 
raw materials demanded by European buyers.
437
 
 
These steps were complemented by further radical changes to this once sleepy 
backwater of the Ottoman Empire. For the first time, the central government instituted 
conscription from the peasant classes, departing from the time-honored tradition of 
drawing solely upon “Turks” for military manpower. The purchase of equipment and 
ships for all these troops also meant that he had to impose a variety of new duties and 
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taxes on exports and other market activities.
438
 This sudden change stirred up 
substantial opposition to the regime amongst the lower echelons of society who faced 
ruin as their young men were taken from the fields and placed in the barracks. It also 
provoked Europeans who resented the reassertion of export controls. Even worse, the 
factories he created to produce basic items like uniforms were poorly utilized and 
hemorrhaged money at appalling rates. The financial situation of Tunisia quickly 
progressed from that of a poor, underdeveloped, but relatively debt-free state, to one 
of fiscal bankruptcy. Coupled with his expensive final act of sending troops to 
participate in the Crimean War, the Tunisian ship of state was fast succumbing to a 
flood of unpaid debts.
439
 
 
Lest one be tempted to think that Ahmad’s reign was an unmitigated disaster, both 
Perkins and Brown point out that some of his reforms had long-lasting effects, 
particularly those of the military academy, which allowed native Tunisians to have a 
degree of participation in their government for the first time since the pre-Islamic era 
and which exposed an entire generation of malleable young cadets to the ideas, 
technologies, and ideologies of Europe.
440
 The whole concept of progress and 
modernization that he imported into Tunisia inculcated into the entire ruling class the 
expectation that Tunisia should be able to take its place on the world stage, even if it 
part was a small one, and that it had an identity and future that were distinct from 
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those of the Ottoman Empire. On a more negative note, his ruinous spending sprees 
opened the door to the massive European interventions in Tunisian political and 
economic life that was to persist from his death until roughly a century later.
441
  It is 
to the pre-colonial roles played by the European powers, particularly the British and 
the French, to which this chapter now turns.  
6.2. The British and French Consuls and Early Tunisian 
Constitutionalism 
 
Ahmad Bey’s successor, Muhammad Bey, ascended to the throne in 1855, the same 
year that Tunis hosted the arrival of British consul Richard Wood and French consul 
Leon Roches. The intense rivalry of these two men and the governments they 
represented led to a variety of unanticipated outcomes for Tunisia, including the 
eventual promulgation of the Islamic/Arabic world’s first written constitution in 
1861.
442
 This was part of a much broader program imposed on the Ottomans by Great 
Britain and France to leverage their participation in the Crimean War into liberal 
political reforms. 
                                                          
441
 Julia Clancy-Smith (1994), p.157, delivers the following verdict on Ahmad Bey: “Ahmad Bey’s 
reign represents a sea change in modern Tunisia’s history, mainly, but not exclusively, because of the 
reforms imposed upon his largely unwilling subjects… Upon taking the throne, the bey inaugurated 
new fiscal policies, organized a conscript army, and established modern commercial, industrial, and 
educational facilities, patterned upon Western institutions with assistance from European advisors.  It 
was a delicate, and ultimately, ruinous balancing act. Only internal consolidation of Tunisia’s 
population and resources could thwart the political ambitions of European and Ottoman suitors; yet his 
subjects had to remain reasonably content as well. In some cases, Ahmad Bey’s reforms expanded state 
power at the expense of provincial autonomy. Yet in regions distant enough from the political center… 
some of these reforms at first had little impact.” 
 
442
 See Perkins (2004), pp. 17 and 26-27. Carl Brown (1974), pp. 320-324, makes a similar point about 
Ahmad Bey’s desire to emulate Europe leading to his abolishing of the Tunisian slave trade in 1841 
and the emancipation of slaves in 1846. Interestingly, he was in some ways ahead of those he sought to 
imitate as the French did not abolish slavery in Algeria until two years later and the former British 
colonies of the United States famously did not end the practice until a bloody civil war compelled legal 
emancipation in 1863 (an effort not fully enacted until 1865 and the spirit of which was left unfinished 
until at least the 1960s). 
 
P a g e  | 206 
 
Although ostensibly most concerned about the sultan’s non-Muslim subjects, the 
European powers hoped that restraints on the arbitrary powers of the ruler and guarantees 
of basic rights and freedoms would also facilitate their own subjects’ commercial 
ventures in the empire and the latter’s integration into the international economy.443 
 
The Tanzimat era found its Tunisian origination in an environment of similar 
European leverage, resulting from Tunis’ debts and the death sentence of Batto Sfez, 
a Tunisian Jew convicted of blasphemy.
444
 This harsh measure provided cover for the 
consuls to insist on major judicial reforms. Roches and Wood requested two particular 
sets of measures. The first was directly related to the Sfez case, and requested the bey 
to establish a mixed court system to deal with cases involving Europeans and which 
would establish clearer rights and duties for the ruler and his subjects. The second 
request (demand may be more accurate), was that Muhammad deal favorably with 
Europeans seeking to own property and establish businesses in Tunisia.
445
 What 
resulted was known as the ‘Ahd al-Aman, or “Security Covenant,” which ironically 
echoed many of the assertions of the 1826 Ottoman Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane and 1856 
Hatt-i Humayun. Among these were the declaration that all of his subjects were equal 
on both civil and religious grounds, the establishment of modern formalized criminal 
and commercial statutes, the previously mentioned mixed courts, and an end of state 
monopolies.
446
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Muhammad Bey’s assent to these changes was reluctant and came about primarily 
because despite the fact that he “inclined toward retrenchment and conservatism,” he 
recognized that the presence of a large French fleet in his waters left him with 
virtually no room for negotiation or even delay. “European economic interests made it 
impossible for Muhammad Bey to survive in the shell into which he wished to 
retreat.”447 His reluctance proved well-founded on two grounds. Firstly, he understood 
from the legacy of his predecessor what an increase in European economic activity 
could lead to in terms of debt and loss of power. Additionally, he was well-aware that 
orthodox understandings of the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state did not in 
any way promote equality before the law. Only monotheists had any status 
(polytheists were at least theoretically to be targeted for conversion or execution), and 
even these dhimmis faced restrictions on military participation and were expected to 
pay the jizya tax designed to both pay for their military protection and humiliate them 
as people living outside the Muslim umma.
448
 Muhammad was also under no illusions 
that one of the major internal poles of power in Tunisia was the Zaituna mosque and 
the ‘ulama who acted as community leaders and judges in private and family life. 
These clerics were incensed at the foreign influence creeping into their country, and 
particularly at the notion that they were on an equal legal and religious footing as their 
non-Muslim counterparts.
449
 
 
                                                          
447
 Perkins (1986), p. 73. Here it is also noted that initially Muhammad attempted to only grant the 
judicial reforms without implementing the trade concessions. This is what prompted the French to 
order their fleet as a final persuasive measure. 
 
448
 Tunisian Muslims faced a real challenge to their legal superiority regardless of this decree. Kenneth 
Perkins (2004), pp. 23-24, points out that at this stage, several non-Muslim and non-Tunisian groups 
comprised significant minorities of the population and workforce. These included approximately 
18,000 Jews; 7,000 Maltese; and 4,600 Italians amongst others. The Italians and Maltese in particular 
were in direct competition with native Tunisians for jobs at the lower end of the economic scale.  
 
449
 Perkins (2004), pp. 19-20. 
P a g e  | 208 
 
Adding insult to injury, the European powers determined that the issuance of the ‘Ahd 
should be followed by the establishment of a more formal constitution. As far as the 
‘ulama were concerned, there was only one constitution and it was the Holy Qur’an. 
The Europeans were already consistently invoking the ‘Ahd to protect the commercial 
and civil interests of their nationals who had entered Tunisia in the flood of 
speculative investment ushered in under the 1857 reforms. Disgusted and unable to 
exert any political influence, the ‘ulama withdrew from the constitutional 
commissions set up by Muhammad.
450
 It is at this stage in Tunisian history that Khayr 
(alternatively transliterated as Khair) al-Din began to play a central role in the affairs 
of his state. Before delving into his biography however, it is important to briefly 
overview the developments surrounding the 1861 Constitution, its operation, and 
legacy.  
 
To a large degree, the constitution or “organic law” that formally came into force after 
Napoleon III, as Tunisia’s quasi-colonial overseer, formally accepted it in 1861 was a 
restatement of earlier reforms undertaken in the ‘Ahd al-Aman. According to various 
sources, this document’s key functions “defined the succession (and) also clarified the 
responsibilities of the ruler, who was to swear an oath of allegiance to the 
Fundamental Law at his accession.”451 It also delineated the respective rights and 
duties of Tunisians and foreigners; “the latter were granted the privileges of work in 
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trades and commerce.”452 Building upon earlier reforms establishment of a governing 
council for Tunis,  
the fundamental law established a constitutional monarchy whose ministers answered to 
a sixty-member Grand Council appointed by the ruler. Many of those named to the 
council were proponents of reform, the most prominent of whom was its president, a 
mamluk named Khair al-Din al-Tunisi.
453
 
 
Ideally, the existence of the constitution would have established a clear condition of 
sovereignty for the Tunisian state and its equality provisions would have actually 
served as a bulwark of protection against European judicial and commercial 
concessions that were driving Tunisia yet closer to the brink. Although far from being 
a democratic or representative form of government, the system established by this 
constitution was revolutionary for an Islamic state in the respect that its inspiration 
was firmly based in nationalized and secular concerns and principles and disregarded 
centuries of previous Islamic government practice. As mentioned previously, this 
innovative quality made the document suspect to both the clerics and the devout, 
which was only exacerbated by the way in which the constitution was (ab)used by the 
European powers who compelled its creation. To begin with, there was no lessening 
of European power as Muhammad al-Sadiq had hoped to achieve as a proper 
“enlightened monarch.” The even more unrealistic nature of the goal of achieving 
parity with Europe that Ahmad had also cherished was derisively plain. Further 
incensing native and religious Tunisians was the fact that,  
Despite the powers’ advocacy of the constitution, members of the Maltese, Italian, and 
other European communities disliked its declaration of equality for all residents of 
Tunisia in so far as that concept resulted in the loss of certain of their privileges. Rather 
than submit to the jurisdiction of Tunisian tribunals, for example, they wanted to retain 
consular courts, as well as to continue to enjoy exemptions from certain forms of 
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taxation. Nevertheless, they asserted their entitlement to the protections guaranteed by 
the constitution.
454
 
 
Undoubtedly, the colonizing instinct of the European powers was either blinding them 
to, or causing them to disregard, the blatant double standard being perpetuated under 
this arrangement. Between the reckless disregard for the rule of law displayed by the 
Europeans and the equally corrupt efforts of native power brokers like former Prime 
Minister Mustafa Khaznadar, the long-term survival of this potentially revolutionary 
document was doomed from the start. There were too many middlemen who 
benefitted from corruption, and foreigners who benefitted from a dualistic and 
inherently unfair judicial arrangement for the reforms to even begin taking effect as 
intended by the reformers.
455
 Ira Lapidus makes the further point that these reforms 
“could not be fully institutionalized, for there were never sufficiently numerous well-
trained troops or administrators.”456 
 
The doom of the reform effort also spelled doom for Tunisia’s attempt to preserve its 
sphere of autonomy from both Ottoman and European encroachments. The unpopular 
reforms were paired with failed harvests, business failures, widespread corruption, 
cleric-led protests over the rapid inflation of basic commodities as a result of the 
export market, and continual propagation of new and treasury-plundering capital and 
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infrastructure projects.
457
 The Zaituna ‘ulama protest of rising wheat and olive oil 
prices is particularly instructive in assessing the extent to which the reforms were 
unpopular and relatively ineffective outside of the Bey’s inner circle and the interests 
of foreign business concerns. Following a demonstration in Tunis’ souk in 1861 and a 
march on Bardo Palace, the government quickly neutralized this perceived threat by 
arresting those demonstrators who were not from the class of ‘ulama and by 
purchasing the acquiescence of the clerics through “cooption of a few moderate 
‘ulama into official positions… it was well known, both in the royal court and the 
foreign consulates, that the protestors regarded their economic woes as a consequence 
of… rampant foreign influence, which the constitution now symbolized.”458 
The 1861 protest was only a shadow of further developments, in which native 
Tunisians and European powers eventually came to agree that the constitution had to 
be dismantled, albeit for very different reasons. In 1863, Great Britain negotiated and 
agreed to the Anglo-Tunisian Convention, which  
placed British subjects in Tunisia on the same footing as Tunisians regarding taxation 
and legal matters,  while according them the right to own property and conduct business 
without restrictions. The Tunisian government accepted this accord because it viewed 
British interests, unlike those of France, as essentially nonpolitical.
459
 
 
Crucially, this treaty covered both British and Maltese residents, which affirmed full 
legal jurisdiction for substantial numbers of foreigners and the additional benefit of 
counterbalancing the influence of the French government.
460
 However, this simple 
arrangement only served to further anger Tunisians already chafing under foreign 
domination and they staged “a full-scale revolt” in 1864, led by a holy man called Ali 
ibn Ghdahem. Although the rebellion was quashed through bribery and military 
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reinforcements paid for by Constantinople, it nonetheless was quickly followed by the 
achievement of one of its key aims of bringing about the repeal of the hated 
constitution.
461
 Angered by the British maneuvers, the French reasoned that the 
Anglo-Tunisian Convention was binding for only as long as the constitution under 
which it operated remained in force. Once again, the threat of imminent military 
invasion proved too persuasive to ignore and Tunisia’s constitutional experiment was 
over before it could really begin. “In short order, the status quo ante, with its virulent 
competition among Europeans and the absence of restraint on Tunisian officials had 
returned.”462 It is only with an understanding of the significance of this turbulent era 
of pre-colonial pressures, technological and industrial revolution, political reform, and 
burgeoning Tunisian identity that one can make sense of the biography and political 
theory of Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, whose work comprises the fulcrum upon which the 
argument of this book rests. 
6.3 Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi- A Man of Multiple Identities and Singular 
Achievement 
 
Like the country which he would adopt as his homeland, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi was a 
man who existed in multiple orbits of culture, power and experience, all of which 
shaped his outlook on life generally, and the challenges facing Muslim states more 
specifically. Born in the Ottoman provinces of the Caucasus in approximately 1820-
25, as a young man Khayr al-Din was taken as a mamluk slave to Constantinople. “He 
lived long enough in Constantinople to learn Turkish but probably received little, if 
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any, formal education.”463 From there, at roughly 16 years of age, he was sold into the 
service of Ahmad Bey of Tunisia in 1839. There he was trained in the administrative 
arts for which the Ottomans and their predecessors were so famed that we still refer to 
unwieldy bureaucracies as byzantine.
464
 Khaldun al-Husry writes this about his early 
professional training: 
Khayr al-Din arrived in Tunis which was to give him his surname. In the Bay’s palace 
and in the Bardo Military School, newly opened in 1840, Khayr al-Din studied Arabic, 
and Islamic ‘ulum (sciences, or knowledge in its broadest sense), and the modern military 
sciences of his day.  He had learned French in Turkey. For a time he was trained by the 
French military mission in Tunis, under Commandant Campenon, who later became 
Gambetta’s minister of war. Khayr al-Din rose quickly to the highest rank in the Tunisian 
army, becoming a fariq (general de division) in 1844. He soon abandoned his military 
career for one in the civil service.
465
 
This brief passage makes clear that Khayr al-Din must have been exceptionally 
capable to have undertaken the range of studies that he did and to rise so quickly (only 
four years) to a position of military leadership at the age of only 21. G.S. van Krieken 
also adds to the list of his achievements that his knowledge of the Islamic texts was 
such that he was familiar with hadith, scriptural interpretation, and had memorized the 
Qurʾan by heart.466  
It is hard to imagine what it must have actually been like for him to be taken from his 
family and raised in this institutional fashion, but there is no sign of self-pity in his 
own accounts of his life, no hint of wishing for the life he could have had. Rather, in 
his autobiography he says simply: 
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Bien que je sache pertinemment que je suis Circassien, je n'ai conservé aucun souvenir 
précis de mon pays et de mes parents [...] Les recherches que j'ai faites [...] sont 
toujours restés infructueuses.
467
 
 
Here one gets the impression that he was naturally curious about his origins but by no 
means obsessed. It is also important to note that his slave status would not be a cause 
for humiliation in the world of the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire. Although he seems 
to have had no choice in being sent to Tunis, once mamluks like him were purchased 
and put in post they had an enormous degree of mobility afforded to them and were as 
free as virtually anyone else in society, perhaps much more free than those in the 
peasant class who did not share the fortune of their education, access to power, and 
comfortable lifestyle.
468
 In other words, he was little more slave than most 
professionals who are compelled to work at set times, sometimes for long hours, but 
who are nonetheless paid well for their work and who have to opportunity for 
promotion and acknowledgement of success. 
 
The degree to which his success as a military officer placed him on his rapid social 
and political assent becomes obvious in light of the fact that he actually was placed in 
charge of the Bardo Military School for a period of time, and “in 1852 was sent by the 
Bey to Paris to deal with a difficult problem, that of certain claims made by a former 
minister against the government. He remained in Paris for four years, and for him… 
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they were a formative period. He observed the life of a great political community and 
applied what he learnt to his own world.”469 It is interesting to note that the “difficult 
problem” he was sent to deal with related to a colleague of Mustafa Khaznadar named 
Bin ‘Ayad, who absconded from Tunisia with enormous sums of money stolen from 
the treasury and then took on French citizenship in an effort to avoid the potential 
consequences of his actions. In a way, this problem would manifest itself in various 
forms like a virulent hydra throughout his career as he was forced to confront one 
debt crisis after another, many of them relating to Tunisian corruption and waste and 
French abuses of power.
470
  
 
In recognition of his lengthy efforts in Paris, Khayr al-Din was made minister of 
marine in 1857, the same year which marked the beginning of a constitutional 
approach to Tunisian monarchy under the previously discussed ‘Ahd al-Aman.471 This 
period of reform, liberalization, and struggle to define the role and identity of Tunisia 
in a rapidly changing international context was one which saw Khayr al-Din’s 
experience and natural talents put to considerable use. Al-Husry comments that some 
scholars directly attribute Khayr al-Din’s influence in the types of reforms undertaken 
by Ahmad Bey, Muhammad Bey, and Muhammad Sadiq Bey.
472
  
 
His influence with the ruling beys was not based on his philosophical prowess, but on 
his ability to deliver positive results in their dealings with ever more bold and 
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audacious European powers. Following his successful mission to Paris, he was also 
asked to undertake yet another foreign mission, but this time it was not to a European 
state, but to the political heart of Islam in Constantinople.  Muhammad Sadiq asked 
him to complete the customary task of announcing the new ruler’s succession and 
asking for the sultan to issue a formal document of investiture. This in itself was 
nothing out of the ordinary. However, this routine diplomatic formality was also a 
cover for a more covert attempt to counterbalance ever stronger French intrusions by 
persuading the sultan to formally grant Tunis the autonomy it had practiced in a de 
facto sense for hundreds of years. Furthermore, he also requested that the Empire 
recognize the hereditary nature of the Beylik, in exchange for which, the Bey would 
pay tribute and also acknowledge the overarching sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. 
This was a win-win face-saving measure, but it did stretch both sides’ willingness to 
swallow some pride. It also was clear to the sultan that it was a move certain to anger 
the French, and this mission failed.  It is ironic in some senses that he would be less 
successful in Constantinople than in Europe, but it possibly had very little to do with 
Khayr al-Din and very much to do with the Empire’s weakness and inability to risk 
offending the Europeans.
473
 
 
In the run up to the implementation of the constitution of 1861, the Bey first 
established a municipal council for running Tunis in 1858. The capital being by far 
the most important urban center and home to a substantial portion of the population, 
this was an ideal laboratory in which to conduct these new experiments in 
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modernization and consultative government.
474
 Importantly, it was at this time that 
Tunis was also coming under extreme pressure from the potential for conflict between 
its various ethnic groups and foreigners. Though it was “controlled by Muslims,” the 
rapid changes in Tunis meant that the “segmentation (of social groups) which had 
obviated the need for a uniform system of regulations and which had kept the urban 
groupings apart, thus permitting them to co-exist, was difficult to maintain with… so 
many Europeans and with increasing state involvement in introducing change.”475 
 
A passage from British consul Richard Wood meant to justify his suggestion for the 
creation of the Municipal Council illustrates the graphic nature of the cultural 
problems confronting Tunis at this time: 
… in  the present instance, the heterogeneous elements which form the bulk of the  ... 
Christian population of Tunis, their utter disregard of the commonest forms of decency 
and decorum, their recklessness and usurpation of the principal thoroughfares, which 
have become impassable and insecure from their having been turned into stables and 
workshops, and  their impatience of  control, render indispensable, for the public good, 
health, and security that some Municipal Regulations should be framed and enforced. In 
one street alone, besides other animals, there are several hundred pigs which wallow in 
the public drains and impede progress of passengers. This circumstance in itself is 
sufficient to produce much irritation and annoyance in a Mussulman city.
476
 
 
In order to rectify the problems of this evolving city, the Council focused on 
providing what today would be considered very basic social services. These consisted 
of tasks like policing, controlling the price and quality of goods in the food market, 
and handling the horrendous overflow of waste and sewage.
477
 Khayr al-Din’s role on 
the Municipal Council was indirect but substantial. Amongst its officers were General 
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Abu ‘Abdullah Husayn, Muhammad al-‘Arbi Zarruq, and Salim Bu Hajib. General 
Husayn, who was President of the Council for seven years, was also a Circassian 
mamluk who served with Khayr al-Din on his mission to Paris. His friend would 
undoubtedly have approved wholeheartedly of this reminder of his to the Bey: 
Those most beloved of God are those who dedicate themselves to the interest of the 
people. He who spends one hour working toward improving the conditions of the country 
and the people is more worthy of praise than he who spends his day praying and handling 
his beads. God Almighty urges action and is pleased by effort.
478
 
 
Likewise, Muhammad al-‘Arbi Zarruq and Salim Bu Hajib were intimately involved 
in the reform efforts being overseen by Khayr al-Din. Zarruq even became “the first 
director of the Sadiqi College in 1875.” Bu Hajib was actually a native Tunisian 
officer (something that would have been impossible before the reign of Ahmad Bey) 
who went on to work at the Zaytuna mosque and was a well-known proponent of 
Khayr al-Din’s reforms. His upward mobility from the tribal Sahel to a position of 
power was itself a direct testament to the impact that even limited liberalizing reforms 
could have.
479
  
 
The larger constitutional effort that resulted from the 1861 Constitution was much 
more directly led by Khayr al-Din, who was named to the presidency of the Grand 
Council. Prior to its actual enactment, he served the equally, perhaps even more, vital 
role of serving on the commission that drafted the constitution.
480
 Writers have 
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generously called this constitution a “liberal constitution,” but it would not be seen as 
terribly liberal by present-day standards.
481
 The Grand Council it created to advise the 
Bey and to restrict his ability to act autonomously was not democratically elected nor 
representative, not even in the very limited understanding these ideas would have had 
in much of 19
th
 century Europe. Rather, its 60 members were appointed by the ruler 
himself. Crucially, they were tasked with keeping the ministers of the Bey 
accountable and even more importantly, the Bey himself appointed several pro-reform 
members to fill its chamber.
482
 This move may seem surprising in terms of an 
authoritarian monarch voluntary limiting his power and placing people willing to 
speak their minds in an advise and consent capacity. When considered as an act of 
Tunisian nationalism and attempt to establish international sovereignty and credibility 
on something approaching the Westphalian model however, it can be seen as an 
entirely logical attempt for the Bey to promote his government into a league of 
civilized modern states, while at the same time demonstrating that his legitimacy did 
not lie in the whims of Constantinople, but on a fundamental social contract with his 
own subjects. This view is well outside the traditional Islamic mainstream of political 
philosophy, but well within the currents of European thought that seemed destined to 
sweep over his nation whether he willed it or not.
483
  
 
This desire to gain more autonomy from the Ottomans while simultaneously fending 
off European advances by joining the ranks of constitutional states explains the logic 
in Muhammad Sadiq’s choice of Khayr al-Din to lead his new Council. Although the 
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constitution placed real limits on his power locally, as discussed previously the ability 
of the Bey to project his power outside of Tunis and the major cities had always been 
limited. Thus, it is mainly for its potential to enlarge his prestige and power abroad 
and to preserve his domestic standing, that the constitutional path was so attractive, at 
least on paper, to Muhammad Sadiq. This harmony of interests between the Bey and 
Khayr al-Din was short-lived however, as Khayr al-Din fully intended to advise the 
Bey according to what he felt were the best interests of the state, even when these 
were at odds with the personal interests of its ruler. This led to his angry resignation 
in 1862 when he argued that ministers were responsible to the Grand Council and not 
the Bey.
484
 Carl Brown highlights his disagreement over Mustafa Khaznadar’s plan to 
obtain a foreign loan to handle Tunisia’s mounting debts as the primary reason for his 
departure.
485
 Whether the cause was his argument with the Bey or with his father-in-
law (he had married Khaznadar’s daughter in what must have been somewhat of a 
political power marriage), his disgust was strong enough to cause him to resign not 
only from the Grand Council, but also from his post as minister of marine.
486
 
 
This was a fortuitous misfortune, for it was during this period of self-imposed 
political exile that Khayr al-Din left Tunisia to travel extensively throughout Europe 
and when he wrote his book The Surest Path, a comparative government text that 
covered over 20 European state systems, and the introductory section of which 
summarizes his political thought and approach to reform from within the traditions of 
Islam. As a detailed analysis of this text comprises the next section of this chapter, it 
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suffices to say that without this time away from the daily political grind to observe 
and reflect on his adopted homeland and its future vis a vis Europe, it may have been 
impossible for this work to have ever been written in the systematic manner in which 
it was ultimately produced.
487
 
 
Shortly after the 1867 publication of this work, Khayr al-Din returned to active 
political life. “In 1869 the worsening situation of Tunisian finances,” thanks largely to 
the loan Khaznadar had advocated, “led to the creation of an International 
Commission to administer the revenues (of the state), and Khayr al-Din became 
president of its executive section.”488 In a bizarre twist of fate, it was then Prime 
Minister Khaznadar himself who asked Khayr al-Din to take on this role because “his 
advocacy of judicious and responsible government was well known.”489 This 
reconciliation was very short-lived. It turns out that Khaznadar had not anticipated the 
enormous scope that the British, French, and Italian-backed debt commission would 
have in setting policy in all matters relating to Tunisia’s fiscal house. Corrupt 
politicians had far less room to skim profits from activities that could generously be 
called consultancy, but which were really tantamount to bribery. There was simply 
little left of the Tunisian treasury to plunder for private gain. Thus, “entirely 
consonant with his past behavior,” Khaznadar tried to “sabotage (the commission) 
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altogether or, failing that, to stonewall directives imperiling his lucrative business 
arrangements or easy access to state funds.”490 
 
For Khayr al-Din’s part, this task was one that he also found extremely distasteful, 
albeit for entirely different reasons. He was no fan of putting his beloved and 
beleaguered Tunisia under foreign domination. However, he also saw no means of 
freedom from foreign control in the absence of first attaining freedom from foreign 
debt.
491
 This stand on fiscal responsibility did him no favors in earning the good 
graces of the Bey, but nonetheless, it demonstrated in a powerful way to the French 
and Italian members of the commission that he “meant business” and was trustworthy, 
which ultimately led them to pressuring a very reluctant Muhammad Sadiq to naming 
him prime minister in 1873.
492
 In turn, Khayr al-Din understood the highly 
competitive and vainglorious nature of the European colonial mindset well enough 
that he was able to create a degree of autonomy for his own political maneuvering by 
playing the various powers off one another while they competed to obtain his favor.
493
 
 
Here it is useful to consider the actions he took as prime minister, in order to better 
appreciate the practical and active follow-up to the political theorizing in The Surest 
Path shortly to be discussed. Here, his achievements in political, social, and cultural 
spheres amount to something both profound and lasting. Various scholars emphasize 
different aspects of his activities, but Khayr al-Din himself provides an excellent 
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holistic account in his memoirs, which incorporates most if not all of what his later 
admirers and scholarly examiners mention on this topic. 
The specific measures which Khayr al-Din listed among his accomplishments included: 
(1) canceling back taxes; (2) granting a twenty-year tax relief for new plantations of olive 
and date trees; (3) controlling the exact amount of personal (capitation) tax in order to 
end the prevarications of the qa’id-s;494 (4) partially canceling the system whereby spahis 
were paid according to the fines collected;
495
 (5) reorganizing the customs with a 5 per 
cent increase on import duties and a reduction of export duties; (6) establishing a regular 
system to control the habous (Muslim endowment) funds; (7) reorganizing studies at 
Zitouna University;
496
 (8) reorganizing the library; (9) paving the streets of Tunis; (10) 
creating Sadiqi College “on the model of European lycees”497; and (11) stopping the 
costly system of collecting taxes from the nomads by means of military expeditions.
498
 
 
This laundry list of reforms is important because, as the reader will see, they are close 
reflections of his earlier ruminations on the role and function of an Islamic 
government. From this list, it is possible not only to gain an appreciation for the broad 
scope of his interests and achievements, but also to draw out certain themes about 
what a state must, should, and can do. Take for instance, the achievements that he 
mentions toward the end of this list in restructuring the Zaituna curriculum, 
establishing Sadiqi College, and reorganizing the library. All of these reveal an 
obvious and passionate conviction that education and knowledge were very much part 
of “the surest path” to maintaining autonomy and dignity for his people. By 
introducing secular subjects for the first time to the Zaituna, he both reaffirmed the 
essential societal role of the ‘ulama while challenging them to expand their 
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understandings of this role in light of a very rapidly changing world which had to 
contend with far more foreign pressure and influence than at any time since the advent 
of Islam in the Maghreb. Likewise, the Sadiqi College he founded continues to exist 
and play an important role in Tunisia to this very day. “The school combined a course 
of traditional studies, taught in Arabic, with a French-inspired curriculum 
emphasizing modern languages, mathematics and science.”499 Eventually, Sadiqi 
graduates began to fill the ranks of the state bureaucracy “forming a tightly knit cadre 
that preserved and, when possible, acted on Khair al-Din’s philosophy well beyond 
the end of their mentor’s ministry.”500 
 
Azzam Tamimi demonstrates the centrality of the founding of this university by 
quoting its founding statement as written by Khayr al-Din: 
To teach the Qur'an, writing and useful knowledge, i.e. juridical sciences, foreign 
languages, and the rational sciences that might be of use to Muslims being at the same 
time not contrary to the faith. The professors must inculcate in the students love of the 
faith by showing them its beauties and excellence, in telling them the deeds of the 
Prophet, the miracles accomplished by him, the virtues of the holy men . . .Khairuddin 
At-Tunisi believed that ' . . . kindling the Ummah's potential liberty through the adoption 
of sound administrative procedures and enabling it to have a say in political affairs, 
would put it on a faster track toward civilization, would limit the rule of despotism, and 
would stop the influx of European civilization that is sweeping everything along its 
path.
501
 
 
What is clear is that he views education as a means of reconciling the apparent 
conflicts between the preservation of Muslim identity and the adoption of “Western” 
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tools for achieving not just this preservation but also the promotion of the state as a 
Muslim state. Combining a love of faith with a rational training program of science 
and language, he believes, not only limits abuse of power and makes its use more 
efficacious, but most importantly holds European encroachment at bay. 
 
Another branch of Khayr al-Din’s governing philosophy can be seen in his various 
uses and reforms of taxation. In canceling back taxes for instance, he was 
reestablishing trust and assent between the governing class and the governed. He 
reasoned that people would be less hesitant to come forward to pay their taxes if they 
knew that in so doing they could avoid potentially ruinous back taxes and regain their 
legal footing. This same idea animated his determination to stop pursuing funds from 
the Bedouin by military raid because aside from the farce of raising funds by spending 
more than they would possibly collect, it seemed to him that “if the state provided 
security and a regular tax system, then the Bedouin would cease their raids, and 
trouble-makers would find no refuge from the civil government among the tribes.”502 
His other actions in standardizing the means and amounts of tax collection all reveal 
an attempt to establish legitimacy based on an idea of fairness and justice; fairness in 
that the state would only collect what was due and without causing harm to its 
subjects; justice in that the state would communicate with its subjects exactly what 
was expected of them. 
 
Still another passion of his premiership is his concern for developing domestic 
production capacity and limiting the taking on of debt via the import of foreign 
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finished goods. This explains his increase of import and decrease of export duties, 
along with his plantation tax relief. Taken as a group, they clearly represent an 
investment in Tunisia’s future economic well-being. This too is behind his ensuring 
that Tunis, the state’s capital and largest city, was paved. What could be more basic to 
an economy than the ability to transport goods efficiently? The Romans found roads 
vital for commercial and military ventures and this lesson remained true for all 
subsequent empires. Indeed, some would trace part of the economic predominance of 
the United States to the building of its interstate highway system. Efficiency also 
factored into his appointment of the highly respected cleric Muhammad Bairam a 
habus to head the Habus Council, which was charged with responsibly administering, 
for the good of the people, the 25% of Tunisian land that had been designated as a 
pious trust.
503
 
 
Uniting each of these strands of his efforts as prime minister is an over-arching and 
very traditional Islamic view that government is primarily about stewardship. Carl 
Brown claims this is consistent with even medieval Islamic thought and defines it as 
“a rigid separation between the rulers and the ruled, whose mutual relations were 
guided by the parallel of the shepherd and his flock.”504 As will be seen later in his 
text, Khayr al-Din remained deeply committed to an Islamic vision of the state, even 
as he was committed to reforming the way an Islamic state functioned in a world that 
had moved well beyond the confines of the Medieval and Renaissance periods. 
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Despite, or perhaps because of, his many successes as prime minister, Khayr al-Din’s 
time in power was over by 1877 after only four years. The same foreign powers that 
conspired to have him appointed prime minister, and who curried his favor, ultimately 
decided that his time was up. The French in particular were upset by his affinity for 
the Ottomans and his business deals with the British. Once British resources and 
attention were diverted to more pressing and long-standing concerns in their more 
traditional Egyptian sphere of influence, there was nothing stopping the French from 
ensuring he was removed from office.
505
  
 
Even this nasty turn of events did not spell the end of his political career. Towards the 
end of 1878, he was asked by Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid, “who had read The Surest Path,” 
to be Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. Although this stint at the pinnacle of the 
traditional seat of Muslim power was extremely short-lived and was the final act of 
his political life, he remained in Constantinople until his death in 1889.
506
 Before 
turning to the analysis of The Surest Path, it is helpful to consider how its translator, 
Khayr al-Din scholar Carl Brown sums up the legacy of its author. 
At first sight Khayr al-Din’s efforts seem to have been as short-lived as those of Ahmad 
Bey. Nothing approaching accountability was established in Tunisian administration… 
Even Sadiqi College, established in 1875 to train the needed new cadres for sound 
administration, by 1881 was on the verge of closing as a result of neglect and 
mismanagement. One could go on tolling a like fate for the other specific measures of 
Khayr al-Din. Yet an approach that overlooks the slow, stumbling manner in which 
societies change and that ignores the importance of ideas, even when they survive for a 
time only in the heads of a small number of insignificant people, would completely miss 
the essence of Tunisian reformism... Khayr al-Din’s efforts appear to have been 
completely frustrated, but something remained- a few persons, a few ideas, a small body 
of experience. Without this saving remnant, the Young Tunisian movement… might not 
have existed at all. It is from this movement (including its many mistakes) that one can 
trace the beginning of Tunisian nationalism. Bechir Safr, a leader of the Young 
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Tunisians, had been a protégé of Khayr al-Din. He was called affectionately the “Second 
Father of the Reawakening.” The first, of course, was Khayr al-Din.507 
 
Thankfully, the ideas of Khayr al-Din were not simply in the heads of some 
insignificant people for a brief time, but were carefully enumerated and persuasively 
argued in his 1867 text, Aqwam al-masalik fi ma‘rifat ah al al-mamalik, or The 
Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Condition of Countries. It is to an 
understanding and analysis of this text that this discussion now turns.
508
 
 
6.4 The Surest Path- Khayr al-Din’s Islamic solution to the challenge 
of the West 
 
During his time in exile, Khayr al-Din remained preoccupied with affairs of state. His 
time away from active office seems to have provided him with the needed leisure to 
systematize his thoughts into a coherent idea of how a Muslim state should be 
properly constituted and run, how this might be achieved, and why it was both 
necessary and in accordance with the principles of the sharīʿa. This last consideration 
gives his work a decidedly defensive tone, but considering the persistence of doubts to 
this day from both Muslim and Western thinkers about the compatibility of orthodox 
Islam with constitutional government and reform this is manifestly understandable.  In 
his A History of Modern Tunisia, Kenneth Perkins describes The Surest Path as 
drawing upon “the three most important components of Khair al-Din’s intellectual 
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heritage: Muslim piety, the traditional statecraft incorporated into his training as a 
mamluk, and the modern culture of the West first encountered in Ahmad Bey’s 
service but comprehended more fully as a result of his residence in France.”509 Rather 
than proceed through the text in a linear fashion, this analysis will seek to draw out 
the three constitutional themes that comprise the focus of this work. As a writer who 
is both a devout Muslim and an experienced high-ranking official who has had 
extensive exposure to European ideas and politics, Khayr al-Din’s work is distinctly 
heterodox. It is as eloquently forceful in its discussion of European virtues and 
advantages as it is in defending the timelessness of Islam and its sharīʿa. As such, the 
way he deals with a concept like the rule of law is concerned with aspects of this 
question that would resonate with Muslim and European audiences. His views on the 
restriction of governmental power derive mainly from the same concerns at 
preventing tyranny and corruption that animate the writers of The Federalist Papers, 
yet do so by appealing to various hadith and sunna that had widespread legitimacy 
amongst Tunisia’s elite, in particular the influential ‘ulama to whom he addresses 
many of his appeals and criticisms. Likewise, his analysis of the qualities of various 
nationalities and how they are fitted for their governments uses the traditional 
language of the umma. Even the publication of The Surest Path in both Arabic and 
French authorized versions shows the dual audiences and traditions that Khayr al-Din 
had in mind as he wrote. 
 
After assessing each of the various constitutional concepts in The Surest Path, a final 
look at the idea of progress is essential. As a true believer in the modernist vision, 
Khayr al-Din’s work is aimed squarely at economic, technological, and military 
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advancement, all of which are presented as the ends which can be gained through the 
means of good government and political reform. In this sense, he is more in the 
philosophical company of someone like Hayek or other political economists than he is 
with either Western or Islamic political philosophers from earlier times. Once his 
constitutional concepts and his goal of progress are analyzed, it will then be possible 
to assess the extent to which his work successfully fuses the two constitutional 
traditions, to what degree it is indeed concerned with constitutionalism, and what its 
implications were and are. 
 
6.5 The Surest Path to the Rule of Law- The De-Personalization of 
Power 
 
Khayr al-Din’s writings have not received the same level of scrutiny as those of 
Sayyid Qutb, al-Afghani, or even Tahtawi. However, his name does crop up in 
various scholarly considerations of Islamic reform, constitutionalism, and/or 
modernism. This passage from Gudrun Kramer is illustrative of the general consensus 
of his view of the rule of law and his place in the Islamic canon of political theory, if 
such a thing exists.  
What emerges as a core concern for modern Muslims is to check and limit arbitrary 
personal rule and to replace it with the rule of law. That had already been the 
preoccupation of the 19
th
 century Arab and Ottoman constitutionalists, ranging from 
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Khair al-Din al-Tunisi to Namik Kemal.510 
 
This very brief statement shows that Khayr al-Din is considered to be a 
constitutionalist and that this has something to do with de-personalizing power and 
replacing it with the rule of law. Although his concerns do very much involve 
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tyranny, the context in which he was writing was very different from that of modern 
European authors. As such, he is far less concerned about the tyranny of the majority 
than he is with the tyranny of one despot and the ruinous effects it can have on a state. 
His perspective is of one who lives in a state that is being overwhelmed by foreign 
influences, money, and residents. Even worse, as discussed earlier, these foreigners 
did not submit to Tunisian authority and maintained their own courts and rules and 
relied upon the military and economic pressure of their home states to extract ever 
more egregious legal exceptions that made their participation in Tunisia’s economy 
more advantaged than that of its own citizens. If anything then, it is the tyranny of the 
minority, the miniscule minority of an autocrat and his sycophants, and the larger 
foreign minority interests which concern him most. For this reason, and because of 
the distinctive Islamic views on the unity of sovereignty, it is necessary to analyze 
Khayr al-Din’s view on the rule of law alongside and in combination with his views 
on the restriction of governmental power. The endemic corruption of the Tunis regime 
is also an important factor in the amount of attention he pays to courting an audience 
of the ‘ulama. His vision of the rule of law and the role of government as being 
analogous to that of shepherd and flock neatly coincided with the role played by the 
‘ulama as local leaders and spiritual shepherds. In view of the political realities he 
acknowledged that “any mandate for change had necessarily to come from above, but 
it also had to fall within the parameters of Islamic values, and confirmed by its 
endorsement of the ‘ulama, the guardians of those values.”511 These two concepts are 
inextricably linked in the historical, political, cultural context in which he is writing. 
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It is telling that in The Surest Path his discussion of the rule of law begins in the 
context of discussing Europe’s historical experience with this constitutional ideal. He 
makes the pointed observation that  
The present situation in the kingdoms of Europe has not long been established. After the 
attacks of the northern barbarians and the fall of the Roman Empire in 476, Europe fell 
into a shocking state of savagery, lawlessness and oppression, beginning in a movement 
of decline- which is naturally quicker than that of advance.
512
 
 
The words “savagery, lawlessness and oppression,” are all familiar terms in 19th 
century political discussion, but primarily in European discussions of other 
civilizations, including “Oriental” groups into which they often classified Muslim 
societies. Here they have been turned on their head to remind his fellow Muslims that 
European claims to superiority in these matters are recent developments in the grand 
scale of history. He goes on to reject claims that this progress is based upon the 
Christian religion of most of Europe, because even though “it does urge the 
enforcement of justice and equality before the law, Christianity does not interfere in 
political behavior.”513 As further proof that Christianity does not ensure the rule of 
law in its domains, he gives the example of the “imperfection” of the Papal States.514 
Contrary to the common Western belief that Islam is inferior in its ability to provide 
sound principles for governance, Khayr al-Din says first that Europe has become 
prosperous and powerful simply because of “tanzimat based on political justice.”515 
Secondly, he contrasts the Christian passivity toward politics with the active 
engagement in politics required by Islam, particularly in predominantly Muslim 
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societies. The idea that good governance and fairness, along with the application of 
knowledge leads to prosperity is “well known from our Holy Law,” as attested to in 
Muhammad’s statement that “ ‘Justice brings glory to religion, probity to constituted 
authority and strength to all orders of the people, high and low. Justice guarantees the 
security and well-being of all subjects.’”516 
 
After an extensive discussion on the nature of kingship and the need for its restraint, 
Khayr al-Din begins making his case for accountable ministerial government’s 
effectiveness at establishing and maintaining the rule of law. He even cites Mill’s 
observation that “‘The English nation reached its highest peak during the reign of 
George III who was mad,’” noting that this happy result was no accident, but rather 
was possible “only through the participation of those qualified to loosen and bind, to 
whom the ministers were responsible.” 517 Translator L. Carl Brown’s footnote on 
“those qualified to loosen or bind” (Ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd) reveals that this phrase has 
an original legal usage meaning:  
those qualified to act for the umma in appointing and deposing the caliph or any ruler. In 
fact, the term came to mean a more loosely-defined group of those actually possessing 
political power plus the eminent religious scholars, leading merchants, and other notables 
whom the political leadership were likely to consult (or ought to consult, according to 
whether the term was being used in a descriptive or normative sense).
518
 
 
Here then, is an interesting juxtaposition of European historical precedent with 
Islamic political terminology. The phrase he chose is not only powerful in that it 
hearkens to the election of the caliph, who was the leader of all Muslims, but it also 
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can be traced back to the very first instance in which the Islamic umma had to appoint 
a political successor to Muhammad. It thus became a tradition that any new caliph, 
including the Ottoman sultans, had to have their role assented to by “those qualified to 
loosen and bind,” although in practice this became a mere formality. Later Muslim 
thinkers use this historical precedent from the earliest days of Islam, in much the way 
that Christians might cite the apostles, to emphasize the legitimacy and even 
requirement that Muslim rulers allow and are responsive to shura, or consultation.
519
 
This term which initially evoked tribal elders conferring their blessing on their 
leaders’ decisions has come to be used in a variety of ways, including advocating 
limited constitutional government and even full liberal representative democracy. 
 
Khayr al-Din never advocates the creation of a representative republic outright. It 
could be that he felt that Tunisia was not yet ready for this degree of self-rule, or that 
he simply did not foresee that this would come to be seen by many as the only 
legitimate type of government. Regardless, his continuation of the topic reveals a 
strong democratic strain in his thought. Keeping his clerical audience in mind, he 
reminds them that promoting the rule of law through institutionalizing government 
and making rulers and ministers accountable is not in contradiction to the sharīʿa 
principle that the ruler is appointed by God and has jurisdiction and power over his 
entire flock. Rather than a derogation of authority, it is a delegation of authority in 
much the same way that Moses asked God to designate his brother Aaron as his wazir 
or helper, pleading that He “ ‘Increase my strength with him and cause him to share 
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my task.’… Therefore, if the imam’s sharing his power with the delegated vizierate… 
is permissible and is not deemed a diminution of his executive authority, then his 
sharing of power within a group-those qualified to loosen and bind- in all aspects of 
policy is even more permissible.”520 This provides a key link between the idea that the 
task of governing should be shared and that the rule of law requires that those who 
share in governing must be chosen. The example of Moses and Aaron could lead one 
to accept, as was Ottoman practice, that the obligation of shura could be met by the 
appointment, by the king, of a minister who would advise him and act alongside him 
to enforce the law. Khayr al-Din supports his more radical view by alluding to the 
requirement of Umar ibn al-Khattab that succession to the caliphate required 
consultation of six people in which at least four of them agreed on a candidate. The 
will of the four was always meant to be followed over that of the other two, regardless 
of who those two people were.
521
 
 
Having established that a constitutional view of the rule of law is compliant with the 
sharīʿa, Khayr al-Din next discusses the secular laws meant to address the 
contingencies a state may face that are not directly addressed in traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence.
522
 He specifically mentions that after the Muslims lost Spain it was the 
Ottomans who saved the dar al-Islam from total chaos, “when Sultan Suleyman Selim 
at the beginning of the tenth century [1495-1591 A.D.] established his beneficial 
qānūn  in order to extirpate the means by which defects befall kingdoms. In doing this 
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he sought the help of the active ‘ulama and the wisest statesmen.”523 The ordinances, 
or qānūns, he proposed including reorganizing the army, police, property system, etc. 
and actually led to his gaining the moniker of al-Qanuni.
524
 These very practical 
concerns make up a considerable percentage of the business of a modern state, yet are 
not typically considered to be decisions with moral implications. Just the same, this 
famous monarch sought out advice and consultation. Khayr al-Din explains the 
significance of his method of rule as follows: 
The essential feature of the qānūn was to make the ‘ulama and the viziers responsible for 
the ruler’s administration, making it possible for them to investigate princes and sultans 
should they deviate. This is because Islamic sovereignty is based upon the Holy Law 
whose principles, already referred to, include the duty of consultation and of resisting 
actions disapproved by God. The ‘ulama are the most knowledgeable about such matters 
just as the viziers are most knowledgeable about politics and the requirements of various 
situations. If the ‘ulama and viziers are apprised of something which violates the sharīʿa 
and the qānūn which serves it, then they will do what the religion requires. This is, first, 
to speak out against what is wrong, and if this works then the desired effect is achieved. 
If not, then they should inform the army leaders that their admonition has been to no 
avail. In the above-mentioned qānūn it is made clear what will happen if the sultan 
should remain determined to carry out his wish even if it is against the public interest. He 
would be deposed and another member of the royal family would take his place. In this 
way certain obligations and commitments would be imposed by the ‘ulama and the 
statesmen, and the situation would continue in this manner. 
Thus according to the provisions of the qānūn  the position of the ‘‘ulama and the viziers 
with authority to hold the sultans accountable for their actions is like that of 
representatives in Europe…Or, more precisely, the authority of the former is greater 
since the secular restrainer of accountability is supported among us by a religious 
restrainer.
525
 
 
From this passage, a rough outline of Khayr al-Din’s solution to arbitrary rule can be 
sketched. The “essential feature” of this good example of Islamic governance from 
the glory days of the Ottoman Empire is not found in any elaborate institutional 
arrangements or popular sovereignty, but simply in accountability. This is because in 
order for the clerics and political elites to discharge their duty and responsibility for 
                                                          
523
 Ibid., p. 112.  
 
524
 For further information on Suleiman’s reign and impact, including his legacy as a lawgiver, see J.M. 
Rogers and R.M. Ward’s (1998) Suleyman the Magnificent. 
 
525
 Tunisi, pp. 112-113. 
P a g e  | 237 
 
the “ruler’s administration,” it was critical that they also gain the corresponding 
power to investigate their rulers. Although Khayr al-Din does not lay out a specific 
procedure for how this investigative power may be used, he mentions that it would 
have to be a matter of violating the law, whether the sacred sharīʿa or the secular 
‘qānūn. This is an important development because there were plenty of historical 
examples of Islamic rulers being overthrown for religious violations, but it was 
unheard of that he should also be removed from office for violating the ordinances 
which he himself promulgated and over which he was theoretically sovereign. This is, 
in European terms, a development that would make an Islamic monarch less like the 
classic French rulers who reigned on the theory of “L’etat c’est moi,” and more like a 
British ruler, with all the attendant expectations that he would be bound to the laws of 
God, nature, and of his own state and accountable to a group representing the interests 
of the whole state.  
 
Furthermore, the first action required of the state’s ruling class is that they verbally 
inform and warn the king of the error which he has committed or is in danger of 
committing, after which, they have the right to appeal to the military to undertake a 
limited form of coup d’état in order to depose the unrighteous or lawless monarch.526 
This theory has its venerable roots in both the West, as seen in the frequent overthrow 
of Roman emperors by rival military leaders, and in Islam, as witnessed in the 
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enormous power wielded by the Ottoman janissaries.
527
 Khayr al-Din’s conclusion to 
this passage is instructive, in that it acknowledges the link to the ways of Europe (the 
model for the successful and prosperous state) by referring to this group of ‘ulama 
and viziers as acting in the same capacity as “representatives in Europe.”528 The real 
advantage for the Islamic state in applying this model is that, whereas European states 
only have their own secular constitutions and laws to appeal to in enforcing 
accountability and justice, Muslim rulers, viziers, and ‘ulama have the additional 
authority that comes from having a “religious restrainer.”529 
 
Slightly later in The Surest Path, Khayr al-Din undertakes the thorny issue of 
pluralism, multi-ethnic states, and democratization. This is important because it shows 
that a thinker can be extremely constitutionally-minded without necessarily being a 
dyed in the wool advocate of democracy. Contrary to the expectations generated by 
his frequent inclusion in the group of “liberal Islamic political thinkers,” he actually 
argues against the demands of groups within the Ottoman Empire for “laws to be 
established and protected” by a truly representative, popularly-elected assembly.530 
This is troubling to him, not because he is opposed to democracy wholesale, but rather 
because he has (very well-founded) fears that behind this opposition movement lay 
                                                          
527
 In fact, this pattern reasserts itself time and again with Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan all 
experiencing military coups in the 19
th
, 20
th
, and 21
st
 centuries. 
 
528
 Note that this is highly reminiscent of the argument made roughly 150 years later by Noah Feldman 
in his The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. 
 
529
 This is yet another example of the sort of two-pronged argument employed by Khayr al-Din 
throughout his writings. He is forceful in arguing for the benefits of certain European behaviors and 
institutions, but even more forceful in his belief that the benefits of Islam will make them even more 
effective in a Muslim polity. 
 
530
 Examples and explanations of the view of Khayr al-Din as a liberal Muslim thinker can be found in 
books ranging from Albert Hourani’s (1983) Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age to Al-Suwaidi’s (1995) 
Arab and Western Conceptions of Democracy to Antony Black’s (2001) The History of Islamic 
Political Thought. 
P a g e  | 239 
 
several foreign powers vying for the diminution of Ottoman power and sovereignty so 
that they can promote their own economic and political interests with less hindrance. 
 
Khayr al-Din’s assessment of the liberal movements in the Ottoman Empire of his day 
is that the political agitators showed  
no signs of good faith toward the state. Instead, they often showed a desire to draw closer 
to those of their own race (jins) by complaining about the state’s official conduct and by 
stirring up confusion. This is due to their being constantly subject to corruption by 
foreigners who plant in their chests the seeds of “protection” for purposes which cannot 
be hidden. It is possible that the establishment of liberty in the way demanded above, 
before giving consideration to those obstacles would merely facilitate these ulterior aims. 
Among the requisites of this liberty is the equality of all subjects in all political rights, 
and this includes access to the highest state positions. However, among the important 
preconditions for granting this freedom is the agreement among all of the subjects 
concerning the interest of the kingdom and the strengthening of the state’s authority.531 
 
This reveals a common critique of liberal democracy that persists to this day, namely, 
that by presuming democracy to be the de facto best form of government, failure to 
achieve a certain degree of democratization leads to a state itself being considered less 
than a full member of the family of civilized nations, when perhaps there are 
underlying reasons that democracy has not yet blossomed.
532
 In the case mentioned 
here, the problem would seem to be that modern notions of liberal government 
conceive of the state as being necessarily a nation-state, acting in the best interests of 
the overarching nation it represents both internally and internationally, whereas 
clearly there was no one nation to which all Ottomans allied themselves. Rather, the 
extreme nature of pluralism in the vast empire, traditionally governed by the 
autonomous millet system which encouraged separation in settlement and private 
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legal matters, meant that the residents of the empire had stronger loyalties to their 
own clans, which in turn sometimes had significant ties from outside the empire. As 
opposed to European history, in which national groups tended to coalesce into 
political units and either absorb or expel foreign peoples into their more or less 
homogenous societies, Islamic societies were traditionally highly tolerant of other 
religious and national groups living and conducting commerce within their borders. 
At the same time, the binding ideal of an Islamic umma which existed apart from and 
above all other peoples, meant that there was little precedent for intermixing between 
religious groups and even less of a sense of national loyalties as being on a par with, 
let alone superior to, the religious loyalty due to other believers. This is why Muslim 
scholars spoke of the House of Islam and the House of War in discussing international 
matters because it was assumed that there was only one sovereign of the Muslims, 
God, and only one deputy of God, the caliph. How then, can an Islamic state be a 
nationalist state? It thus makes sense that Khayr al-Din does not believe a coherent 
national identity to be a prerequisite of democracy, but rather a coherent and unifying 
idea of what is in the public interest (maslaha) and how the power which promotes 
that interest can best be strengthened so as to protect it. 
 
Though it does not follow next in Khayr al-Din’s work, it would seem logical to 
briefly examine his conception of liberty, “since what we have been presenting on this 
subject indicates that liberty is the basis of the great development of knowledge in the 
European kingdoms.”533 In exploring this concept, he sums it up as follows: 
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“Liberty” is used by the Europeans in two senses. One is called “personal liberty.” This 
is the individual’s complete freedom of action over himself and his property, and the 
protection of his person, his honor, and his wealth. He is equal before the law to others so 
that no individual need fear encroachment upon his person nor any of his other rights. He 
would not be prosecuted for anything not provided for in the laws of the land duly 
determined before the courts. In general, the laws bind both the rulers and the 
subjects…The second sense of liberty is political liberty which is the demand of subjects 
to participate in the politics of the kingdom and to discuss the best course of action. This 
is similar to what the second caliph , ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with 
him, referred to in saying, “Whoever among you sees any crookedness then let him set it 
straight,” meaning any deviation in his conduct or governance of the umma.534 
 
The advantage of presenting liberty in this perfunctory manner, making it a European 
fait accompli, is that he can avoid the philosophical debates as to what liberty should 
be, who grants it, what its origins are, etc., and can instead focus on the types of 
liberty that actually already exist in the European states whose prosperity he seeks to 
achieve on behalf of his own umma. Al-Husry argues that for Khayr al-Din, liberty is 
one of the usul, or principles, embodied in the sharīʿa.535 The first type of liberty is an 
inherently negative set of freedoms which limit the state’s interference in its subjects’ 
lives by guaranteeing their rights and the protection of that which they already have 
through publication and fair adjudication of the laws of the land. This is also a very 
individualistic type of liberty that will later be used to make a variety of political 
economy based arguments as to the creative and commercial energies it can 
unleash.
536
 The second type of liberty is more communitarian, and it is not surprising 
that it is this type that he explicitly links to Islamic tradition, begging the question 
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whether a good example of personal liberty was not readily apparent in his extensive 
store of knowledge from the Qurʾan and hadith. The freedom to participate politically 
and arrive at an agreed course of action for the well-being of the state epitomizes the 
title of his work in that he sees it as the means by which a ruler or state can avoid 
“deviation” and remain on “the surest path.” 
Part of staying on the straight and narrow path, to borrow from Christian terminology, 
relies upon an expansion of what political freedom means in practice beyond the 
simple mechanics of creating representative institutions and electing their members. 
Particularly important in this effort, is “something else which is called freedom of the 
press.” Oddly, this term which is now largely taken for granted is carefully defined to 
mean that “no one can be prevented from writing that which it seems to him to be in 
the public interest in books or newspapers which can be read by the public.”537 This 
would seem to be a fairly expansive view of this freedom because the body that 
determines the public interest value of the writings is not the ‘ulama, a board of 
censors, or the state, but rather “what seems to him,” the writer, to be “in the public 
interest.” As the state cannot claim to read the minds of the writers in its domains to 
know with certainty if they intend to write on behalf of the public interest, this would 
seem to be a fairly good guarantee of journalistic freedom. Likewise, he specifies that 
not only can anyone write what he wishes, but he can also publish it so that “it can be 
read by the public.” This means that opposition to government policy or even to the 
                                                          
537
 Tunisi (1967), p. 162. 
 
P a g e  | 243 
 
regime does not need to be privately registered in order to be legal, but is legitimate in 
the public sphere.
538
 
The freedom of the press and political liberty are circumscribed to an extent in his 
following discussion of how some European states have granted both personal and 
political liberty, whereas others have only granted personal liberty along with varying 
degrees of political liberty “because the conditions of kingdoms vary according to the 
aims of their subjects.”539 This would seem to be an implicit statement of his view that 
not all Muslim states would be immediately ready for what he terms “absolute 
liberty,” but would need to first achieve an internal consolidation of the public will so 
that the essential political questions would enjoy enough broad consensus to confer 
legitimacy on the decisions made on the day to day affairs of the state by its various 
organs.  
 
In speaking about the variety of European states’ readiness for absolute liberty, he 
could easily be speaking about any number of Islamic states. Those which are ready 
have subjects who “resist their kings only in order to have a right of opposing the state 
if it turns aside from the straight path, and to draw it toward a policy of benefit for the 
kingdom.”540 In other states, there is not even agreement about which form the 
government should ultimately take, let alone what its aims should be, allowing 
various parties to harbor potentially detrimental “ulterior motives.” “As a result of this 
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belief some kings deem it permissible to abstain from granting complete liberty.”541 
This would seem to advocate for what would now be considered commonplace, or 
“universal,” rights like free expression and freedom of the press, but his willingness to 
grant the ruler discretion in how much freedom to allow his subjects could also 
advocate for a variety of political measures that could be seen as repressive. One 
might ask Khayr al-Din how a consensus about the form and aims of the state can be 
achieved and legitimized absent an open public debate on the matter, which would 
necessarily require freedom of expression, assembly, the press and some type of 
popular vote.
542
 
Khayr al-Din’s solution to the problem of how to advance the goal of a free and 
prosperous society in a measured way in the presence of a king who can unilaterally 
grant or deny freedoms as he deems appropriate is to ensure that the king himself is 
properly educated and trained in an argument that hearkens back to the neo-Platonism 
so popular with earlier Muslim thinkers like al-Farabi. He thinks that Muslim rulers 
should imitate their European counterparts in the education of future rulers by 
choosing “proficient masters who will teach him science and knowledge appropriate 
to his standing, the aim being whatever trains his character and broadens his 
knowledge.” They should also travel to foreign countries to gain a wider view of the 
world and to ascertain their “progress in development,” taking advantage of the 
beneficial customs and practices to be found in various places, and avoiding “things 
which would hold back his own country.” Following this training via tourism, the 
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future king is groomed for power through gradual initiation and elevation in political 
life by attending, then speaking, and then presiding over the assembly. 
543
 
It becomes clear in the follow up to this summary, that in the guise of discussing 
European royal customs, Khayr al-Din is actually advocating that Muslim states do 
the same. He says: 
What is required of kings is not simply settling private disputes- as seen in some Islamic 
countries. Nor is it getting involved in details of administration which can be carried out 
by other functionaries. Rather, what is required of rulers is over-all supervision- knowing 
the men appropriate for public office, testing them, investigating them closely in order to 
guide them in their ignorance and restrain their feigned ignorance, inspecting the 
conditions of the subjects, assisting with increase of industries and sciences leading to 
the training of character and growth of wealth, showing a concern for the organization of 
the army and navy, fortifying the frontiers with material for resistance and defensive 
forces in order to protect the religion and the homeland, regulating the political and 
commercial relations with foreign states in a way which will cause the honor and wealth 
of the kingdom to grow, and other such general things. 
The worldly happiness and misery of kingdoms depend on the success or failure of its 
kings in these matters and upon the possession of political tanzimat based on justice 
which is recognized and respected by those in charge.
544
 
 
What is less than clear is why he does not at least more fully discuss the possibility of 
these same duties being discharged by a representative group or assembly. His own 
Ottoman and Tunisian context of being steeped in monarchy was surely a significant 
factor in Khayr al-Din’s seeming obsession with discussing political merit and 
reforms in the context of kingship, but one would think his years in France would 
have graphically illustrated that a state with “absolute freedom” is very likely mature 
enough to dispense with the need for a single wise ruler to guide its affairs. Perhaps it 
is simply that his work is aimed largely at the Tunisian elites in the ‘ulama and 
political classes who derive many tangible benefits from the presence of a monarch. 
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In response to the European cynics and Muslim critics of the tanzimat reforms that he 
feels will promote a broader vision of a shared public interest for Muslim states (not 
least of which because the previously discussed Ottoman reforms granted full legal 
equality to all subjects and placed them under the same jurisdictions, taxation laws, 
and military obligations), Khayr al-Din says that it is ridiculous to claim that “rulers 
of Muslim states” are universally and forever incapable of reforming to an extent that 
they can be trusted to be fair with Europeans living and doing business in their 
domains. Some of these very European powers, he points out, also struggled for 
generations to implement political reform, suffering setbacks and reversals until “they 
finally succeeded (in consolidating political reforms in accordance with justice) with 
the support of their inhabitants in carrying out its provisions without hardship.”545 
Indeed, the very writing of The Surest Path would seem to be meant to generate the 
legitimacy for reform within his own society because without “this support of the 
population, one cannot hope to attain any results.”546 
 
In the long-term it would seem that Khayr al-Din believes that Muslim states are 
capable of lasting and significant reform and progress in establishing equality and the 
rule of law, although the manipulation of European powers makes the task 
extraordinarily difficult. He laments that in some countries a given European power 
may advocate reform, whereas in another it may say “‘These tanzimat are not 
appropriate for your situation and it is preferable for you to return to your previous 
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condition,’ although such advice is in conflict with the political principles of their 
own countries.”547 Fed up with the contradiction of European policy toward Muslim 
states, he nonetheless is aware of their power and proposes a temporary compromise 
meant to assuage European fears of injustice should all people, including foreign 
residents, of an Islamic state be treated as fully equal before the law and subject to the 
same courts.
548
 For a time, there could be a special group of courts that would be 
under the state’s jurisdiction but in operation especially for foreigners and with a few 
basic guarantees. Following the establishment of trust that running these courts 
successfully would engender, it might then be possible to convince fair-minded 
Europeans that “finally they could be placed under our jurisdiction.”549 This would be 
key to the larger move that he feels is “incumbent upon the Islamic states,” to 
“remove these disadvantages (of the capitulation treaties) by granting these guarantees 
and making them known abroad.”550 This effort is very similar to a newly 
reconstituted state or regime proving its good faith to the international community by 
signing on to certain humanitarian treaties and conventions that bind them to certain 
internationally agreed standards of conduct in their dealings with their own citizens 
and with foreigners, which is then reciprocated by a fuller granting and respect for 
that state’s sovereignty. 
Once an Islamic state successfully throws off the restraints of the capitulation treaties 
and establishes universal jurisdiction over all people living in its lands, the question 
remains what type of laws it should enact in order to achieve the level of development 
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that Khayr al-Din seeks. Here again, as with his discussion of the training of future 
monarchs, he uses European practice as both a model and a foil for advocating 
similar, but Islamicized measures in Tunisia and the broader Ottoman Empire.
551
 
Intriguingly, he begins his discussion of the types of European law, how they are 
made, and how they are enforced by reminding his readers that Europeans have found 
after much long suffering experience that “the granting of unlimited freedom of action 
to kings and statesmen leads to oppression resulting in the kingdom’s ruin.” This is 
why they “have decided on the necessity of having those qualified to loosen and bind 
participate (as will be shown) in all aspects of politics while placing responsibility for 
administering the kingdom upon the executive ministers.”552 By using this 
terminology he is giving yet another overt indication that this is a pattern which he 
would gladly see emulated in the lands of Islam, although without necessarily 
subscribing to the social contract or representation theories that the European models 
of government by “those qualified to loosen and bind” would normally employ. 
He then breaks down European law into two categories: laws “observed between the 
state and the subject,” and laws “drawn up to decide legal actions between 
individuals, adjust the taxes and grants among the population according to the profits 
and merits of each, and other such domestic matters.”553 These two categories just 
happen to dovetail nicely with the Islamic categories of sharīʿa and qānūn, a point 
which he does not need to make explicitly to any ‘ulama reading his work. The first 
set of laws between the ruler/state and subjects/citizens is roughly equivalent to the 
types of law considered to be simple ordinances or codes in Islamic jurisprudence. 
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They are not terribly concerned with forbidding immorality or promoting morality in 
any direct fashion, but rather they 
cover the sovereign’s rights and duties… Many things are included in this category such 
as liberty for the masses secured by the guarantee of their rights, determination of the 
type of regime whether republic or hereditary monarchy, execution of the laws, the 
conduct of domestic and foreign policy, which includes making war and negotiating 
terms of peace and of commerce, designation of official duties, appointment of ministers 
and other officers…expenditures of tax revenues for their designated purposes, and other 
such matters relating to the administration of the kingdom provided they do not go 
beyond the purpose of it laws.
554
 
 
These qānūn comprise much of the day to day business of any state and Khayr al-Din 
seems to advocate an executive and bureaucratic approach to the conduct of this 
branch of law by saying that “these things are among the prerogatives of the ruler 
with the aid of his ministers.”555 In an answer to the earlier question as to why he 
seems so obsessed with presenting rule in a monarchic context, it is clear from his 
presentation of the French system that in theoretical terms the word “ruler” could be 
applied to any executive authority, even one that is elected or is somehow embodied 
in an institution of multiple individuals. It must be then, that the particular context of 
kingly rule is used to make his argument more Islamic, Ottoman, and Tunisian. In 
fact, the first group of executive laws is created in the way that they would be in an 
ideal version of the Tunisian monarchy. In France, they are “established by the 
agreement of those adults who are in full possession of their civil and political rights. 
Other states have additional conditions such as an educational qualification, 
ownership of property… or belonging to the class of distinguished persons called by 
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them the noblesse.”556 These are the same types of people already given precedence in 
Tunisia, but the important distinction is that the Bey was under no obligation to 
follow the advice of his nobility. The European rulers, on the other hand, are legally 
obliged to acquiesce to the authority of this upper parliament by taking actions such as 
allowing ministers to be questioned by the upper legal chamber and compelled to 
answer their questions, and in the case of disapproval of the ministers or the 
executive’s policy, the ministers must be dismissed, or parliament dissolved, and a 
new set of representatives given the chance to resolve the dispute. They either agree 
with the king or continue to oppose him, but in either case the rule of the people wins 
out. Khayr al-Din couldn’t have summed it up better when he says that  
The benefit to the country comes in firmly establishing the rectitude of those in charge of 
the country’s interests. Thus, it is easy for the country to appropriate her wealth and the 
blood of her sons since it is for her own benefit. In this way the situation of both the state 
and the country is properly secured even if the king be a prisoner of his own appetites or 
endowed with poor judgment.
557
 
 
The system he proposes then, is one in which the responsibility for both making and 
executing the law is shared between the king and a group of wise advisors. Beyond 
this, the actual form of government and the corresponding institutions, rights, and 
duties remain a question that is open to the contingent circumstances of any give state. 
This is less assertive in its promotion of freedom than might be hoped for by those 
labeling Khayr al-Din as a liberal thinker, but if his view that political development 
must be natively and gradually driven is taken into account, it still leaves plenty of 
room for the true self-determination of a populace that liberalism’s institutions aim to 
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achieve.
558
 At the end of the day, the rule of law must reign supreme for Khayr al-
Din’s vision of a prosperous Islamic state to be achieved. It is this achievement that 
would satisfy the requirements of the wise ancient Greek refugee quoted near the end 
of his text, who in answer to the question of were he and his fellow Greeks should 
settle answered simply, “ ‘In any land where the law is stronger than the ruler.’”559 
6.6. The Surest Form of Legitimacy- The role of the Islamic umma in 
history and political reform 
 
Having examined Khayr al-Din’s views on the need for the rule of law and its 
interrelationship with the depersonalization of political power, this chapter will now 
turn to the question of the role national character plays in his constitutional thought. 
In sharp contrast to most European writing on this idea, his notion of nationality will 
be shown to be intimately related to a pan-Islamic identity.
560
 Just as his ultimate 
views on the form and size of government are highly flexible, so too are the ways in 
which he would define the nature and scope of those being ruled by an Islamic 
regime. In order to convince his readers of not only the compliance of political reform 
with the principals of sharīʿa but also its feasibility in an Islamic context, he seeks to 
simultaneously demystify Europe’s success and the decline of Islamic states, saying  
One could cite other nations that had attained the ultimate in stability only by respecting 
their legal system which was based on just government. In the same way disregard for 
these rules was the cause of their decline. 
It should not be imagined that this was due to a divine grace in the holy laws of the 
nations mentioned. Actually, these were laws derives from human reason based on due 
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consideration to worldly authority. If laws should also be endowed with divine grace and 
sanctity, as is the case with our immaculate sharīʿa, then their being violated would be 
even more likely to cause decline in this world, not to mention the punishment which 
would ensue in the next. Whoever follows the history of the nations referred to and of the 
Islamic umma will see this clearly.
561
 
 
Thus it is seen that it is not any special innate quality of European states that has led 
to their relative success, but primarily that their legal systems are “based on just 
government.” The laws which they’ve instituted, he argues, are not inexplicable and 
should be easily seen by Muslims to be in accordance with reason. If Europeans can 
derive a just legal order from reason, how much more then should Muslim states be 
able to create a just state given the “divine grace and sanctity” underlying obligatory 
sharīʿa that would surely inform the decrees of the state? If reason and order explain 
European success, Islamic decline is presented as a matter of punishment for failing to 
live up to the principles dictated by the sharīʿa. It is not the case then that the reforms 
of the Ottoman Empire and or various Islamic kingdoms contradict God’s law that is 
the problem, but rather that corruption and a lack of respect for the law have violated 
the spirit of the spiritual law. 
 
Having debunked the idea that Islam and Islamic civilization are somehow inherently 
contradictory or inferior to European norms, Khayr al-Din turns to his Muslim critics 
and their claims that “the tanzimat are not suitable for the condition of the Islamic 
umma.” This belief, he says, is based on four “objections”, which are as follows: 
1. The tanzimat are contrary to the sharīʿa. 
2. They are inappropriate since there is no disposition on the part of the umma to accept 
the civilization on which they are based. 
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3. They will almost certainly lead to the loss of rights given the long time needed to settle 
lawsuits, and identical delays will be seen throughout the administrative system. 
4. The increased government employment required for the various administrations will 
require an increase in taxation.
562
 
 
He answers the first and second objections in a strident affirmation of the ability of 
Muslim people to apply European-style reforms to their own countries in a successful 
manner by claiming that “impartial observers” will attest to the “superior native 
intelligence” of the Muslim masses and that the historical experience and venerable 
civilization of the Islamic umma “still bearing the influence of the pious predecessors 
should be able to acquire what will set right its present situation and expand the scope 
of its civilization.”563 This, for his ‘ulama audience, would be tantamount to an 
intellectual and political call to arms, a type of liberal progressive jihad. By 
embracing reform they can tap into the superior nature of Islamic society and not only 
fend off European advances but perhaps even expand the influence of Islam. The 
technocratic element of his call can be seen in his assertion that “the umma’s latent 
freedom can be kindled by precise tanzimat which will facilitate its integration into 
political affairs.” If only the people were ruled justly and properly, then the society 
could mature politically until it was ready to use its “latent freedom” productively. 
 
Khayr al-Din’s next point is one that would resonate with many Muslim thinkers 
today. He remarks upon the fact that some of the European states that have 
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successfully introduced reforms were more or less culturally, politically, and 
economically backward before undertaking them. “Moreover, we still see today 
disparities among these states in the refinement of their tanzimat and the knowledge 
and virtue of their judges, but these disparities have not prevented the most advanced 
subjects upon entering these countries from being under the jurisdiction of the most 
backward.”564 
 
In order to further drive home his contention that the various Islamic peoples are 
indeed well-suited to the reforms he is advocating, Khayr al-Din turns from the case 
of European success to recounting the well-known and unprecedented successes of 
the early Islamic empires. The case he makes, is one that  
reveals the expansive development, extent of wealth and military strength growing out of 
justice, consensus, fraternal relations among the provinces and political unity professed 
by the Islamic umma, not to mention the concern for the sciences, industries and other 
such recognized achievements which have appeared in Islam. The Europeans followed in 
the footsteps of the Islamic umma, and those among them who are impartial concede this 
priority to the Islamic umma.
565
 
 
The concept of nationhood presented in this short passage is of a dual nature. The 
pressing concerns of his time to resist European pressure commended to Khayr al-Din 
the strategic advantage, and perhaps even necessity, of the Islamic states being able to 
present a united front to the Europeans. This is why his era of prosperity is portrayed 
as one of consensus, “fraternal relations,” and “political unity.” In truth, these 
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conditions rarely prevailed after the earliest days of the House of Islam, but the idea 
that they should remains powerful to the present day. It is important to note that he 
does give tacit recognition to political disunity, or at least autonomy, when he 
mentions relations between “provinces.” Whereas European provinces tended to have 
a very circumscribed set of local powers, those in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed almost 
complete de facto autonomy, even if de jure they were under the suzerainty of the 
sultan.  
 
In support of his arguments, he then quotes extensively from the French historian 
Duruy, who lends additional credibility to the former glory and present potential 
Khayr al-Din sees within the umma because he is a non-Muslim European, and 
therefore ostensibly impartial in his account. The descriptive language he borrows is 
very inspiring and poetic, as when he cites Duruy’s line: “ ‘While the people of 
Europe were lost in the deepest darkness of ignorance seeing only the slightest light as 
if through the eye of a needle, there radiated from the Islamic umma a powerful light 
of literature, philosophy, the arts, industries, etc.’”566 In addition to their past 
achievements the binding power of the Arabic language is also cited as one which “ 
‘has a depth and wide scope which cannot be hidden to those who know it.’” It is 
commonly accepted that language is an important part of national identity, and this 
may very well be one reason why Khayr al-Din’s nationalist appeals, if they can be 
called that, are largely pan-Islamic.
567
 Duruy takes this argument further in regards to 
Arabic, arguing that its high number of synonyms, especially for those words rooted 
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in the historical desert origins of the Arabs and Arabic, such as the “‘80 words for 
honey, 200 for the snake, 500 for the lion, 1,000 for the camel, a like number for the 
sword and more than 4,000 for misfortune,’” are demonstrative of the need of Arabic 
speakers to have “ ‘a powerful memory,’” and as they managed to successfully 
comprehend their language and use it to develop the poetic arts, for instance, then it 
becomes clear for Duruy that “ ‘the Arab undoubtedly has a powerful memory and a 
keen intellect.’”568 Khayr al-Din’s agreement that this is indeed the case means that 
surely, the Arabic-speaking peoples are capable of developing and using a lexicon for 
modern statecraft that draws upon their deep well of vocabulary and accumulated 
historical experience.  
 
The rest of Khayr al-Din’s excerpt from Duruy’s work traces the development of 
these early linguistic advantages (which must also translate into advantages for the 
Qurʾan which was revealed and transmitted in its pure Arabic form) into the 
advantages born of successful conquest. The sweep of Muslim armies throughout the 
Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa, put them into contact with a dizzying 
array of cultures and customs. Much as Khayr al-Din advocates copying useful 
European practices in his own time, these early Muslims “ ‘mingled with nations who 
had preceded them in civilization,’” coming across the writings of Aristotle (albeit 
indirectly) and saving them for posterity. They also took advantage of the knowledge 
of men brought from Constantinople by Caliph al-Ma’mun to make significant strides 
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in mathematical knowledge and improved upon ancient Mediterranean discoveries in 
geography, physics, astronomy, and medicine.
569
 
 
In terms of economic development, Medieval Muslims “‘learned all of the industries 
when they conquered the great Roman cities, and they eventually became the most 
proficient masters in all of these fields.’” This is yet another example of Muslims 
borrowing knowledge that was good and bringing their own creativity to it to create 
far greater levels of expertise. The examples given here are more of a manufacturing 
and economic nature than the discoveries mentioned earlier, which were largely in the 
arts and theoretical aspects of science. Arab excellence in crafting products is given 
“sufficient witness” in “‘the swords of Toledo… the silks of Granada, the blue and 
green broadcloth of the city of Cuenca, the saddles, harnesses and leathers of 
Cordova.’” In other words, there is absolutely no excuse for the utter lack of industrial 
development and prowess in the assorted Muslim domains. After all, “‘Europeans 
used to buy these commodities at high prices and vie with each other for them… In 
sum, Spain achieved such a fame for its development from the time of the caliphs in 
the early centuries that is was even more of an attraction than the East.’”570 
 
Of course, this spectacular Islamic rise was followed by a humiliating series of defeats 
and decay, but the latent power of the idea of the Islamic nation, the umma, meant that 
the “ ‘disruption of the Islamic states did not stop the Arabs’ work in the sciences and 
literature… The Christians who drove the Muslims out of Spain obtained through 
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contacts with them in wars their knowledge, industries, and discoveries. The Mongols 
and the Turks who successively dominated Asia became in the sciences the servants 
of those they had conquered.’”571 In other words, even in defeat, the Islamic ethos and 
civilization maintained, and Khayr al-Din would probably argue could regain, a 
victorious stature in the fields of knowledge, practical science, and culture.
572
 Indeed, 
in recalling his comparison between Islamic and European histories in discussing the 
Islamic umma, he says that the purpose of using Europe as a comparative case in 
successful development is “that we may choose what is suitable to our own 
circumstance which at the same time supports and is in accordance with our sharīʿa. 
Then, we may be able to restore what was taken from our hands and by use of it 
overcome the present predicament of negligence existing among us.”573  
 
Having laid out the dual historical developments in the Islamic and European 
civilizations and made a strong case for the compatibility and readiness of Islamic 
civilization and modern reforms, Khayr al-Din also sought to lay out a vision of 
progress and prosperity that was in keeping with Islamic mores suspicious of foreign 
innovations and yet proud of their own illustrious past.
574
 By packaging this effort as 
a recapturing of knowledge and skills once already in Muslim hands, he attempts to 
circumvent the objections based on innovation’s corrosive effects and to re-brand it as 
a mere continuation of the legacy of Islam. Thus in the next section of this chapter, 
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Khayr al-Din’s advocacy of progress and Western-style liberalization (even though he 
would not have employed that term) will be assessed in order to understand how he 
perceived it to be the solution to “the present predicament of negligence” he identified 
above. 
6.7. The Surest Path to Progress- Innovation through Reclamation 
In many ways, Khayr al-Din’s account of the meaning and importance of progress is a 
restatement of his arguments on the rule of law and nationhood. It uses the same types 
of arguments from Muslim scripture, history, and references to European experiences. 
The reason for examining it in its own right, however, is that Khayr al-Din himself 
says near the beginning of The Surest Path that in order to achieve the goal of 
independence and prosperity 
The first task is to spur on those statesmen and savants having zeal and resolution to seek 
all possible ways of improving the condition of the Islamic umma and of promoting the 
means of its development by such things as expanding the scope of the sciences and 
knowledge, smoothing the paths to wealth in agriculture and commerce, promoting all 
the industries and eliminating the causes of idleness. The basic requirement is good 
government…575 
 
This identifies one primary audience that Khayr al-Din addresses throughout his 
work, although rarely in the same direct fashion he uses with the ‘ulama. These are 
the people who would have worked alongside him in government, who control the 
various levers of power and influence in the state. This is a prodding reminder that 
their aim should not be self-improvement but “improving the condition of the Islamic 
umma.” It is a well accepted principle that one of the primary reasons certain states do 
not perform well economically is that they are too plagued by corrupt and/or inept 
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government. An additional reason for looking at Khayr al-Din’s use of the concept of 
progress in his work is that he states that The Surest Path’s “second task” is 
to warn the heedless among the Muslim masses against their persistent opposition to the 
behavior of others that is praiseworthy and in conformity with our Holy Law simply 
because they are possessed by the idea that all behavior and organizations of non-
Muslims must be renounced, their books must be cast out and not mentioned, and anyone 
praising such things must be disavowed. This attitude is a mistake under any 
circumstances.
576
 
 
Although it would appear that his other audience is the Muslim population at large, as 
seen in the rest of his book, it appears more likely that he is addressing their most 
influential local leaders and their spokesmen in the ‘ulama class. That is why he 
bluntly criticizes blind rejection of outsiders’ ideas even when they are morally good 
or neutral and would prove beneficial to society. He hammers this home with a well-
chosen paraphrase of al-Ghazali’s maxim, stating that “It is not according to man that 
truth is known. Rather, it is by truth that man is known. Wisdom is the goal of the 
believer. He is to take it wherever he finds it.”577 He goes on to cite the ultimate 
source of authority, the Prophet Muhammad, who, in the Battle of the Trench, took 
the advice of Salman the Persian in digging a trench around Medina in order to better 
defend it. It was this willingness to consult and learn from others that establishes the 
Islamic bona fides of both the principle of consultation and of using what is beneficial 
from others for the good of the umma. “If it was permissible for the virtuous ancestors 
to take such things as logic from outside their own religious community and to 
translate it from Greek…then what objection can there be today to our adopting 
certain skills that we greatly need in order to resist intrigues and attract benefits?”578 
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This shows that it is ultimately Khayr al-Din’s preoccupation with avoiding 
occupation by Europeans that motivates his push for progress as much as it is the 
result of his desire to restore pride to the umma.  
 
In a development which he found particularly pernicious and perverse, Khayr al-Din 
later mocks those who reflexively reject European ideas that could gain their society 
more independence, development, and wealth, while at the same time “vying with 
each other in clothing, home furnishings and such everyday needs just as in weapons 
and all military requirements. The truth is that these are things are European 
products.”579 The evil is not in the purchase of these products but that in perpetuating 
a cycle of indebtedness whereby Tunisia (or other Muslim states presumably) 
produces primary agricultural and raw materials, which are exported to Europe at low 
cost, where they are turned into manufactured goods and resold to Tunisians at a 
much higher price in reflection of the value added in manufacture. He ominously and 
accurately predicts that “if the value of imports exceeds the exports, ruin will 
unavoidably take place.”580 His economic analysis continues throughout the text, 
making reference to the advantage of regulating taxes, promoting inventions through 
state competitions and recognition, educating youths, and the development of a robust 
financial industry.
581
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Each of these economic strands is intimately tied up with the two types of freedom 
alluded to earlier. Khayr al-Din paints a vivid picture of the type of future freedom 
could afford the umma in his reference to the gains already realized in Europe. 
Among the most important things the Europeans have gathered from the lofty tree of 
liberty are the improvements in communications by means of railroads, support for 
commercial societies, and the attention given to technical training. By means of the 
railroads products can be imported from distant lands quickly enough to be useful, 
whereas there their importation was formerly impossible…With these societies the 
circulation of capital is expanded, profits increase accordingly, and wealth is put into the 
hands of the most proficient who can cause it to increase.
582
 
 
The picture that emerges from this view of progress is that Khayr al-Din has an 
impressive grasp of capitalist economics and the centrality of infrastructure given the 
lack of familiarity he would have gained with well-managed development in Tunisia. 
He could potentially even be seen as a proto-Keynesian who advocates significant 
state involvement in paying for various social and capital investments meant to 
generate the capacity for industry and wealth to be created and to eventually pay the 
state back with a solid return on this investment in the form of increased productivity, 
decreased need to provide social welfare, and increased tax revenues. He also reveals 
free market stripes in his belief that capital markets that are well-run result in wealth 
being “put into the hands of the most proficient who can cause it to increase.” This is, 
from a holistic perspective, a very balanced approach to economics and progress, 
much as his approaches to the use of European principles in the rule of law applied on 
behalf of the Islamic umma is also one which strikes a careful balance.
583
 
                                                          
582
 Ibid., pp. 163-164.  
 
583
 For a fascinating example of Khayr al-Din’s economic philosophy in practice, see Byron, D. 
Cannon. “Administrative and Economic Regionalism in Tunisian Oleiculture: The Idarat Al Ghabah 
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6.8. A Sure Success?- Assessing the practical and theoretical legacy of 
Khayr al-Din  
In reflecting upon the narrative woven by Khayr al-Din in making his case for 
tanzimat, it is clear that each of the constitutional themes discussed above cannot be 
applied to his theory in a piecemeal fashion. Each of these pillars is part of a mutually 
reinforcing structure. Although some of his contemporaries and some present-day 
contemporary scholars display disappointment that this work and his later work do not 
explicitly advocate that Tunisia return to constitutional rule, it is important to bear in 
mind the historical context that made the constitution engender such native hostility 
that the idea of its restoration was perhaps even more unpopular with the Tunisians 
than it was with the French business and political interests who found its provisions 
inconvenient.
584
 
Various students of Khayr al-Din have come to a number of conclusions about how 
successfully he fused European and Islamic political ideas, and how successfully he 
put his ideas into practice when he later regained political power. In terms of his effort 
to fuse two traditions with their own sets of questions, problems, and answers, Khayr 
al-Din’s results would seem to be mixed. His rule of law is situated firmly in both the 
Western and Islamic orbits. It advocates limited, accountable government, recourse to 
the courts, and uses the language of rights and duties found throughout Western 
constitutional discourse. This does not detract from its simultaneous anchoring in 
Islamic values as enshrined in the sharīʿa, which provide authentic and ardent 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Experiment, 1870-1914.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 11, no. 4 (1978): 
584-628. 
 
584
 See Hourani (1983), p. 94. Here he recounts how in response to critics who questioned his lack of 
advocacy for the reestablishment of constitutionalism in Tunisia, he replied that two conditions were 
necessary in order for this type of governance to succeed. The ruler had to be “willing to promulgate 
them,” and the subjects have to be able to understand them and “be willing to accept them.” The fact he 
had to be so cautious on his return to power would seem to indicate that The Surest Path was not 
immediately successful in its aim to convince the Tunisian ruling class of the virtues of reform. 
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motivation for Muslims to this day.
585
 His views on nationhood, on the other hand, are 
decidedly and emphatically Muslim. There may have been a time when the idea of 
Christendom had a certain resonance, but it is doubtful that it has ever matched the 
imaginative and political power represented by the Dar al-Islam, with its united 
umma, and sovereign caliph. This is because Christendom never fully embodied itself 
as a political reality and instead remained a unity of faith and ideas, whereas the 
historical Muslim experience found success in the marriage of this same type of faith 
with political power. It is a restoration of this power that Khayr al-Din most desires, 
and to his mind, progress in the guise of economic and political development is the 
“surest path” to achieving this goal. 
To conclude these reflections on the introduction of The Surest Path, it is sufficient to 
consider these words from Khayr al-Din: “We have seen that the countries which 
have progressed to the highest ranks of prosperity are those having established the 
roots of liberty and the constitution, synonymous with political tanzimat.”586 Thus, the 
implications of this comparative examination of constitutional thought in the West 
and Islam, and its fusion in the work of Khayr al-Din will be summarized in the 
following chapter. 
                                                          
585
 Al-Husry (1966) is one of the more critical commentators on Khayr al-Din’s Islamicizing of 
Western political ideas. He summarily renders his verdict as follows: “Khayr al-Din’s main 
preoccupation was to find in traditional political theory and practice precedents for those Western 
political institutions and practices that he admired and hoped his coreligionists would adopt. He himself 
admits, unwittingly but clearly, the final failure of his attempt, when at the very end of his book he 
apologizes to the reader for using foreign terms for which he can find no equivalent in Arabic. Among 
the terms are: ‘constitution’, ‘dictator’, ‘jury’, and ‘camera (in a parliament)’.” Of course, one could 
argue his use of these terms is no different than a Western writer using words like umma, jihad, or 
asabiyya in describing concepts which have venerable and particular meanings in the Islamic tradition 
without exact correlations in the West. 
 
586
 Tunisi (1967), p. 164. 
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Conclusion: A brief summation of this comparative look at 
constitutional values 
 
C.1. Introduction- Constitutional Conversations, Alternative models for 
civilizational conflict 
 
After contextualizing current debates about constitutionalism, particularly in regards 
to majority Muslim countries, the introduction of this thesis established a working 
definition of constitutionalism and a comparative methodology based upon 
constitutional values rather than institutional arrangements. For the purposes of this 
argument, constitutionalism is defined as a mode of governance which is defined by 
adherence to a written or generally agreed body of law, equally applied to all adult 
members of society. Furthermore, it reflects the cultural values and civilizational 
goals of its citizens, establishing both the boundaries of the state’s role in society as 
well as the scope of the various institutional organs of the state. This view of 
constitutionalism is one which is located within the classical tradition of viewing the 
constitution as an organic political/institutional representation of a society and with 
the more modern approach which looks at constitutions as legal documents which 
codify the architecture and operation of the state. Although by no means exhaustive, 
the core constitutional values being examined in this book can be broadly stated as the 
Rule of Law, embodying National Character, and Restricting Power of the various 
organs and personnel of the state. Each of these concepts are further developed and 
refined in subsequent chapters. The thesis then briefly contrasts the civilizational 
clash thesis of Samuel Huntington and the cultural pluralist approach of Fred 
Dallmayr as represented in his books Alternative Visions, Integral Pluralism, and 
Beyond Orientalism.   
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Elie Kedourie’s Orientalist critique is then dissected in detail and applied to some of 
the more popular generalizations about the “Muslim world.” In particular, the chapter 
examines his book Politics in the Middle East. His contention that majority Muslim 
states are uniquely prone to intermixing religion and the state due to the legacy of 
Muhammad’s initial politico-religious structure is specifically challenged in light of 
Europe’s historical experience with an extremely politicized Christianity. This serves 
the further purpose of establishing common political philosophical roots between 
historically Christian and Muslim (or Western and Islamic) states and directly 
confronts a host of literature that operates largely on the basis of “othering” Islam and 
Muslims. Since his work deals with each of the core constitutional values identified in 
this chapter, it provides a clear opportunity to analyze his critiques in a manner 
consistent with the rest of the thesis.  
                   
C.1.A. What is a Constitution and Why Constitutionalism? 
 
The introduction also looks at the contested nature of what a constitution is and 
establishes a fuller definition of what is meant by the words constitution and 
constitutionalism. It begins by examining a debate on the meaning of the word 
“constitution” between Giovanni Sartori and Graham Maddox. Rejecting Sartori’s 
role-based teleological argument, which says in essence that constitutions should 
assign roles to political actors and be assessed on their success in doing so, Maddox 
argues that the constitution must be seen as both codified law and an organic 
institutional expression of a polity. This position draws support from the classical 
approaches of thinkers like CH MacIlwain, whose work is the next subject of 
discussion. The brief examination of MacIlwain’s work is crucial in this chapter 
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because of his influence in defining a separate sphere for constitutionalism as a 
distinct subject of study and because of his impact on a host of other scholars from the 
mid to late 20
th
 century. The key insights highlighted in this discussion include his 
contention that constitutionalism is an attempt to pursue the classic aim of “the good 
or just life,” whatever that may mean to a particular people. It also is non-arbitrary, 
non-despotic rule that must operate within commonly understood bound. 
Constitutionalism is simultaneously a reflection of how a society is and an aspiration 
of how it sees itself in ideal terms. Rather than a simple institutional teleology then, 
MacIlwain envisions the constitution serving the larger goal of promoting the good 
life through a historical dialectic involving a constant balancing of individual rights 
and state power.  
 
An alternative, yet potentially complementary view of constitutionalism is next 
assessed in the positivist approach of Hans Kelsen. His legacy as an author of actual 
constitutions lends considerable practical weight to his theoretical discussions of the 
state. From the Austrian constitution of 1920, which still forms the basis of 
constitutional law in much of Europe, to his far-ranging and influential critiques of the 
United Nations, his impact as a jurist and legal theorist is difficult to overstate. 
Directly contrasting MacIlwain’s views, Kelsen argues that positive law is law 
distinguished from justice. Rather than being cosmically ordained and available via 
deduction from nature, Kelsen’s vision of law is simply “an order of human 
behavior.” Thus his definition of constitutionalism is one which is theoretically 
applicable to any society because it is empty of social and historical content. It is 
simply a framework or Grundnorm (first and foundational assumption) that can then 
be filled with whatever a given polity desires. Although famous critics like Carl 
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Schmitt mock this idea of law as meaningless, Kelsen himself argues that law is only 
binding once it takes on a normative element. The crucial distinction in his vision of 
the law versus that of natural law is that in Kelsen’s formulation, a people can 
determine their own set of fundamental norms and tailor their constitution to them. 
This provides a much stronger account of human agency without actually stripping 
constitutionalism of its essentially normative character. 
 
C.1.B. Cicero’s Dream and the Eternal Rule of Law 
 
The next chapter begins the examination of key canonical thinkers in the Western 
constitutional tradition with an analysis of Cicero’s Republic. His experience with a 
republican proto-hegemon, Rome on the cusp of imperial rule, provides an 
opportunity to assess some startling parallels with the universalist aspirations of the 
West, particularly the United States, to create an international rule of law based upon 
the values of a powerful exemplar state. 
 
In Cicero’s view of constitutional development, the strength of the Roman institution 
derives from its development by several authors over the course of many generations. 
The key virtue of this tradition is that it creates legitimacy as a by-product of the 
methodical way in which it accretes and codifies various political and social norms. 
Thus, once codified into law, these norms take on the character of common sense and 
don’t require much coercive force.  This process occurs on political and social levels, 
meaning that below the level of the official state, the social structure must educate 
each new generation in the traditions and values of its forebears to ensure continuity 
and the stability of the social order. What Cicero is describing in his Republic could 
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therefore be described as the very essence of what has come to be called the Rule of 
Law. It is a willing obedience to the state that relies more on consent and social 
custom than coercion to enforce and maintain its norms.  
 
Placing Cicero’s theory alongside the much more recent work of Tom Bingham’s 
book The Rule of Law, the chapter emphasizes that for both thinkers, this concept is 
one which is applicable to a variety of state systems. This is a critical observation for 
constitutionalism as it allows for constitutional concepts to be discussed without being 
conflated with the discourses of democratization and representation. Bingham’s 
definition of the Rule of Law to be “all persons and all authorities within the state, 
whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws 
publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered by the 
court,” dovetails nicely with Cicero’s advocacy of law being made so that it is “in 
right sense” and “in right reason in harmony with nature.” Although Cicero’s terms 
are highly contingent and normative, they are nonetheless flexible enough to work in 
virtually any society and stress the necessity of at least perceived legitimacy in order 
for law to be universally accepted and applied within a given state. 
 
Next the chapter looks at Frank Upham’s criticism of the “Rule of Law Orthodoxy” in 
developing states. In particular, his observation that a formalist interpretation of the 
rule of law can actually destroy existing power structures and destabilize states is used 
to show that in order to be truly constitutional, the rule of law must reflect, or at least 
show respect to, the organic rules of a society.  
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The chapter next assesses the applicability of Cicero’s rule of law in the context of 
security concerns. Here, in contrast to the ideal Platonic Philosopher King, Cicero 
argues that what states need most is a Wise Politician. Someone who is able to 
negotiate peace in order to minimize the harm of war is ultimately far more effective 
at maintaining domestic order and prosperity. Likewise, Cicero argues the persuasive 
politician reinforces the legitimacy of the ruling structure, and like a conductor adjusts 
the power of various elements of the society in order to create a harmonious social 
order, thereby solidifying the sovereignty of the state.  
 
C.1.C. Monte-skewed: The Constitution and National Character (or 
Caricature)  
 
Following on from the issues of legitimacy raised in the previous section, the next 
sub-chapter examines Montequieu’s view that any rule of law must be one which 
exists not only according to a codified legal letter, but also according to the “spirit” of 
the people it is meant to govern. As constitutionalist Donald Lutz argues, “The 
culture-power-justice nexus that characterizes modern constitutionalism was first 
dissected by Montesquieu, and an examination of his approach to constitutionalism 
provides a useful window into why we developed the political technology of 
constitutional democracy and why the future of this technology is not a foregone 
conclusion.” The discovery of this nexus relies upon Montesquieu’s innovative 
dissection of the political and cultural into separate spheres. This allows for 
conceptions of the good life and just state to evolve according to a particular local 
context rather than according to a presumed universal natural law.  
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Released from the dictates of universal reason and natural law, Montesquieu’s vision 
of the state is one which can assess constitutionalism not only according to 
institutional accounts, but also according to the telos of various states. Like Kelsen 
after him, he is aiming at a generally applicable social science which can 
accommodate a wide range of historical, geographical, and cultural particularities. He 
does this by outlining certain universal variables that can be used in cross-cultural 
comparison, which are then used to assess individual cases. In assessing the purpose 
of historical regimes, he thus notes that Rome existed for expansion, the Jewish state 
for religion, etc. The more determinist elements of his thought aside, this vision of 
constitutionalism is extremely useful for those wishing to look at core constitutional 
values from a comparative perspective as there are virtually no restrictions on the 
ultimate aims or mechanisms that are legitimately open to the state. 
 
Perhaps equally important in achieving a holistic account of constitutionalism, is 
Montesquieu’s recognition that the climate and culture of a given people has an 
impact on what they produce and on how they conceive of wealth and property.  
 
Montesquieu is not only an interesting thinker in his own right, but was hugely 
influential upon the American founding fathers, and thus upon all subsequent 
constitutional thought. Although his work contains elements that would now be 
considered essentialist and determinist, it provides a key insight into how social and 
cultural context influences the development of laws and their interpretation, or again, 
what Donald Lutz refers to as the “culture-power-justice nexus.”  
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C.1.D. One Body, Many Members: The Federalist Papers and the 
Specialization of Powers as a Mechanism of Restraint 
 
In sharp relief to Montesquieu’s concern that a society not be corrupted by law, is the 
recognition of later thinkers that society is almost never monolithic and nearly always 
contains majority and minority factions. In democracies then, it becomes an urgent 
matter for the government to ensure protection of minority rights whilst still 
respecting the will of the majority. This effort is usually given the neat doctrinal title 
of Separation of Powers. The issue of the separation of powers is not simply one of 
assigning specific roles to the discrete branches of government, but rather is one of 
assigning power in such a way that no societal group can hold a preponderance of 
power over the others.
587
 It is also meant to create specific proficiencies in the various 
departments so that they can specialize in the sphere assigned to them by the 
constitutional framework. 
 
Just as a physical body is threatened when one group of cells multiply beyond their 
proper bounds resulting in cancer, so too is a government threatened when one 
specialized branch grows beyond its proper bounds. The question, however, is one of 
determining where those proper bounds lie, where they overlap, and to what extent 
government functions can or should be shared. Important examples of such 
overlapping or shared powers include legislative confirmation of judicial 
appointments, negotiation of treaties by the Executive and confirmation of the same 
by the Senate, and the impeachment process. Most importantly of all however, is the 
power of executive veto. This is because the American founders saw the legislative 
                                                          
587
 In Federalist No. 47, p. 324, Madison states: “The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive 
and judiciary in the same hands…may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  
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branch as that which was most likely to encroach upon the power of the other 
branches since it was the branch primarily imbued with the power to make positive 
law, whereas the executive could merely enforce law and the judiciary could simply 
rule according to existing law and only on cases proactively brought to it by outside 
parties.  
 
The impulse to separate comes from within the departments: powered by the 
allegiance of individuals, each department pushes outward and expands to the limits 
of its power. Imagine that the departments were parts of a machine-as the Framers 
were wont to do- and that each part represented an expandable chamber sharing a wall 
with another part. In such a scheme, each chamber's internal expansion serves to limit 
the reach of the power of its coordinate branch. Interest fuels both this hydraulic 
pressure and its restraint by expanding the chamber to limits set by the expansion of 
neighbor chambers. In such a scheme, the interior structure of the departments has 
been "so contrived" that its "several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, 
be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. (Quoting Federalist 51)
588
 
 
Of all the constitutional concepts discussed thus far, the idea that government power 
should be structured into separate departments that could check one another’s power 
is arguably the latest to reach anything approaching its present form. The Federalist 
Papers reveal that the American constitutional experiment was by no means 
predetermined. The very public nature of the arguments surrounding the creation and 
adoption of the US constitution provide an informative and persuasive means of 
                                                          
588
 Nourse, Victoria. "Toward A "Due Foundation" For the Separation of Powers: The Federalist 
Papers as Political Narrative." Texas Law Review 74, no. 3 (1996): p. 481. 
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demonstrating the centrality of restricting state power to the modern constitutional 
enterprise.  
 
C.2. In the beginning? An analysis of the Constitution of Medina  
 
This bridging chapter examines the keystone document called the “Constitution of 
Medina.” Identifying an Islamic constitutional tradition can be controversial due to 
orthodox Muslim understandings of God’s sovereignty and agency. Further 
complicating such discussions are arguments surrounding the compatibility of Muslim 
traditions with international norms alternately referred to as ‘Western’ or ‘universal’, 
depending upon one’s political preferences. This examination of Muhammad’s 
‘Constitution of Medina’ argues that where there is assent and accountability, there is 
also agency. The very existence of Muhammad’s covenant along with the fact that 
this covenant details specific tribal duties with corresponding rights to societal goods 
and a vision of the rule of law, indicates that Muslim states can indeed codify and 
negotiate the challenges of governing, even within the framework of a transcendent 
law (sharīʿa).  
 
In the case of the Constitution of Medina, the power mainly lies in its constituent parts 
being (arguably) authored by Muhammad himself and his role as Prophet/exemplar 
for the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims. One can see that the symbiosis of religion and 
state power existed from the very origins of Islam, but that in its earliest form its 
definition of umma was fairly inclusive and pluralistic. A lack of restraint on the ruler 
can also be found in the Constitution, and it could be argued that its principles would 
do little to counteract the autocracy that bedevils governments in primarily Muslim 
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states to this day. However, this is potentially obviated by a recognition that the ruler 
is meaningfully restrained in a variety of ways by the sharīʿa. 
 
One will not find a ready-made system of government in the “Constitution of 
Medina,” but one does find well-established, time-tested principles that have achieved 
wide acceptance and legitimacy amongst Muslim societies, even if this particular text 
is not the acknowledged source of these norms.  
 
In light of the Qurʾanicic exegesis of Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, this constitutional vision can 
be argued to sit very comfortably within the dictates of Scripture and the received 
wisdom of the sunna of the Prophet. It therefore deserves further scrutiny if one 
wishes to establish religio-historical bases upon which to build a case for a native 
Muslim constitutional tradition. 
C.3. Al-Farabi’s Philosophical and Mawardi’s Juristic Views of the 
State 
 
The first thinker from the Muslim canon included in the thesis is al-Farabi. This 
chapter establishes crucial links to Greek political philosophy and also lays out 
Farabi’s conception of the ideal state in the person of the Imam. It illustrates a 
philosophy that is well-developed and which is heavily influenced by its Islamic 
context, but which will nonetheless be quite familiar to those who study neo-Platonic 
and Aristotelian ideas. Its focus on the ideal ruler also provides a nice contrast with 
Cicero’s ideal regime. 
 
Acknowledging his relative lack of appearances in Islamic literature on the state and 
governance, the chapter argues that the inclusion of al-Farabi in this wider argument 
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is justified both by the impact his work had on European scholars from the Middle 
Ages onward, and because even in the context of Islamic constitutionalism he is a 
figure whose work was studied by religious scholars and philosophers, even if only 
for the purposes of refutation. Additionally, this book is not making a historical 
argument about the relevance of al-Farabi, but rather a practical argument. His work 
is an original take on classical philosophical questions about the state; it is 
unapologetically Islamic and largely (though certainly not entirely) in line with 
orthodox Muslim belief; and it deserves to be given close examination for its potential 
to transcend the divides between Western and Muslim philosophy.  
 
Following a brief biographical sketch which notes his training under a Christian 
Aristotelian and later career as an independent thinker who largely shunned belonging 
to any particular scholarly or political circles, the chapter examines his book On the 
Perfect State. Noting that his Aristotelianism was also highly colored by Platonic and 
neo-Platonic thought, it first addresses his personification of the law in the person of 
the Imam. This ruler is the genesis of the state and its administrator. In al-Farabi’s 
schema, he is also likely to be a prophet who brings a simplified version of truth to the 
masses through revelation. Farabi is fairly open as to what this revelation may be in 
any given place and time, which means that his work lends itself easily to pluralist 
interpretations. The establishment of order in the state also stems from the Imam and 
it is his job to ensure that society is rightly ordered and that each member of the polity 
is performing according to the role assigned him or her.  
 
Farabi encounters difficulties in his work that are also in keeping with the Greek 
heritage of his thought. For instance, any polity, no matter how well-ordered and 
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established by its first Imam, runs the risk of decay and disorder should subsequent 
rulers be less able or righteous. His intriguing solution to this problem, for the 
purposes of constitutionalism, is to point out that the qualities necessary for right rule 
may not all be present in one man at the same time, but that does not preclude the 
possibility that they may not all be present singly in multiple people who could rule 
together. This opens the door to rule which requires not just multiple rulers but also 
consultation. In present day states, this rule through consultation and shared amongst 
multiple people typically takes the form of elective accountable democracy. Though 
al-Farabi does not advocate democracy as such, this work certainly supports 
accountable rule based on the greatest good. The rule of law presented here is one 
which is all-encompassing, eternal, transcendent, and which absolutely requires 
virtuous rule.  
 
In counterpoint, but not contradiction, to the views of the state presented by al-Farabi, 
al-Mawardi’s vision of the state is one in which the sovereignty of God and the fact of 
power work together to create a de facto legitimacy that can be rightly claimed by 
virtually any Muslim ruler.  
 
C.4. Ibn-Khaldun’s Double-Edged Sword: The Creative and 
Destructive Genius of Asabiyya (Group Feeling) 
 
Known to many as the “father of sociology,” Ibn Khaldun’s examination of the rise 
and fall of societies has been highly influential in Muslim discourse and is 
increasingly discussed in Western accounts of political formation and sustainability. 
This chapter takes his concept of group feeling (asabiyya) and examines its 
P a g e  | 278 
 
implications for state legitimacy and the tension in layers of identity and nationality 
that can threaten social and state stability.  
 
Often compared to Montesquieu, Ibn Khaldun is similarly obsessed with the effects of 
climate and social settings upon people. He is also similarly determinist in much of 
his social discussions. This chapter concentrates on the Muqaddimah, or Introduction, 
to his larger history of the world and specifically upon the role of feeling part of a 
group. The stronger this feeling, or asabiyya, is, the more powerful will that group be. 
Citing its definitive impact in battles in which the early Muslims were outnumbered 
four-fold, he argues that it is this one attribute which fuels courage and sacrifice for 
the greater social good. The Bedouin tribes, due in large part to their blood 
relationships to one another, show the highest degree of this trait, which allowed them 
to conquer vast territories and to subsequently rule over far more “civilized” peoples.  
 
Lest one think that this quality is merely present in social groups, the chapter next 
discusses Ibn Khaldun’s observation that these tribal groups are themselves held in 
awe and stability by the strong rule of a sheik. Interestingly, and in line with his faith, 
the quality necessary for this rule is not based on descent, but rather upon a particular 
type of asabiyya, which he calls mulk or “royal authority.” This authority derives 
from the fact that this person has more asabiyya than anyone else in the group. The 
other members of the group sense this superior asabiyya and thus yield willingly to 
the rule of this person. Thus rule is derived from an odd marriage of despotism and 
consent.  
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Unfortunately, the asabiyya that raises a group and a person to power is degraded by 
the need to become civilized in order to maintain that same power. Ibn Khaldun 
predicts a firm lifespan of four generations for a regime before it becomes too soft and 
forgets that its legitimacy is based not upon descent or divine right, but upon 
asabiyya. It is only a matter of time before a less civilized, but more united, group is 
able to conquer based upon superior asabiyya. 
 
The chapter concludes by drawing constitutional principles from this account. Despite 
the determinism and the admittedly dangerous qualities of asabiyya, Ibn Khaldun 
does offer a way out of the cycle of decay that he observes in the historical record. 
Admitting that Muhammad himself censured asabiyya and admonished all Muslims to 
avoid divisions, he argues that what Muhammad actually means to happen is for 
asabiyya to be taken out of its destructive history and placed into a constructive use 
for the Muslim community. Therefore, he says, as long as a ruler uses asabiyya with 
good intent it will actually enable the Muslim community to fulfill God’s expectations 
of it. Additionally, his derivation of authority from popular legitimacy and 
identification with the social group rather than descent, lends itself nicely to 
constitutionalist interpretations which argue that state legitimacy rests upon a people 
who identify in some fundamental way with their regime. 
 
C.5. Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms and the rise of the Young Turks 
 
Turkey has long been at the heart of developments in Islamic conceptions of the state. 
In the 19
th
 century, as the Ottoman Empire declined and saw its sovereignty 
threatened by capitulation treaties with European powers, it attempted to harness a 
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new sense of nationalism (perhaps even a renewed asabiyya) by reforming its 
definition of citizenship, codifying equal rights for its citizens irrespective of religion, 
and creating a state based upon a federal system that allowed for a high degree of 
minority autonomy. Two of these reform decrees, referred to collectively as the 
Tanzimat, are examined for the way in which they attempted to define state imperial 
power, hence restricting it by the very act of definition, and to regulate the 
relationship between the state and its citizens. 
 
The first of these decrees, the Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane, written in 1839, set about 
reforming the Ottoman state in four crucial areas. Firstly, it established security of 
one’s person and private property for all of its subjects. Secondly, it created and 
defined the purposes of various state institutions that would collect taxes in a 
regulated and fair manner to ensure a reliable revenue stream. Next, it regulated 
military service to limited terms and in consideration of the numbers of soldiers 
individual localities could realistically be expected to contribute. Finally, it 
established the principle that criminal trials and sentencing should be held publicly 
and that punishing crime could only occur after due process. All of these reforms are 
interconnected and serve to create a sense of citizens’ rights and duties to the state, as 
well as expectations that the people could legitimately have of their state. By 
specifying government powers and also their limits, this document serves as a vital 
restraint on the heretofore absolute despotism employed by the Sultan.  
 
After analyzing the wording of each of these reforms and their wider implications in 
creating citizens (rather than subjects) and in forming a sense of Ottoman identity, the 
chapter moves on to discussing a later set of reforms meant to build upon those of the 
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1839 decree. This next decree, the Hatt-ı Hümayun of Gülhane, promulgated in 1856 
built upon these reforms and took the creation of citizens with equal status before the 
law to unprecedented levels. Abolishing tax farming entirely, it went further in also 
abolishing the jizya or poll tax that had traditionally been levied against all non-
Muslims in the Empire. This practice dates back to Muhammad itself, meaning that a 
break with this tradition symbolized a new sense of identity emerging which was still 
unapologetically Islamic, but which saw this as an ethic upon which the state was 
based rather than as a hierarchical religious system that mandated inequality. This 
reform is complemented by opening the military and the civil service to non-Muslims 
and basing promotion in them upon merit. Perhaps less inspiring, but not at all less 
important, is the reform of the budgetary practice of the state that required the 
government to publish its annual tax receipts and expenditures. This is a clear 
corruption fighting measure which empowers the people through knowledge. 
Additionally, all the peoples of the Empire were to be represented on the Sultan’s 
council and in courts that were tailored to the needs of their local community, much as 
Orthodox Jews and Muslims enjoy separate private court systems in many Western 
states within a larger state justice framework.  
 
The chapter concludes by noting that despite the promising rhetoric, these reforms 
largely failed to rectify the widespread corruption and inequality in Ottoman society. 
They also failed to mollify Western powers which were increasingly encroaching on 
Ottoman sovereignty and demanding favorable trade and criminal capitulation treaties 
for their citizens. Despite these shortcomings, it is clear that the Tanzimat inspired not 
only the Young Ottomans and Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (the subject of the following 
chapter), but also the future founders of the present Turkish state. 
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C.6. The Fusing of Political Tradition in Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi’s The 
Surest Path 
 
The first Muslim state to have a written constitution was Tunisia. In the 1860s its king 
approved this official document which was largely written and then enacted by Khayr 
al-Din al-Tunisi, who served a variety of roles in the Tunisian government, including 
Prime Minister. Khayr al-Din’s efforts to gain popular legitimacy for 
constitutionalism and reforms designed to help Tunisia fend off Western 
encroachments took the form of a book called The Surest Path to Knowledge 
Concerning the Conditions of Countries. This chapter seeks to develop a contextual 
understanding of the political and social world that Khayr al-Din inhabited this book. 
Written in 1867, it is the product of a very unique set of circumstances and cannot be 
properly appreciated without a basic acquaintance with those circumstances.  
 
In keeping with the constitutional concerns of the thesis, particular attention is given 
to the Rule of Law in 19
th
 century Tunisia, in addition to its complicated and 
competing national character(s) and the limits facing various political actors in 
Tunisia at this time. Following this discussion, a brief biographical sketch of Khayr 
al-Din examines the influences and pressures that factored into his conception and 
execution of his written work. Finally, a detailed analysis of The Surest Path teases 
out the distinctive elements of Khayr al-Din’s political thought and seeks to place 
them within the larger contexts of both Western and Islamic constitutionalism more 
generally.  
 
P a g e  | 283 
 
The introduction to this work, which is probed in depth, lays out his political 
philosophy and his thoroughly Islamic justifications for his slate of reforms. 
Attempting to maintain Tunisian autonomy as a part of the Ottoman Empire while 
simultaneously fending off European encroachment, his overarching task is to 
persuade Tunisian officials and clerics that reform is not optional, it is essential. He 
also maintains that this reform or Tanzimat can occur in a way that is thoroughly 
supported in the Qurʾan and sunna, and also by Muslim history. Next, his 
reformulation of various Islamic terms will be assessed for their meaning in the 
context of constitutional governance. These include a dramatic expansion of the idea 
of shura, or consultation, which can be interpreted largely along liberal democratic 
lines, and also his attempt to reconcile the need to adhere to a timeless sharīʿa while 
still allowing for the state to keep pace with new political and economic developments 
in the wider world. Also distinctive is his view that state legitimacy rests not merely 
on the principles of consultation and virtue, but also upon acceptance by the clerics 
(‘ulama).  
 
Ultimately, his rule of law is situated firmly in both the Western and Islamic orbits. It 
advocates limited, accountable government, recourse to the courts, and uses the 
language of rights and duties found throughout Western constitutional discourse. This 
does not detract from its simultaneous anchoring in Islamic values as enshrined in the 
sharīʿa, which provide authentic and ardent motivation for Muslims to this day. His 
views on nationhood are unapologetically Muslim. Christendom never fully embodied 
itself as a political reality and instead remained a unity of faith and ideas, whereas the 
Islamic experience found success in the marriage of this same type of faith with 
political power. It is a restoration of this power that Khayr al-Din most desires, and to 
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his mind, progress in the guise of economic and political development is the “surest 
path” to achieving this goal. 
 
C.7. Bringing the Strands Together- Assessing constitutionalism in 
Islamic contexts 
 
 
Constantly changing and in the throes of novelty, such a dynamic universe may never be 
completely transparent or fully grasped by traditional conceptual categories.
589
 
 
 
Bringing this conversation full circle, this quote from Dallymayr’s Integral 
Pluralism could easily be applied to the ever-evolving concepts of 
constitutionalism. Its preoccupation with society and its organization into 
political units means that the avenues for its expression are potentially as 
numerous as the human race. What is clear is that there is perhaps less 
separating the fundamental assumptions of Western and Islamic constitutional 
narratives than is usually suggested.  Contrary to the assertions of Elie Kedourie 
or Steven Emerson, the application of Islam in the political process is not bound 
to any particular fate. Rather, as Mark Tessler contends, “The influence of the 
religion thus depends to a very considerable extent on how and by whom it is 
interpreted. There is no single or accepted interpretation on many issues, nor 
even a consensus on who speaks for Islam.”590 
 
Just as there is no consensus on who speaks for Islam, the consensus on who 
speaks for the West is one which should be open to challenge. Cicero, 
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Montesquieu, and the writers of The Federalist Papers are by no means 
strangers to the Western constitutional canon. However, by teasing out the 
thread of one particular constitutional concern in each of their works, they can 
be assessed as thinkers in a global tradition of theorizing about society and 
government, rather than just as Western thinkers.  
 
A great deal of Cicero’s thought, perhaps because of his training in Greek 
philosophy, finds almost eerie echoes in the cosmological portrayal of how the 
rule of law operates in the state in the work of al-Farabi. Montesquieu’s 
approach to looking at the native cultural elements that vivify the “spirit of the 
laws” of a particular people is one which in many ways unknowingly emulates 
the method of Ibn Khaldun. The idea that the state is an institutional emanation 
that is legitimated by the extent to which it mirrors its citizens is one which is a 
persistent force in political deliberations about the proper place of intervention 
in the international sphere. Within the domestic sphere, Publius demonstrated 
that the early American republic was not as enamored of democracy as might be 
widely believed. Rather, there was a genuine concern to protect against the 
potential dangers of democratic rule by incorporating elements of oligarchy and 
executive rule in a mixed constitutional arrangement. By including thinkers 
from various European/North American epochs and cultures and examining 
their work in a conceptual fashion, the thesis sought to isolate the definition of 
constitutionalism from that of democratization with which is it often conflated. 
This is crucial because liberal democracy, though it may very well prove to be a 
universal aspiration, is an institutional arrangement with a particular cultural 
historical basis that is firmly located in the West and the Enlightenment. The 
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desire to be ruled by a set of consistent laws in keeping with one’s culture and 
in a way that carves distinct spheres of rights and responsibilities for the rulers 
and ruled, on the other hand, is indeed something that is universally present in a 
plethora of forms that conform to the exigencies of a given time and place.  
 
Giving due consideration to the time and place at which the Western and 
Islamic frames of constitutionalism were established is therefore a crucial part 
of directly comparing their concepts. Without understanding the contingency of 
these ideas, it is impossible to isolate and compare them in a meaningful way. In 
this way, ideas can be liberated from one context to be negotiated and translated 
by people for use in another context entirely. This endeavor to redefine 
boundaries and negotiate a balance between tradition and endless change is one 
that is also universally experienced by people seeking to both anchor and steer 
the ship of state in a way that successfully navigates this contentious path. 
 
What John Esposito refers to as “The Straight Path,” is the metaphorical 
preoccupation of Muslim scripture and practice. If “one-fifth of the world’s 
population testifies to the dynamism of Islam and the continued commitment of 
Muslims to follow ‘the straight path, the way of God, to whom belongs all that 
is in the heavens and all that is on earth,’” then it is only logical that Islamic 
thinkers should be consulted on alternative iterations of constitutional norms.
591
 
The legacy of the falsafa is intriguing not only for its role in the Islamic world 
in preserving ancient knowledge and methods of learning, but also for its 
enormous impact on European thought from the Medieval era onwards. As 
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discussed earlier, Al-Farabi ironically had less impact on his fellow Muslims 
than upon one Thomas Aquinas and the Western thinkers who later drew upon 
Aquinas’ writings, but his work has nonetheless been shown to be 
representative of a certain philosophically based strain of Islam and represents a 
well from which native Islamic conceptions of justice and the rule of law can be 
drawn. That this well happens to spring from Aristotelian and neo-Platonic 
thought is also serendipitous to those who seek to compare Western and Islamic 
political philosophy. This Greek root gives the two traditions a great deal of 
shared vocabulary, and perhaps more importantly, a shared set of essential 
questions. 
 
The pioneering nature of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah and the array of uses for 
his asabiyya can also not be overstated. This work is one of the few to come out 
of the Muslim world that may very well be included in the future canon of 
political thought studied in the West. Whether in his role as the “father of 
sociology,” or as chronicler of Muslim society and culture, or as philosopher of 
history, there is widespread agreement that Ibn Khaldun deserves to be widely 
and carefully studied. For constitutional purposes, his use of asabiyya as the 
defining quality of vibrant society is incredibly interesting. This is due in no 
small part to the destructive bellicose role asabiyya can play in society, in 
addition to its more positivistic role in creating a sense of identity and loyalty 
that can form a type of proto-nationalism.  
 
The national identities in Muslim states that contended with more traditional 
views of the primacy of the umma can largely trace their start to the royal 
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decrees that mark the Tanzimat era of the Ottoman Empire. Although these 
edicts were initiated in a top-down fashion and were somewhat derivative in 
their liberal nature, they still represented a seismic shift in the way the Islamic 
world approached the question of government. That the subjects of the sultan 
would be guaranteed certain basic rights, including the promise of equality 
regardless of one’s religion was a radical departure from Muslim orthodoxy 
concerning non-believers and the origin of the duty to obey. Importantly, these 
reforms also had a practical impact in establishing an expectation of rule by and 
under the law, a law that applied even to the sultan. That the reforms did not 
fulfill all of their stated aims does not diminish the fact that they formed the 
basis of later reformist constitutional movements that eventually displaced the 
Ottoman system, and with it the caliphate, constituting the basis of secularized 
Muslim states like Turkey. 
 
Finally, the experience of 19
th
 century Tunisia as it sought to fend off Western 
imperial overtures along with Ottoman imperial demands while simultaneously 
carving a sphere of autonomy and national self-determination is one which is 
both enlightening and sobering. Reforming rulers like Ahmad Bey recognized 
the threat and the opportunity posed by Western industrialization, globalization, 
and political stability. In seeking to emulate Western success while remaining 
thoroughly Muslim and Tunisian, Khayr al-Din’s work in government and his 
book The Surest Path are testaments to the new avenues created by an open and 
honest examination of another culture’s ideas. He had the foresight to see that 
the only way to escape European domination was to beat France and Britain at 
their own game. If he could modernize and play international political actors 
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against each other well enough while avoiding ruinous deficit spending, it may 
just have been possible to avoid the humiliation of colonial rule. Sadly, 
domestic and foreign pressures aligned to make this task impossible, but the 
written record of his attempt provides an inspiring example of how ideas can be 
subverted and translated to create new iterations of them that more closely align 
with local customs and goals. His Islamic constitutional system was not terribly 
liberal, but it sought to be truly representative of Tunisia’s historical and 
religious heritage.  
 
Comparative constitutional dialogue, undertaken in the pluralist fashion advocated by 
Dallmayr and Euben, increases the possibility that as non-Western powers move 
toward the rule of law that they will find a way to generate their own canons and 
justifications for arriving at some of the same “universal” norms hitherto dictated to 
the rest of the world by the West. It also offers the benefit of diversifying and 
enriching the canon of political theory in the West, potentially informing new 
solutions to some of the more intractable problems of the age. Abdullah An-Na‘im’s 
earlier quote bears repeating here. “Each society is constructing its own constitutional 
development on its own terms, and that includes its own retrieval and adaptation 
projects, as well as internally generated responses to current challenges and 
concerns.”592 Let us hope that these developments illuminate new ways of 
understanding and accepting difference while advancing the universal goals of human 
well-being. 
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